In mid-July, less than two months after his election as Vietnam’s president, To Lam made his first foreign trip as head of state to Laos. The visit was a sign of the important place that the Vietnam-Laos special relationship occupies for the new leadership. It is notable that the Vietnamese delegation to Laos included Nguyen Thi Thanh, the deputy chairwoman of the National Assembly, the newly appointed Minister of Public Security Gen. Luong Tam Quang, Minister of Defense Gen. Phan Van Giang, Foreign Minister Affairs Bui Thanh Son and many other dignitaries This reflects the comprehensive nature of the agenda that was addressed during the trip.
While the ministers were tasked with the implementation of various bilateral agreements, including an MOU between the two police forces on extradition and the roll-out of a Lao digital identification card with the assistance of Vietnamese security experts, Lam, who has since been appointed the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), said that the two sides should work “to prevent any forces from attempting to separate the special brotherly relationship” between Laos and Vietnam, according to Vietnamese media reports.
This happened against the backdrop of an increasingly prominent Chinese presence in Laos and the Lower Mekong region, both economically and security-wise. To counter the growing Chinese influence in Laos, the best Vietnam could do is devise a strategy linking security with economic development that benefits both nations.
Laos Is Unique for Vietnam’s Security
Vietnam and Laos are united above all by geographic proximity on the eastern part of the Indochinese Peninsula. This has made Laos essential to Vietnam’s “strategic space,” a notion that holds significant weight in the country’s strategic lexicon.
“Strategic space” refers to a country’s physical environment, encompassing its land, sea, space, and surrounding environment, including neighboring countries and their foreign policies. Vietnam’s contemporary strategic space comprises its continental north and west (with Cambodia, Laos, and China as immediate neighbors) and the maritime east: i.e. the South China Sea.
Without a solid and friendly Lao state, whose 2,161-kilometer border is the longest Vietnam has with any neighboring country (compared to its 1,297-kilometer border with China and its 1,131-kilometer border with Cambodia), Hanoi could not maintain one of its most critical strategic goals: a peaceful environment conducive to economic growth. Some have concluded that Vietnam could not survive as a state without Laos and vice-versa. Regardless of which political regimes are in charge, a healthy political connection between Vietnam and Laos is decisive in ensuring both nations’ long-term security and prosperity.
From a military perspective, Vietnam and Laos are considered “medium” and relatively “small” countries, respectively, occupying a strategic location in Southeast Asia. A shared history of communist-led anti-colonial struggles in the 20th century and the balance of power have encouraged the two nations to unite, form alliances, and rely on each other to fight against foreign invaders. Historically, both countries have been able to depend on each other militarily to offset their deficiencies in strategic depth. Vietnam has an extensive eastern coastline, but sea defense is challenging. Therefore, it depends upon the protection of the Annamite mountain range that runs along its border with Laos. For Laos, the rugged mountainous terrain in northern and southern Laos and the narrow, empty plains in the west along the Mekong River (bordering Thailand) create vulnerabilities that require the solid support from Vietnam in case of an emergency.
In today’s interconnected world, however, Vietnam’s relationship with its three neighboring countries is based on different principles, priorities, dynamics, and mindsets from the Cold War era. The western borderlands abutting Cambodia and Laos have been increasingly shaped by peaceful economic cooperation and the concept of common prosperity. This western frontier is home to completely different sets of “non-traditional” security threats. For example, trafficking in humans and the trafficking of illicit drugs from Myanmar and Laos into Vietnam has been a source of concern for Vietnamese police. This requires different methods and approaches to resolve.
History, Ideology, and Security
Vietnam and Laos, bound by shared ideals of national independence and socialism, have aligned their viewpoints and policies in many respects.
During his meetings with Lao leaders, President Lam recalled the common roots of all three ruling parties in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia: they were once members of the same Indochinese Communist Party, founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1930. Today, Cambodia has already formally adopted a multi-party system, and opposition political figures often use anti-Vietnamese nationalism to score political points. Both Laos and Vietnam maintain their one-party state. This Vietnamese-Lao ideological harmony between the CPV and the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), coupled with regular exchanges between senior leaders, has been instrumental in formulating mutual and bilateral guidelines and strategies in developing their respective countries.
However, the second decade of the 21st century brought many challenges that have tested the foundation of the Laos-Vietnam special relationship, especially from the Vietnamese perspective. The cooperative capacity of Laos and Vietnam in multilateral mechanisms in the Greater Mekong Subregion presents a challenge, particularly concerning the rational use of Mekong River water resources. This issue affects both countries’ water security, the ecological environment, and their economic interests. The construction of hydropower dams in Laos has led to the depletion of Mekong River water resources, threatening the livelihoods of residents along the Mekong River and the survival of the Mekong Delta in Vietnam. Finding a suitable solution is crucial to meet the interests of all parties involved. However, Vietnam must be more inventive and proactive, balancing the need to secure its interests in the Mekong Delta and Laos’ legitimate demands for economic development.
It is also important to note that the nature of Vietnamese assistance to Laos has also changed significantly compared to the Cold War period. While military and security assistance dominated when the two countries fought for independence, Vietnamese support in the post-Cold War era has broadened considerably, and ranges now from infrastructure projects and military assistance to economic support and assistance. The recent cooperation between the Vietnamese and Lao ministries of finance, aimed at addressing Laos’ severe economic woes, is an example of how Vietnamese experience in financial reform could be translated into new forms of assistance .
The China Question and Vietnam’s Outlook
Those challenges have been intensified politically and strategically by the growing presence of China in the region. Both countries have been forced to manage carefully their relationships with China, in order to safeguard their own nations’ security and prosperity. China’s increasing investment in infrastructure, economic aid, and trade is beneficial for Laos’ economic development, but has also brought debt distress.
Also, under the banner of ensuring safe navigation on the Mekong River, China has conducted over 130 joint patrols with Laos, Thailand, and Myanmar, bringing Chinese police and law enforcement units deep into mainland Southeast Asia. Vietnam, given its geographical location, has only been able to manage land border patrols with Laos.
The combination of economic and security concerns has increased Laos’ dependence on China and strengthened its connection to Beijing’s sphere of influence. Vietnam faces a complex situation in which it has to manage the threats posed by the growing Chinese influence on its western border and Beijing’s ongoing assertiveness in the South China Sea. This challenge has demanded dedicated efforts and significant resources.
In the future, the strong connection between the LPRP and CPV will no doubt endure, especially with President Lam also now serving as the chief of the CPV. His experience as Vietnam’s top police official will help in managing both internal and external security issues, including relations with Laos, but this is not sufficient. A comprehensive strategy focusing on mutual economic development, infrastructure, and information technology needs to be developed for comprehensive cooperation. Until now, Vietnam’s growing importance in the global economy has not been fully connected to Laos and has not benefitted Vientiane in a more thorough and forceful way.
Vietnam’s ability to maintain its growth and support for Laos depends on its infrastructural and institutional capabilities. To address its foreign policy challenges, Vietnam may need to focus not only on external factors but also on internal development to secure its economic future and its partnership with Laos. A strong economic foundation is essential to the success of any security arrangement necessary to ensure long-term security along Vietnam’s western border. Moreover, a sustainable mutual relationship should also be based on mutual understanding and mutual respect between the two fellow communist states.