Conceived in 2013 as the main vehicle of development in Balochistan, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), was launched in 2015. The $62-billion regional corridor comprising road, rail and port infrastructure and energy projects was promoted as a game changer in Pakistan.
However, a decade later, no game has changed in Balochistan in terms of economic and human development due to separatist violence and unrest. For instance, on August 26, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA)’s militants killed 53 people in a fresh spate of attacks across 10 districts of Balochistan.
The new wave of violence coincides with the revered Baloch tribal elder Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti’s 18th death anniversary and the visit of Chinese Chief of General Staff General Li Qiaoming to Pakistan. During the near-simultaneous, multiple coordinated attacks, the BLA blocked Balochistan’s main entry points to prevent security forces’ reinforcements and prolong the duration of its violent campaign to fuel its media warfare by creating an impression of slipping Pakistani writ in the province.
An atmosphere of insecurity and unrest emanating from Baloch separatists’ attacks has undermined CPEC projects and Balochistan’s development. At the same time, Pakistan’s unmet commitments with Chinese companies, bureaucratic inefficiencies, financial crisis and uncertain political climate have also slowed the pace of development. In June, the Minister of the Central Committee of the International Department of the Communist Party of China Liu Jianchao warned Pakistan that “security threats were the main hazards to CPEC cooperation” and “the primary factor shaking the confidence of Chinese investors is the security situation.”
BLA’s Majeed Brigade: China’s Arch Nemesis in Balochistan
Both Baloch insurgent and jihadist militant groups have targeted Chinese infrastructure projects and workers in Pakistan to undermine CPEC. Unfortunately, Pakistan has emerged as one of the countries where the highest number of terrorist attacks against China have taken place.
Of all the groups targeting Chinese interests in Pakistan, the BLA’s suicide squad, the Majeed Brigade, has earned the notoriety of carrying out the most high-profile attacks. After assuming BLA’s leadership in 2018, Aslam Baloch revived the Majeed Brigade and embraced suicide terrorism in a strategic shift to grab international attention and highlight Baloch socio-economic grievances. The Majeed Brigade carried out the first suicide attack targeting a bus of Chinese engineers working on CPEC in Dalbandin district in 2018. Likewise, BLA attacked the Chinese Consulate in Karachi in 2018, Gwadar’s Pearl Continental Hotel frequented by the Chinese in 2019, the Pakistan Stock Exchange where Beijing is a major shareholder in 2020, and the Karachi University’s Confucius Instituted in 2022. Consequently, Pakistan banned the Majeed Brigade as a terrorist group in July 2024.
Led by Bashir Zaib, BLA is one of the most organized insurgent groups in Balochistan with an elaborate structure and numerical strength of 3,500 to 4,000 fighters. Over the years, BLA has improved its communication warfare capabilities and uses multiple social media platforms to claim attacks, and articulate its separatist narratives using infographics, video statements and articles on different issues, including CPEC.
In 2018, following BLA founder Hyrbyair Marri’s self-exile in London and his efforts to sideline his deputy Aslam Baloch, BLA split into two factions. Most of the local commanders supported the latter. Since then, Hyrbyair’s faction has been marginalized and operates as BLA-Azad, while Aslam’s faction identifies itself as BLA. Aslam was killed in December 2018 during a suicide bombing in southern Afghanistan’s Kandahar province. Zaib succeeded him as BLA’s new commander.
BLA, which emerged after the Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Bugti’s killing in August 2006 has its roots in the Marri tribe. It attaches great importance to alliances with Baloch insurgents by rising above tribal considerations and personality disputes to forge a unified separatist front. The Baloch Raji Ajoi Sangar (BRAS), an alliance of BLA, the Baloch Liberation Front, the Baloch Republican Guard and the Baloch Republican Army, is Aslam’s brainchild.
China and CPEC Through BLA’s Propaganda Lens
In its propaganda, BLA frames China’s economic footprint in Balochistan as a neo-colonial project and compares it with the British East India Company which entered the Indian Subcontinent in 1608 as spice traders and gradually took over the entire region. In multiple statements after targeting Chinese nationals and projects in Pakistan, BLA has issued warnings to Beijing to roll back its development projects and leave the province.
