Engineering infrastructure, particularly in the context of large-scale projects like dams, bridges, and energy facilities, has increasingly become a potent tool of foreign influence and interference in a country’s domestic affairs.
Globally, infrastructure investments have often been used by powerful nations to extend their influence. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for example, has been both a boon and a burden for countries like Sri Lanka and Pakistan. While these nations have benefited from improved infrastructure, they have also found themselves grappling with significant debt obligations, leading to increased Chinese influence over their policies. Similarly, Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has given the country strategic control over the Nile’s flow, affecting Egypt’s water security and altering regional power dynamics.
Russia’s energy infrastructure, particularly its gas pipelines to Europe, exemplifies how control over essential resources can be used to influence foreign governments and secure geopolitical advantages. The Nord Stream pipelines, for example, have been at the center of geopolitical tensions, where Russia’s control over Europe’s energy supply has led to significant leverage in diplomatic negotiations, often at the expense of European autonomy.
The United States, too, has leveraged infrastructure projects for strategic purposes in the name of American values. For instance, U.S. foreign aid and infrastructure projects in Latin America and Africa have often been tied to broader geopolitical goals, such as countering Soviet influence during the Cold War or, more recently, providing alternatives to Chinese investments. These projects, while promoting development, have at times led to dependencies that align recipient countries more closely with U.S. strategic interests, sometimes at the cost of their own policy independence.
These examples highlight how major infrastructure projects can be double-edged swords – offering developmental benefits on one side while creating vulnerabilities and dependencies on the other.
The Bangladesh Context
With this backdrop in mind, the recent release of water from India’s Dumbur Dam, which led to catastrophic flooding in Bangladesh, cannot be dismissed as an unavoidable or purely “automatic” event.
India’s response to allegations regarding the impact of the Dumbur Dam on flooding in Bangladesh reflects a broader pattern of deflecting responsibility in transboundary water management. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs attributed the floods primarily to heavy rainfall in downstream catchment areas, which led to the automatic release of water from the dam.
However, the technical documents governing dam operations make it clear that the state, not the automated systems, is ultimately responsible for managing such events. The Tripura State Disaster Management Plan outlines specific safeguards intended to prevent such disasters, yet these were blatantly ignored.
This incident underscores the need for greater accountability and transparency in transboundary water management, particularly when the consequences of neglect are so devastating. India’s attempt to deflect blame by attributing the disaster to the very system it controls is not only disingenuous but also a grave injustice to the millions of lives impacted downstream in Bangladesh.
The Dumbur Dam incident is not an isolated event but part of a broader pattern of transboundary water management challenges between India and Bangladesh. These issues have historical roots in the complexities of managing shared river systems, where technical failures, lack of communication, and political disagreements have repeatedly led to crises.
As Muhammad Yunus, the chief advisor of Bangladesh’s new interim government, engages with India, he is likely to address the concerning trend of increasing water releases from Indian dams. He will likely point out Bangladesh’s failure to secure a comprehensive water-sharing agreement, despite prolonged negotiations, and should critique the bilateral relationship prioritizing politics over the well-being of rural people in Bangladesh.
Additionally, Yunus must consider the broader geopolitical implications, particularly the roles of China and the United States, as he navigates these complex issues.
India, China, and the United States
The Dumbur Dam incident has significantly heightened the strategic stakes for Bangladesh, India, China, and even the United States.
For years, the Teesta River has been a source of contention, with India’s construction of upstream dams and canals drastically reducing water flow into Bangladesh. This reduction has severely impacted agriculture and the livelihoods of millions in northern Bangladesh. In 2011, Bangladesh and India nearly reached an agreement to share the Teesta’s waters, but the deal was blocked by West Bengal’s Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee due to local political concerns. Since then, no significant progress has been made.
Instead, India’s construction of dams and canals upstream on the Teesta River has significantly reduced the flow of water into Bangladesh, affecting the livelihoods of millions. India’s actions raise concerns about the violation of international laws, specifically the United Nations’ Watercourses Convention of 1997, which emphasizes equitable and reasonable utilization of shared water resources. India’s unwillingness to engage with Bangladesh on this issue has created tensions and highlights the strategic use of infrastructure as a means of influence.
While India’s actions in the Teesta River dispute are criticized, it is also crucial to acknowledge the security dynamics that shape its foreign policy. India is well aware of the national security impacts of infrastructure. In fact, India’s concerns over Chinese involvement in South Asian infrastructure projects stem from precisely such strategic security considerations, particularly regarding its vulnerable northeastern regions.
China’s involvement in Bangladesh’s infrastructure is part of a larger pattern of using engineering projects to gain influence in South Asia. Through its BRI, China has invested heavily in infrastructure across the region, creating dependencies that can be leveraged to exert political influence. In Bangladesh, this dynamic is evident in projects like the Padma Bridge and the Karnaphuli Tunnel, which are critical to the country’s economic development but also tie it closer to China.
In 2020, China stepped into the Teesta River fray, offering to assist Bangladesh with a comprehensive restoration project for the river, including dredging and embankment work. This move by China was seen as an attempt to expand its influence in South Asia, which alarmed India. In response, India proposed funding the project itself, a strategic maneuver aimed at preventing Chinese involvement.
Where China and India are asserting their influence, the United States inevitably follows. Earlier this year, I attended the OECD Infrastructure Forum in Paris, where the United States officially launched the Blue Dot Network, a certification initiative designed to promote high-quality, sustainable infrastructure projects globally. This initiative aligns with the Biden administration’s Build Back Better World (B3W) Initiative and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, all designed to offer high-standard, transparent alternatives to China’s investment model in developing countries.
While the Blue Dot Network promotes transparency and sustainability, it also reflects the United States’ broader strategy to counter China’s influence through the Belt and Road Initiative. This dual purpose highlights how the U.S., like other powers, uses infrastructure not only for development but also as a tool to advance its geopolitical interests
Notes for the Bangladesh Government
Bangladesh now finds itself navigating a complex diplomatic landscape, balancing its relationships with India, China, and the United States. Each country offers different benefits and risks, and Bangladesh’s decision on the Teesta River project will have far-reaching implications for its national interest and regional stability
The Yunus administration is well advised to approach such offers with a strategic mindset, ensuring that any privatization efforts are aligned with Bangladesh’s long-term national interests.
Bangladesh must be cautious in rolling out the red carpet for the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and other U.S.-aligned financial institutions, ensuring that any deals made do not compromise national sovereignty or lead to excessive foreign control over critical sectors.
Bangladesh must navigate these dynamics with caution, ensuring that it benefits from international partnerships without compromising its sovereignty or becoming a pawn in broader geopolitical games.
As Bangladesh navigates these partnerships, it must weigh the long-term implications carefully, including the potential for debt dependency on China, political pressures from India, and economic conditionalities from U.S.-aligned financial institutions. These factors could significantly impact Bangladesh’s sovereignty and its ability to pursue independent development policies.