The gloves are off: That might seem to be the undertone of surprisingly tough talk from New Zealand’s foreign and trade ministers.
Foreign Minister Winston Peters may be facing legal action after making allegations about former Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr on Radio New Zealand.
Carr had made highly critical comments about Pillar II of the AUKUS pact, which New Zealand is contemplating joining, at a conference held by New Zealand’s Labor Party opposition in Wellington in mid-April.
Meanwhile, Trade Minister Todd McClay has engaged in some plain speaking of his own. In a press release on Thursday, McClay called Canada’s refusal to comply with a ruling in New Zealand’s favor on “tariff rate quotas” by the disputes settlement body of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) “cynical” and “disappointing.”
The minister said he was seeking legal advice, as New Zealand had “no intention of backing down.”
Canada has been allocating a large share of its preferential duty quotas for dairy products to its own domestic processors. This has heavily limited the ability of lower-cost exporters such as New Zealand to enter the Canadian market.
To outsiders, it might seem surprising that Australia and Canada are on the receiving end of fiery remarks made by the New Zealand ministers. All three countries are members of the Five Eyes – and Australia is New Zealand’s only formal ally. And New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon sought out his counterparts from both Australia and Canada in December and February to issue joint statements on Gaza.
However, the exceptions probably prove the rule.
Bob Carr is from the same Labor Party as Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. However, no love appears to be lost between Carr and the current Australian Labor Party leadership when it comes to foreign policy issues. In 2021, Albanese was heavily critical of an internal party motion supported by Carr, which called for a boycott of Israel.
In trade, the picture is more complex. It is true that New Zealand, where there is largely a bipartisan consensus on the merits of free trade, has a long track record of speaking up for itself when it feels hard done by – even against close partners.
Most famously, this included successfully taking a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute in 2007 against Australia over the country’s long-standing de facto ban on importing New Zealand apples. The WTO case is now largely forgotten. When it is remembered, it is usually as a technocratic measure that did not affect wider bilateral relations.
Indeed, New Zealand’s other previous WTO cases have mostly been against other Western countries with which it has generally had improving relations – including Canada, the European Communities, and the United States.
Over the years, New Zealand governments have openly expressed frustrations and trumpeted successes on the trade front. However, as trade issues increasingly become entangled with wider geopolitical concerns – witness the rise of “friendshoring” in arrangements such as the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) – this general approach may be changing.
For example, New Zealand largely kept quiet after the WTO ruled in 2022 that U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs introduced under the Trump administration contravened the rules of the global trade body. When pressed in a media interview, then-Trade Minister Damien O’Connor would only say “it is an anomaly in what is otherwise a very positive and valuable relationship.”
New Zealand is a third party to WTO disputes against the metals tariffs lodged by other countries. Moreover, the case was an important point of principle: The United States refused to comply with the ruling, citing a national security exception in the dispute settlement process. The issue also helps to explain why the United States continues to block the appointment of judges to the WTO’s Appellate Body.
No real progress was made on the dispute settlement issue at the WTO’s Ministerial Conference in Abu Dhabi in February, at which Todd McClay served as deputy chair. But McClay avoided mentioning the failure in his press release after the event, instead focusing on successes such as an extension to a moratorium on digital duties (for which McClay had led negotiations) and a string of bilateral meetings.
In other foreign policy areas, too, Wellington is being careful about how and when it raises its voice.
At times, New Zealand has openly expressed frustration with Israel over its actions in Gaza. For example, Peters, the foreign minister, used social media to condemn the Israeli strike that killed seven aid workers for the World Central Kitchen charity on April 1. And Luxon soon followed this up by calling the strike “utterly unacceptable.”
On the other hand, both Peters and Luxon were less outspoken about the Israeli strike on Iran’s embassy in Damascus the same day. The incident was particularly significant because diplomatic missions are normally deemed to be sacrosanct under the 1961 Vienna Convention.
When pressed in a radio interview on April 16, Peters said: “Of course we condemn that action now, because it’s actually illegal, but the other point is that there were countless actions from the other side well before that and on an ongoing basis. But shouting out who’s wrong here will not help.”
The Damascus precedent became even more pertinent after Ecuadorian authorities raided Mexico’s embassy in Quito on April 5 – an action that did bring condemnation and a warning from New Zealand for “states to uphold their obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.”
New Zealand condemns any unlawful forced entry by Ecuadorean authorities into the Mexican Embassy in Quito. We expect states to uphold their obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
— New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade (@MFATNZ) April 8, 2024
Another example of careful wording could be found in Peters’ speech to the United Nations, in which Peters decried the use of the veto in the Security Council – but carefully avoided naming and shaming the countries responsible.
Doing so might have been uncomfortable, given that the United States has used its veto power three times since the war in Gaza began in October. Peters is currently trying to align New Zealand more closely with the United States on other foreign policy issues and met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken shortly after making his speech in New York.
This also sheds light on why New Zealand appears to have kept quiet about the U.S. view that the U.N. Security Council resolution adopted in March that calls for a ceasefire in Gaza is “non-binding.”
Still, among the gloom, there is always a silver lining.
For example, even the overall challenging WTO summit in February provided opportunities for valuable facetime. For trade minister McClay, these included meetings with Saudi Arabia and the host United Arab Emirates (UAE), two countries with which New Zealand is currently seeking to do more.
Great to meet again with my trade counterpart Saudi Arabia Minister of Commerce HE Majid Al Qasabi @malkassabi while in Riyadh yesterday. We had a productive & constructive discussion about ways to grow trade between our countries, especially in tourism and services 🇸🇦🇳🇿 pic.twitter.com/oEvMTjX4EY
— Todd McClay (@toddmcclaymp) May 1, 2024
Last week, McClay travelled to Dubai to continue talks on a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the UAE. He also went to Riyadh, the Saudi capital, in an attempt to make headway on stalled free trade negotiations with the wider six-member Gulf Cooperation Council and to build ties with Saudi Arabia itself.
New Zealand is still very much capable of finding its voice – when it wants to. But increasingly, Wellington is choosing to be more careful with its words.
This article was originally published by the Democracy Project, which aims to enhance New Zealand’s democracy and public life by promoting critical thinking, analysis, debate, and engagement in politics and society.