The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Rachel Minyoung Lee, a senior fellow for the Stimson Center’s Korea Program and 38 North, is the 427th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”
Are North Korea-Russia relations transactional or strategic? Explain
Even after [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s latest visit to Pyongyang and the signing of a new treaty, the prevailing view still seems to be that the relationship is “transactional.” Rather than locking ourselves into that conclusion, however, we should remain open to the possibility that the relationship may be “strategic,” if not in the outcome at least in terms of intent.
There are three main reasons for the assessment that the Pyongyang-Moscow honeymoon will not last beyond the war in Ukraine. First, the general assumption is that North Korea’s value for Russia will diminish significantly once the war is over. Second, Kim Jong Un may have merely picked up the Cold War playbook of shuttling back and forth between China and Russia. Third, the two countries have a long history of attempts at cooperation, but they rarely led to tangible outcomes.
Yet, geopolitical shifts will heavily shape these two countries’ longer-term calculations. Putin shattered the existing global order when he invaded Ukraine, and it seems unlikely that Russia will return to its old place in the world after the war. North Korea in recent years seems to have renounced its decades-old policy of normalizing relations with the United States through denuclearization. Their interests are now more aligned than ever, bound by the common goal of discrediting and combating the U.S.-led international rule of law and possibly developing their own bloc of influence.
Examine Pyongyang’s calculus in developing closer relations with Moscow.
We should understand North Korea’s close alignment with Russia from two angles: first, what it has already gained, and stands to win still; second, Pyongyang’s desire to become a bigger player regionally and internationally.
The diplomatic, economic, and possibly miliary-technology benefits Pyongyang has already reaped from supplying munitions to Russia have been well documented. The new treaty, if properly implemented, is poised to offer North Korea much more: It provides a legal framework for defying sanctions and outlines bilateral cooperation across a wide range of areas.
Buoyed by its self-styled status as an “irreversible” nuclear state, and almost certainly seeing an opportunity in a shifting global order, North Korea appears to view itself more as Russia’s proactive partner than a passive participant in a campaign to defy international norms and build a new bloc of influence. Over the past year, North Korea has said it would work with Russia to build a new security structure, an idea echoed by Putin on the eve of his visit to Pyongyang. The recent uptick in North Korea’s exchange with Russia’s key partner Belarus appears to be a part of this move.
It is important to note that the opportunities and potential benefits Kim Jong Un sees in building longer-term ties with Moscow, irrespective of the actual outcome of the relationship, may have far-reaching implications for North Korea’s economic policy as well as its U.S. and China policy.
Analyze Moscow’s agenda in seeking North Korea’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine.
The most obvious and immediate need is military: continued supplies of North Korea’s munitions and most likely personnel. According to South Korean media reports, North Korea sent technical and medical support units to Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine in the lead-up to Putin’s visit to Pyongyang and is planning to send engineering troops to support reconstruction work.
Politically, Russia would benefit from as much diplomatic support as it can win, as Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has left Russia with few friends. It is in that vein that Putin expressed appreciation for North Korea’s support for Russia’s “special military operation.” North Korea was quick to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It was only one of the three countries to recognize the independence of Ukraine’s breakaway regions.
In strengthening North Korea-Russia cooperation, what are Pyongyang and Moscow signaling to Washington and Beijing?
The unusual frequency and level of exchange between the two countries since the Kim-Putin summit in September 2023, culminating in the new treaty, clearly point to an intent to institutionalize cooperation and build a longer-term relationship in disregard of sanctions. The treaty’s scope, as well as references to building a new security structure, indicate that the two countries will take practical steps to develop a political and economic (and possibly military) bloc of like-minded countries, going beyond waging an anti-U.S. campaign. All of this should be a red flag for the United States. For China, these developments may not be all that bad only if North Korea and Russia do not disrupt the status quo or China’s influence in the region.
On that note, it is important to track China-North Korea relations, which remain strained. North Korea is sending a clear message to China through its deepening relations with Russia: that it has other cards to play. North Korea’s attitude toward China has cooled down considerably since the fall of 2023, around the time it started to gravitate closer to Russia. If Kim’s bet on Russia proves to be successful, it will have far-reaching implications for China’s own influence and leverage vis-à-vis North Korea.
Assess the implications of expanding North Korea-Russia relations vis-à-vis the broader China-U.S. strategic competition in the geopolitics of Northeast Asia.
The new treaty serves multiple purposes for both countries, but from a regional point of view, the document leaves the door open for greater Russian involvement in Northeast Asia. For example, the treaty makes it possible for Russia to intervene in the early stages of a conflict (Article 3) and provide “miliary and other assistance” to North Korea (Article 4). It also stipulates creating “mechanisms for taking joint measures” to strengthen defense capabilities, which seems to suggest the institutionalization of bilateral security cooperation (Article 8).
This seems to serve two main objectives. First, the treaty likely was a response to the deepening of U.S.-South Korea-Japan trilateral security cooperation, which both Pyongyang and Moscow have characterized as an Asian version of NATO.
Second, the treaty seems in part to be targeting China. From Moscow’s point of view, fostering closer relations with Pyongyang will help to curb Beijing’s growing influence in Northeast Asia. Despite the declared “no limits” in friendship with China, Beijing’s ever-expanding influence cannot be an altogether welcome development for Russia, which has historically had stakes in Northeast Asia. For North Korea, which traditionally has been wary of heavy dependence on China, closer alignment with Russia is an opportunity to hedge.
North Korea-Russia cooperation has already started to have an impact on multiple fronts. Their relationship could further complicate the already complex and volatile security dynamic in the region.