The protest against terrorism in Bannu City, in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, which resulted multiple deaths and injuries after security forces fired upon a large gathering, has sparked massive anger among Pashtuns. A similar episode occurred in Balochistan when a protest against the forced disappearance of Zaheer Baloch was dispersed through brute violence, including live fire. Following the incident, attempts to organize a Baloch gathering have been dealt with using severe violence and censorship.
These are not isolated incidents but a reflection of historic and sustained unrest in Pakistan’s peripheral regions. These regions perceive discriminatory policies and a high-handed attitude of the center toward their grievances. The genesis of this discrimination is rooted in the state structure of Pakistan, the nature of its elite, and its failure to account for the ethnic diversity of the nation. Unless a course correction is made, this growing relative deprivation in a large section of the population in very strategic locations can produce severe consequences domestically and regionally.
The Road Not Taken
The principal contradiction in Pakistan is that although it was initially conceived as a confederation with autonomous and independent provinces, it has taken a path of extreme centralization since its formation in 1947. Right after its formation, the unwillingness of the ruling elite based in West Pakistan to yield to the numerically superior East Pakistan led to the “One-Unit” scheme of 1955, which eventually became a stepping stone in the formation of Bangladesh in 1971.
After the debacle of 1971, an attempt at a course correction was made through the 1973 constitution, which accommodated the provincial demands for a bicameral parliament and recognition of provincial language. However, the 1973 constitution was never truly implemented due to the subsequent military takeover by Zia-ul-Haq, followed by unstable democratic governments in the 1990s.
The last serious attempt to rectify the federal disequilibrium was made during the reign of the Pakistan People’s Party government under Asif Ali Zardari through the 18th amendment, which granted administrative and financial autonomy to the provinces. Since its passage, the military establishment has viewed the 18th amendment with suspicion and attempted to undo it. These events culminated in a permanent Punjabi domination in the state structure of Pakistan against the detriment of smaller provinces.
Pakistan “Proper” Versus “Periphery”
The impact of an inequitable state structure has been exacerbated by a lack of economic development and continuous military interventions in the peripheral areas, especially Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Balochistan has very abysmal socioeconomic parameters when compared with the rest of Pakistan in terms of prevalence of poverty, out-of-school children, and literacy rates. This condition is ironic, given that Balochistan is the most resource-rich region of Pakistan, with vast deposits of minerals and gas.
Pakistan’s state policy, which views Balochistan only as a resource-rich region to be exploited through mega projects like China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) without giving the province its due share has caused the alienation of a large section of the population. Initiating mega projects in a province like Balochistan, which constitutes only about 5 percent of Pakistan’s population, without taking the local population into confidence has led to fear of demographic imbalance in the province. Resistance by insurgent groups in Balochistan has been met by counter-violence by security forces in the form of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. The failure of state institutions like the judiciary and elected representatives to remedy the situation has precipitated a sense of alienation inside Balochistan.
Attempts by activists or civil society organizations to demand their rights within the constitutional framework have been suppressed through violence, as exhibited during the long march led by Dr. Mahrang Baloch early this year. Balochistan, which is currently experiencing its fifth wave of insurgency, is a powder keg with rising attacks from militants, marginalization of political and civil society activists, and heightened securitization by the state.
In the case of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pashtuns have long been at the receiving end of machinations by the military establishment and external actors. The introduction of “Kalashnikov culture” and the Deobandi version of Islam in tribal areas as a consequence of Pakistan’s participation in the Afghan jihad in the 1980s has permanently altered the contours of Pashtun society. In the post-9/11 period, Pakistan’s assistance to the United States in the war on terror led to the birth of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan’s policy of support to the Afghan Taliban in pursuit of its “strategic depth” policy against India has proven to be counterproductive. Since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, terror attacks have increased sharply, with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan being the worst affected provinces.
The current quagmire in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa stems from the military establishment’s inability to engage meaningfully with relevant political actors within the province. The Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) under Manzoor Pashteen has emerged in recent years as a grassroots movement seeking non-violent redressal of human rights violations of Pashtuns by the military. Despite confining its demands within the constitutional framework of Pakistan, PTM has been targeted by the military with allegations of foreign funding and engaging in anti-state activities. Within the mainstream political arena, the military establishment crackdown on the Pakistan Tehreek Insaf (PTI) after the May 9 riots has created a political logjam in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
The announcement of a new Operation Azm-i-Istehkam by the government to curb the rising tide of terrorism has reinvigorated the memories of massive internal displacement in tribal areas during the previous Operation Zarb-e-Azb. With the ruling PTI in the province at loggerheads with the central establishment, ordinary people find themselves on their own against the TTP.
In addition to these two provinces, the disputed region of Gilgit-Baltistan witnessed a massive protest early this year against the increase in subsidized wheat prices and other grievances related to resource sharing.
The Road Ahead
All of Pakistan’s peripheral regions are highly strategic locations; hence, the ramifications of instability in these areas percolate beyond Pakistan. Through ethnicity and history, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is intricately linked to Afghanistan and Balochistan to Iran. In recent years, Balochistan’s significance has grown in Pakistan’s strategic calculus due to Gwadar being the end point of CPEC and a site of massive Chinese investment.
Internally, both Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are historically troubled regions for Pakistan due to Baloch and Pashtun ethnonationalism with their irredentist claims. The imprudent handling of these regions can further strengthen the latent subnationalist tendencies within Pakistan. The current crisis in Pakistan is compounded by the crisis of the legitimacy of Shehbaz Sharif’s government because of allegations of extensive rigging in the February elections. Yet the military establishment is unwilling to take a reconciliatory path, as evidenced by the recent government announcement that it will ban the PTI.
Pakistan’s path to normalcy in terms of economic recovery and civil discontent can only be possible through an inclusive approach involving dialogue with all relevant stakeholders, including civil society organizations and the PTI under Imran Khan. Whether this path is chosen is hard to predict; what is certain is that it is Pakistan’s moment of truth, and the path to the future can only be possible through honest acknowledgment of the past.