The future of U.S. power is at crossroads. The two major political parties in the United States accuse each other of being threats to democracy, a presidential candidate survived a nearly successful assassination attempt and the incumbent president, Joe Biden, under mounting pressure from his own party has withdrawn his bid for re-election. In the scenario of former President Donald Trump winning a second term, U.S. citizens will have a convicted felon as their 47th president.
Geopolitically, the U.S. faces one of its most formidable challenges in the new Cold War. Out of the Afghanistan quagmire after two decades, the U.S. foreign policy and national security bureaucracies face an array of challenges: From leading the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in a faceoff with Russia over its aggression in Ukraine, to the Israel-Hamas War in the Middle East, and the ratcheting up of tension in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. diplomatic and military machinery have their hands full.
China’s national power remains comprehensive, posing long-term challenges to U.S. global pre-eminence across the spectrum. While Russia’s military aggression clearly upends the European security order, its emerging alliance with China is potent enough for a wake-up call in U.S. strategic planning and execution. Therefore, as the world watches the twists and turns of the U.S. election cycle and waits for the verdict on November 5, it is imperative to take a long view of the dynamic power balance in the new Cold War.
Currently, Russia produces three times more artillery shells than the U.S. and Europe. Furthermore, the target set by the U.S. military to manufacture 100,000 rounds of artillery a month by the end of 2025 is less than the Russian monthly output. Washington has begun to withdraw from a key drone base in Niger, a major center for U.S. aerial intelligence and counterterrorism operations in West Africa, after the country’s government was overthrown in a military coup in 2023. And in April, Chad requested U.S. special operations advisers to exit the country.
Meanwhile, Russian forces have started moving into the region from Libya and the Central African Republic. Moscow signed a defense agreement with Niger and sent advisers to the country earlier this year.
U.S. Africa Command Commander General Michael Langley stated that some African countries were “on the verge of being overrun by Russia” in regards to military bases and reach.
Meanwhile, in the Arctic, increased U.S. involvement is restricted by a shortage of ships equipped to handle icy conditions. In contrast, Moscow has consistently invested in ice-hardened vessels capable of navigating through waters filled with small frozen debris. Russia’s and China’s force posturing complicates matters in a region that remains crucial in the United States’ ballistic missile defense system and intelligence gathering, as well as an essential shipping route. In 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin unveiled a new naval strategy that emphasized the Arctic as a top priority region and outlined a role for Russia’s “partner nations.”
Notably, the U.S. Navy currently maintains 292 ships while the Chinese naval fleet operates 370 vessels, which is projected to expand to 435 warships by 2030. A single Chinese shipyard, Jiangnan, apparently has more capacity than all U.S. shipyards combined. Beijing has similarly prioritized its investment in high-end weapons systems and equipment “five to six times faster” than the United States. China is quickly increasing its nuclear arsenal, which is expected to boast 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 from approximately 200 in 2019. China likewise retains the world’s “leading hypersonic weapons arsenal.”
On December 21, 2023, China announced a ban on the extraction and separation technologies of rare earth metals. China currently produces 60 percent of rare earth metals and processes around 90 percent of them, used in multiple technologies including defense, computers, televisions, and clean energy technologies. The United States is “particularly exposed to processing restrictions for heavy rare earths, given China separates 99.9 percent of them.”
In terms of purchasing power parity, China’s economy surpassed the U.S. economy in 2014. Meanwhile, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects the Russian economy to grow by 3.2 percent in 2024 – more than all advanced economies, including the U.S. – driven by oil exports and high government spending. Concurrently, Russia has faced more sanctions than Iran, Venezuela, Myanmar, and Cuba combined, but it has managed to circumvent these sanctions by collaborating with Central Asian republics like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan that not only maintain a customs union with Russia but also share an extensive border.
State-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) has been working with the China National Space Administration (CNSA) to plan 70 launches in 2024, which would place more than 290 satellites, cargo vessels and crewed spacecraft into orbit. Meanwhile, the Chinese private sector has another 30 launches planned. The launch sites encompass a sea-based spaceport off Haiyang’s coast and a commercial spaceport on Hainan Island. Additionally, the CASC expects to see Chang’e 7’s orbiter, lander, and rover land on the moon’s south pole in 2026. Following this, Chang’e 8 is planned for 2028.
A former administrator of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) stated, “there’s no question that the technology they have is verging very close to being competitive with us.” On the other hand, NASA has decided to cancel its Volatiles Investigating Polar Exploration Rover (VIPER) program, amid budgetary concerns, after having invested approximately $450 million in building the rover, which would have explored lunar ice.
China has also been actively increasing its diplomatic reach and has more embassies and consulates in Africa, East Asia, the Pacific, and Central Asia than the United States. Despite rising criticism for its unilateral ventures and opaque commercial outcomes, China’s infamous yet gargantuan projects under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) so far face no viable competition. Moreover, China’s influence projection through groupings like BRICS (expanded and on the verge of growing membership), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), its Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global Security Initiative (GSI) and through multilateral banking systems like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), are unmistakable signs of Beijing’s ambition to reshape the world order.
No doubt, the U.S. faces significant challenges in this two-front Cold War. The United States faces a crisis of leadership at home and grapples with a perception problem after its hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan and the mounting doubts on its role as a global security guarantor. As such, the U.S. cannot apply the same handbook it did against the Soviet Union and take winning this new Cold War for granted.
Moreover, this shifting power balance is a crucial barometer for other major stakeholders of the global security environment, such as India. How New Delhi maneuvers this uncertain balance of military, economic, and diplomatic power will be crucial as India moves into a growing strategic embrace with the U.S., sees its relationship with China become more competitive and adversarial, and navigates its circumscribed ties with Russia to prevent the anti-West China-Russia alliance from turning anti-India.