At the July 2024 NATO summit, member states issued the Washington Summit Declaration, which notably focused on condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and outlining how allies and partners should respond. The declaration included a paragraph on military cooperation among Russia, North Korea, China, and Iran, emphasizing that North Korea’s support for Russia is illegal and violates United Nations Security Council resolutions.
Unlike last year’s Vilnius summit, which concentrated on proliferation concerns and denuclearization obligations, this year’s summit centered on support for the Russian military from North Korea, which is believed to be prolonging the war in Ukraine. Consequently, the Korean Peninsula has become more relevant to NATO’s sphere of interest, highlighting the increased importance of South Korea as a NATO partner.
The inclusion of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea, members of the so-called Indo-Pacific 4 (IP4), at the NATO Summit for the third consecutive year reflects U.S. interests in reorganizing its alliance relations. Kurt Campbell, the U.S. deputy secretary of state, noted that Washington aims to institutionalize the IP4 grouping and seeks opportunities to involve South Korea in other engagements.
South Korea’s potential to arm Ukraine could elevate its status as a capable NATO partner. Given these circumstances, the call for a stronger partnership with NATO presents opportunities for South Korea. However, it also presents challenges because joining this alignment could involve costly signaling, where the stronger the commitment to the partnership, the higher the cost.
At the cost of souring relations with China and increasing uncertainty about Russia’s potential military aid to North Korea in retaliation, South Korea finds itself in a position where it must signal its alignment commitment. Seoul’s signaling can be examined through its rhetoric and provision of assistance, which helps us understand how South Korea navigates two significant challenges. The first challenge is managing relations with China, which was reflected in South Korea’s rhetoric after the NATO summit. The second challenge involves altering the nature of Seoul’s military assistance to Ukraine, based on its assessment of the strategic benefits. This shift can be observed in how South Korea has adjusted the scale of its assistance following the summit.
Rhetoric on China
Regarding rhetoric on China, NATO has noted the deepening strategic partnership between Russia and China and criticized them for undermining the rules-based international order. Both last year’s and this year’s summits highlighted that “China’s coercive policies continue to challenge our interests, security, and values,” while also emphasizing openness to constructive engagement with China.
However, this year, China’s collusion with Russia, particularly as a “decisive enabler” of the war on Ukraine, has been more prominently criticized. NATO demanded that China refrain from providing dual-use materials and components to Russia for military purposes. China has resisted the “enabler” label, denying that it is helping Russia in the war on Ukraine and asking NATO not to bring the same chaos to Asia.
NATO’s intentions can be understood in two dimensions. First, the antagonistic structure of the North Korea-Russia relationship leads to viewing China as part of authoritarian collusion. Second, NATO is sending strategic communication aimed at raising China’s reputational costs to induce distancing from Russia. While South Korea’s interests may align with the latter, the former might not be entirely welcome.
On May 27, South Korea hosted a China-Japan-South Korea trilateral summit in Seoul, marking 25 years of cooperation and pledging to implement a “vision of cooperation for the next decade.” South Korea and China committed to identifying and implementing cooperation projects in areas such as economy, trade, science and technology, and human security, including climate change, health, and disaster relief. This is not entirely new because, amid global tensions over chip technology and supplies, China has continued dialogue with South Korea on cooperation regarding supply chain of semiconductors, critical materials, and new technologies such as bio and clean energy.
The recent summit between China and South Korea led to the decision to restart the China-South Korea Investment Cooperation Commission and revitalize negotiations on the China-South Korea FTA, aiming to boost mutual trade and investment. South Korea must consider whether these trilateral cooperation projects are compatible with those discussed at the NATO summit.
Despite intensifying military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang, there are strong opinions in South Korea that the North Korean issues should be managed through improved Seoul-Beijing relations. The South Korean presidential office reported on the IP4 meeting outcomes at the NATO summit, noting a determination to address North Korea-Russia military cooperation but omitting mention of China, possibly acknowledging Beijing’s sensitivities.
Support for Ukraine
Following the NATO summit, South Korea faces increased pressure to share the burden of military support for Ukraine in countering Russia. NATO pledged long-term security support for Ukraine, including 40 billion euros worth of military equipment, training, and defense industry investment. This pledge underscores the ongoing nature of the conflict and the necessity for sustained assistance. However, the pledge is slated for next year only, with no plans extending beyond that period or provisions for additional support, leaving room for Indo-Pacific partners to contribute.
Before the summit, Ukraine expressed its expectations for enhanced military assistance, including the deployment of South Korea’s missile defense system. On July 11, NATO’s secretary general welcomed deeper cooperation with South Korea, noting that North Korea-Russia military cooperation threatens global stability.
Previously, South Korea indicated that it might review its military aid to Ukraine, demonstrating its stern stance on the bilateral ties between Russia and North Korea. However, at the NATO summit, South Korea announced only that it would double its contribution to the NATO Ukraine Trust Fund. It did not commit to providing lethal weapons to Ukraine, suggesting a reluctance to make costly signals.
South Korea’s assistance to Ukraine is primarily focused on nonmilitary sectors. As a member of the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine (MDCP), South Korea has provided development aid, including humanitarian assistance and financial support through international organizations. Its involvement in post-conflict reconstruction efforts, such as rebuilding infrastructure, exemplifies South Korea’s safe choice.
With concerns about deeper military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, South Korea is carefully assessing Russia’s mixed messages. Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that it would be a very big mistake if South Korea decided to supply arms to Ukraine, while simultaneously downplaying the significance of the new strategic partnership pact with North Korea. It is in Seoul’s interest to avoid provoking Russia into providing North Korea with significant military and technical assistance.
Furthermore, reducing uncertainty in the business sector has become crucial. While only a few South Korean conglomerates have exited Russia, the majority of South Korean medium- and small-sized companies have remained, grappling with the extended Russia risk. This compels the South Korean government to maintain strategic ambiguity, anticipating potential changes in North Korea-Russia relations and aiming to pursue economic cooperation post-conflict.
In presenting the outcomes of the NATO summit, the South Korean government emphasized its willingness and commitment to deepen its partnership with NATO as a key Indo-Pacific ally. However, South Korea’s signaling for alignment was not substantial, leaving uncertainty about its actual level of commitment.
As one of the IP4 partners with which NATO seeks to strengthen ties, South Korea’s relationship with NATO is expected to continue growing. Nonetheless, the pace of developing this relationship may be slow due to external factors related to China and Russia, which were initially thought to accelerate the deepening of ties. South Korea faces a significant dilemma that is holding back its more decisive moves in this regard.