BLA alleges that CPEC would give China control over Balochistan’s mineral resources and strategic coastline through Gwadar’s deep-sea port. BLA also accuses China of furthering the restive province’s sense of economic marginalization that would reduce the Baloch community to a minority in their own province once Gwadar is fully developed as a modern city. Lacking technical skills and modern education, the Baloch fear that job opportunities in Gwadar will be grabbed by outsiders while sidelining them. Concurrently, Pakistan’s worsening economic situation has also generated rumors that the country will offer Balochistan’s resources to repay soaring Chinese loans, which have now risen to $30 billion of Pakistan’s $126 billion external debt. Such narratives strengthen the insurgent groups and allow them to recruit by leveraging the Baloch community’s economic anxieties to perpetuate the conflict.
The Insecurity-Underdevelopment Nexus in Balochistan
A strategic location can be a double-edged sword that can become a liability instead of an advantage if not handled prudently. Indeed, Balochistan’s location at the confluence of South and Central Asia has turned out to be a geostrategic curse, reinforcing the province’s underdevelopment coupled with the state’s neglect and mishandling of the local conflict. Despite being resource-rich in gold, copper, limestone, titanium and iron ore, and 44 percent of Pakistan’s geographical land mass, Balochistan is Pakistan’s poorest and least developed province. Most of Pakistan’s least developed districts are in Balochistan and around 41 percent of the province’s population lives below the poverty line. At the same time, the Baloch insurgent groups have also undermined the development due to their antagonistic center-periphery stance where the former’s focus has been on security and resource extraction rather than socio-economic and human development.
BLA and other insurgent groups have persistently targeted infrastructure projects, gas pipelines, railway tracks, power pylons, cellular towers as well as staff of oil and gas exploration companies and construction workers involved in road and highway development. Furthermore, the unrest has delayed the construction of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline that will pass through the province. The insecurity has pushed the impoverished province further into the abyss of recession. Hence, CPEC’s vision has been reduced to a rhetoric that does not match ground realities due to widespread insecurity and volatility.
Though development is considered to have a pacifying impact on local conflicts, it has worked the other way in Balochistan where insurgent groups have opposed CPEC tooth and nail. Despite Gwadar port’s development and improvement in communication infrastructure, ethno-separatist violence has undermined efforts to unlock Balochistan’s true economic potential and hindered efforts of transforming it into a regional hub of transit trade as originally envisaged under CPEC.
Pitfalls of Throwing Away the Insurgents’ Asymmetric Advantage in Balochistan
BLA and other insurgent groups’ primary conflict is with the Pakistani military establishment, and they could have used China’s economic intervention as an opportunity to articulate their grievances politically while using Beijing’s good offices to explore a negotiated settlement of the dispute. Instead, they attacked Chinese projects and nationals in Balochistan, and not only wasted an opportunity for conflict settlement but furthered Balochistan’s underdevelopment as well.
In asymmetric warfare, the ability of insurgent groups to deadlock the conflict on the battlefield by denying a military victory to a traditionally superior enemy constitutes success. In Henry Kissinger’s words, “The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerilla wins if he does not lose.” Insurgents deadlock the conflict on the battlefield to seek a chair at the negotiation table by impressing upon the conventionally superior adversary that there is no military solution. However, by not talking to the Pakistani state through a potential Chinese mediation, the Baloch insurgents are exhausting their asymmetric battlefield advantage.
Insurgent deadlocks in asymmetric conflicts sans negotiations can lead to further brutalization of the conflict and more extreme forms of violence. Potentially, it can push the hardline Baloch insurgents to perpetuate the conflict, while the more pragmatic factions abandon the conflict. Still others, use the conflict’s dark economy to seek material advantages by resorting to organized crimes and smuggling.
Balochistan’s conflict is a cautionary tale of missed economic opportunities due to perpetual cycles of state and non-state violence. The Pakistani state’s mishandling of the conflict through high-handed tactics has alienated an entire generation of Baloch, engendering more radical forms of Baloch nationalism. At the same time, the insurgents’ hardened attitudes have also eluded potential avenues of conflict resolution. Unfortunately, China finds itself in the crosshairs of this antagonistic equation, which does not show any signs of abating. A political process addressing the genuine grievances of the Baloch and making them part of the development process where they can see a bright future offers a workable template out of the current morass.