On July 15, K.P. Sharma Oli was sworn in as prime minister of Nepal for the fourth time. Frequent changes in leadership are not unusual for Nepal, which has seen 14 governments in 16 years. However, this change assumes added significance as the new government reportedly plans to modify Nepal’s electoral processes through constitutional amendments – a move that will have ramifications for Nepal’s political structure, stability, and representation.
The Oli-led Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) has come into power in alliance with Sher Bahadur Deuba’s Nepali Congress (NC). With 78 and 88 members, respectively, the CPN-UML and NC together command 60 percent of Nepal’s 275-member lower house.
The CPN-UML was previously in coalition with Pushpa Kamal Dahal (also known as Prachanda) and his Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Center (CPN-MC). Following the CPN-UML’s decision to break away from this coalition, Dahal failed to secure a vote of confidence in the lower house on July 12.
Oli, five-time prime minister Deuba, and three-time prime minister Dahal are key players in Nepal’s political landscape. They lead Nepal’s three main parties, which often reshuffle coalitions with support from fringe parties.
Media reports indicate that the new Oli-Deuba alliance plans to change Nepal’s mixed electoral system.
The current system is a combination of the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, under which representatives are elected directly, and the proportional representation (PR) system, under which electorates vote for parties and parties choose their representatives. Sixty percent of Nepal’s lower house members are elected through the FPTP system while 40 percent are elected through the PR system. Nepal’s 59-member upper house is composed of 56 similarly elected leaders and three members appointed by the president.
Per the Oli-Deuba alliance’s plans, lower house members will be elected solely through the FPTP system while upper house members will be elected solely through the PR system.
Political observers’ readings of the alliance’s plans vary, with some contending that it will pave the way for political stability and others arguing it will undo mechanisms instituted for political inclusivity.
Those in favor of the alliance’s plans highlight that in a mixed electoral system, it is difficult for parties to get an absolute majority, making a hung parliament “characteristic” of Nepal’s lower house. They note that under the current system, “factions, splits, and divisions are regular occurrences within political parties,” creating room for the “game of toppling and forming [coalition] governments.”
Nepal’s contemporary political history is a testament to these arguments. Between Dahal’s election in December 2022 and now, the CPN-MC switched alliance partners three times – from the CPN-UML to the NC and back to the CPN-UML again. These alliances lasted for two months, 12 months, and four months, respectively. When the most recent alliance between the CPN-MC and CPN-UML was threatened by the withdrawal of support from the Janata Samajbadi Party Nepal, Oli and Dahal reportedly orchestrated the formation of a breakaway party to remain in power.
Such instances of alliance-hopping, party formation, and party fracture are often used by Nepali politicians to retain power – a key reason for growing calls to change Nepal’s electoral system altogether.
On the other hand, the existing electoral system is designed to ensure representation – a fundamental tenet of Nepal’s constitution. Quotas have been put in place to ensure that Nepali politics – which have “been dominated by the upper Hindu castes from the northern hill region for centuries” – is more inclusive of marginalized communities including women, Dalits, Madhesis, and Tharus, among others.
Political stakeholders contend that changing this electoral system comes at the cost of representation. Dahal accused the Oli-Deuba alliance of “conspiring against marginalized and underprivileged communities.”
But opponents point to the “deliberate and gross misuse” of mechanisms instituted for political inclusivity. Indeed, quotas for backward communities are often filled by politicians’ family members and friends. Moreover, quotas aren’t always met. As of 2022, approximately half of Nepal’s 126 enlisted ethnic groups had not been represented in the lower house at all.
Dr. Bipin Adhikari, professor of law at Kathmandu University, said that changing Nepal’s electoral processes does not need to come at the cost of inclusivity.
He argued that electing the lower house solely through the FPTP system and the upper house solely through the PR system could be a positive development, if these changes are made with provisions to “further consolidate and strengthen” marginalized communities’ representation.
He also noted the need to address the existing power differential between the lower and upper houses. Under Nepal’s constitution, the two houses “perform similar tasks.” In fact, some political observers contend that the upper house, which does not have “exclusive law-making rights,” is struggling to establish a separate identity and has become a “shadow” of the lower house.
While calls for both retaining and modifying Nepal’s electoral system have merit, its fate ultimately lies in the Oli-Deuba alliance’s capability to steer constitutional change.
Adhikari explained that making constitutional changes requires support from both provincial and federal assemblies. At the provincial level, the alliance needs support from 50 percent of parliamentary members, while at the federal level, two-thirds of both the lower and upper houses need to approve any amendments.
The “domino effect” of federal politics on provincial affairs (the CPN-UML and NC are already set to lead three provincial governments each) and the Oli-Deuba alliance’s dominance in the lower house paint a positive picture for the proposed constitutional changes. But with 17 seats in the upper house, the Dahal-led CPN-MC remains a decisive force and a potential hurdle.
Additionally, political observers question Oli’s partnership with Deuba, deeming the alliance between the CPN-UML and NC “unnatural.” The parties, which have “opposing ideologies and agendas,” have only formed coalition governments three times since 1990.
Oli’s historical reluctance to share the prime ministership is a potential thorn in the new alliance. Indeed, after winning general elections together through a unified party in 2017, Oli and Dahal had settled on an arrangement to split the prime ministership for their five-year tenure. Oli’s refusal to pass on the role resulted in the lower house’s dissolution twice, as well as split their merged parties back into two separate entities – the Oli-led CPN-UML and the Dahal-led CPN-MC.
This raises the question: Will Oli pass on the role of prime minister to Deuba after 18 months, as agreed?
The new Oli-Deuba alliance could very well be another coalition reshuffle of “no real concern of significance.” On the off chance it isn’t, it could have significant implications for Nepal’s electoral processes.
The implications of the Oli-Deuba alliance, of course, go beyond just electoral processes. A sluggish economy, the continued exodus of Nepali youth, balancing Indian and Chinese interests in Nepal, citizens’ growing disillusionment with Nepali politics and politicians, and nostalgia for monarchy are among several issues that the alliance needs to address.
Prime Minister Oli and Deuba’s capacity to drive constitutional change, as well as their ability to address said issues, will be decisive for the outcome of Nepal’s next elections scheduled for 2027.