Even as the violent crackdown on participants in the anti-quota reform movement in Bangladesh continues, with the reported death toll having risen to 213 and injuries crossing the thousands, indiscriminate arrests around the country are mounting. One must ask who is bearing the brunt of it and what twisted rationale can be advanced to support the gross violation of human rights. But importantly, the question is whether more pretexts are being made to continue this crackdown for an indefinite period under an undeclared state of emergency.
The War Zone Mindset and People as the Enemy
The reported number of deaths, almost all sources acknowledge, is highly conservative as they are reported only from known hospitals around the country. Information from smaller hospitals and health clinics is yet to be available, and perhaps will never be reported. Many victims have not been listed as dead in the hospital registers as families aim to avoid the subsequent police hassles. They lost their loved ones and knew that they would never see justice. In many instances, those who died on the streets during the mayhem were not taken to hospitals, particularly when the area came under police control. As videos emerging after partial relaxation of internet restrictions attest, from July 18-21, the country became a killing field at the hands of police and the paramilitary Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB). Members of law enforcement agencies were given a license to kill, well before the official “shoot-on-sight” order was issued on the evening of July 19. The issuance of the official “shoot-on-sight” order was a mockery because the police and the BGB were already in action.
Deaths were not limited to the streets or places where the clashes were taking place. Dozens of incidents are now known where children inside their homes became victims. Such a scale of killing can take place in war zones or by a force that is trying to capture an enemy territory. Considering that these cannot have taken place without the explicit orders of the government, both in terms of command responsibility and execution, one cannot escape the question—what kind of mindset drives the regime?
It surely cannot be only for a day or two when citizens are seen as “the enemy” and killing as many as possible is considered a solution. There are explanations for these kinds of behaviors on the part of rulers, in academic and policy discourses, but if we for the moment keep them aside, what comes to mind?
Who are the Dead?
Analysis of the identities — age and professions — of those who died reveals who bore the brunt of the carnage. Prothom Alo, a Bengali newspaper, gathered information about 150 of those killed and found that 113 of them were aged between 18 and 39 years. More than 75 percent of those who lost their lives were young. Ninety-four of them – that is 64 percent – were between 18 and 29, at the height of their youth.
Samakal, another Bengali newspaper, examined the profiles of 200 people. According to its count, 104 of them were aged between 19 and 30, that is more than 50 percent. This is a testimony to the fact that the streets were flooded by the younger generations. For the past decade, policymakers and politicians, as well as demographers in Bangladesh reiterated that Bangladesh’s potential to become a powerhouse economy lies with the younger population. Bangladesh could make good on its “demographic dividend.” Yet, in the past decade, the much-touted “development miracle” left the youth behind — 41 percent of 15 to 24-year-olds are neither in jobs nor education. Those who are in public universities across the country have been subjected to thuggery by the ruling party student wing. Nationally, like other citizens, the youth were made spectators of the mockery of elections which anoints one person, again and again.
The demographic profiles of the victims have also revealed the ruthless nature of the massacre perpetrated by state actors. According to the data provided by Prothom Alo, of 113 victims, 19 were below the age of 18. According to Samakal, the number is 35, more than 17 percent of the total that it gathered. Some were as young as four years old. Whatever way the regime and its loyalists try to spin the statistics, the fact points to the diabolic nature of those who ordered and executed the killing spree.
The Revolt of the Downtrodden?
The professional profiles documented by the two newspapers, Prothom Alo and Samakal, is telling. Students were the largest numbers, 50 out of 200 according to Samakal, while Prothom Alo’s count is 45 out of 150, that is 25 percent and 30 percent respectively. But the remainder has come from all walks of life — day laborers, rickshaw pullers, small businessmen, employees of small restaurants, garment workers. Four members of law enforcement agencies and four journalists have been killed too. The defining feature of this profile is people from the lower middle class and poorer segments.
These were the people on the streets, either as protestors or as bystanders. The first explanation only shows how the movement became a grassroots movement of the downtrodden, the most aggrieved are those who have been bypassed by the “decade of development.” If the regime wants to spin it by saying these people were just bystanders and became unintended victims, and thus blame the protestors, it will only prove the point that police and BGB had not adhered to the “rules of engagement” and acted beyond the purview of lawful behavior.
The Regime Narrative Falls Apart
As of the evening of July 30, the number of arrests has been reported to be more than 10,000. But this number reflects only a part of what is going on. In Dhaka alone the number of cases filed stood at 229. Of these cases, an examination of 178 case documents by the Daily Star shows that 210,848 people have been accused. Most of these accused are unnamed, leaving it open to add anyone the police want to. Having thousands of unnamed individuals in cases is a familiar tactic of police who then pick up anyone and persecute them.
The arrests are made during the nighttime curfew without any recourse for the people who are being hauled away from their homes, at times after their homes are ransacked. Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan claimed, “We are not arresting any innocent person. We are arresting those whom we have been able to identify with intelligence information, video footage, and witnesses.” Independent reports in the media not only belie the claim but point to a deeply disconcerting picture.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the regime apologists have been saying that the upsurge was designed and orchestrated by “militants” and Jamaat-Shibir and supported by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Such a claim falls flat even when looking at those the government has arbitrarily rounded up. As of Monday, the number of arrests in Dhaka was 2,630 and of these arrestees, 2,264 — almost 87 percent — had no political affiliation. Undoubtedly, another license of impunity has been issued to the police.
A New Twist in an Old Narrative and Things to Come
The narrative, since the carnage, especially by Prime Minister Hasina, is familiar albeit with a new twist. The familiar part is that she blamed the opposition. But unlike previous occasions, it is no longer the BNP-JI, but militants, JI-Shibir and then BNP, in this order. Portraying the mass upsurge as militant attacks, she is trying to frame the entire episode as her fight against terrorism. This is to garner the support or at least silence of the Western nations, a ploy she used for years.
The government has banned the Jamaat-i-Islam (JI) and its student wing Shibir through an executive order. This move is intended to achieve three objectives.
Firstly, to distract from the massacre and the demands for Hasina’s resignation.
Secondly, to consolidate her support base and create a schism within the movement. The regime seems to be banking on the idea that reintroduction of this longstanding issue will engender a debate among her opponents and create a fault line. The intended audience of this move is the urban-educated middle class, who had in large measure acquiesced to the autocratization process and contributed to the rise of a personalistic autocracy. They have remained silent until the last few days.
Thirdly, to allow for a further crackdown under the legal ruse that the government is arresting members of proscribed organizations. Although it is not a new tactic that anyone to be assaulted, arrested or vilified is labeled as an activist or a sympathizer of the “Jamaat-Shibir,” but from hereon this will be legally permissible. The move is nothing short of a reflection of desperation but is also a pretext for a more extensive crackdown in the coming days.