Although Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups affiliated with the Islamic State and al-Qaida are not directly involved in the Hamas-Israel conflict and lack the capability to influence the war in Gaza, they responded swiftly and vividly to the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31.
Their public response highlights two opposing views, reflecting the ideological stances of their parent organizations, the Islamic State and al-Qaida, neither of which aligns with Hamas.
Historically, relations between Hamas and al-Qaida have been strained, especially since Hamas’ participation in the 2006 elections. Additionally, the Islamic State has condemned Hamas for its cooperation with Shia factions, particularly Iran and Hezbollah. Therefore, as expected, the Central Asian branches of the two global Sunni terror organizations exploited the assassination of Hamas’ political leader Ismail Haniyeh for their own mercenary purposes, just as they had previously leveraged the issue of liberating the Muslim holy sites of Bayt al-Maqdis (Jerusalem) and Masjid al-Aqsa from Israeli occupation to bolster their ideological foundations and intensify their recruitment efforts.
The Islamic State’s Aggressive Approach to Haniyeh’s Assassination
On August 2, following the assassination of Haniyeh, the Islamic State’s al-Naba weekly newsletter, in its 454th issue, published an editorial entitled with a Quranic verse “Those who perished through disbelief would perish upon evidence.” The article derided the Hamas leader as a “sellout” tyrant who, instead of being a martyr for Jerusalem, became a “martyr of Tehran,” having died in the arms of rafidas (rejectionists – a derogatory term for Shiites) on their stronghold.
The official Islamic State propaganda outlet compared Haniyeh to Qassem Soleimani, the slain senior IRGC commander, stating that both met the same “disgraceful end” as “enemies of Allah, His Prophet, and all Sunni believers.” The editorial accused Haniyeh of fighting under the banner of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” and taking orders from its coordination centers in Lebanon and Tehran.
As expected, al-Naba’s editorial served as an ideological blueprint for the Central Asian Uzbek, Tajik, and Russian-speaking ISKP propaganda media, who exploited its themes to capitalize on historical Muslim-Jewish enmity and present the Islamic State as the sole liberator of the holy land.
The pro-ISKP Russian-language Telegram channel “Baqo” mocked the slain Haniyeh, labeling him a murtad (apostate). According to the channel, Hamas’ democratic governance system in Gaza allowed them to enact laws contrary to those of Allah. It argued that Allah punished Haniyeh with a dishonorable death, unworthy of a shahid (martyr), as he allied with the rafidas of Iran and the mushriks (polytheist) of Hezbollah.
Another ISKP supporter, Abu Turob, stated on his Uzbek-language Telegram channel that “Hamas and its leader Haniyeh did not come to power through holy jihad, but rather through democratic elections in Palestine, governing based on man-made laws that contradict the Sharia laws of the Almighty. Therefore, Ismail Haniyeh is not worthy of being honored as a shahid, and Allah will determine his place in Hell,” he concluded.
Additionally, the Uzbek-language pro-ISKP Telegram channels “Salomatqolb,” “Muvahhidlar Muhokamasi,” and “Xuroson Ovozi Nashri” denounced Hamas and its slain leader Haniyeh as apostates and political slaves of Shiite Iran.
Notably, the consistency of the propaganda publications and the unified negative reaction toward Hamas’ activities demonstrated the effective coordination between Islamic State Central’s official media and ISKP’s local jihadi outlets, both in terms of Islamic ideological content and hierarchical communication.
Al-Qaida Adapting Haniyeh’s Assassination to Amplify Anti-U.S. Sentiment
Al-Qaida, its Central-Asian affiliates, and pro-Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and pro-Taliban Uzbek and Tajik jihadi groups have taken a different stance than Islamic State-affiliated groups regarding the assassination of Haniyeh and the current state of the Israeli-Hamas war.
On July 31, 2024, al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) released a statement in Arabic, English, Urdu, and Pashto eulogizing Haniyeh and threatening Israel and the United States with retaliation for his murder. This marked the first such statement from an al-Qaida branch, aimed at its diverse audience of followers.
In contrast to the Islamic State, al-Qaida honored Haniyeh as a “prominent leader of the Mujahideen of Islam,” expressing “profound sorrow and grief” at his death. The AQIS statement expressed condolences “to the entire Muslim Ummah, to all the Mujahideen worldwide, and to the leadership, members, and Mujahid companions of Hamas and al-Qassam Brigades,” asserting that Haniyeh became a shahid at “the hands of the Jews, the eternal enemies of Allah, His Messenger, and the Muslims.”
The group elevated Haniyeh’s martyrdom to the stature of “prominent leaders of al-Qaida and the global jihadi movement, such as Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Azzam, alongside Hamas leaders like Ahmad Yassin,” signaling warming relations between al-Qaida and Hamas. AQIS asserted that the war in Gaza “is not merely a local conflict but a global war between Islam and kufr [non-belief]” The group called on its supporters to “target America and Israel, which are two faces of the same coin, waging a global war against Islam.”
In conclusion, al-Qaida assured that in the wake of Haniyeh’s assassination, the divine victory from Allah is imminent, heralding the liberation of Masjid al-Aqsa, the annihilation of the Jews, and the ultimate triumph of the Muslim Ummah against the global Zionist world.
Notably, al-Qaida and Hamas have a complex and contentious history. When Hamas won the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 2006, al-Qaida criticized them for participating in “polytheistic councils.” Al-Qaida also accused Hamas of “losing its religion” due to its involvement in international diplomacy.
Following al-Qaida’s recent statement, several aligned Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups in Afghanistan and Syria echoed the same propaganda framework in their responses to the assassination of Haniyeh. For instance, the Katibat al-Ghuraba al-Turkistan jihadi group, which comprises Uyghur, Uzbek, and local Arab militants and has extensively covered the events surrounding the Israel-Hamas war, referred to Haniyeh as a brave defender of Islam.
Abu Saloh, the former leader of the Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad group and one of the most noteworthy ideological standard-bearers of the Central Asian Salafi Jihadist movement, published two posts on his Telegram channel “Fikrlar.” In his first post, he accused Iran of providing Israel with information about Haniyeh’s whereabouts and eulogized him, along with his deceased children and grandchildren, as true shahids. In his second post, Abu Saloh observed that Hamas had previously lost more prominent and influential leaders than Haniyeh, yet this did not affect its combat effectiveness or its resolve to wage holy jihad against the Jewish invaders in Palestine. This resilience, according to him, indicates that Hamas has a robust system for training mujahideen leaders.
One of the widely-followed pro-Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad Telegram channels, “Ovozli Yangiliklar,” praised the martyrdom of Haniyeh, citing it as inspiration to continue holy jihad against the enemies of Islam. Furthermore, Uzbek, Russian, and Tajik-language Telegram channels that promote the jihadi ideology of al-Qaida, the Taliban, and HTS – such as “Guroba Media,” “Global Tahlil,” “Maxfiy Haqiat,” “Faruk Shami,” “Abu Valid,” and “Abdullah Azat” – sought to capitalize on the death of the Hamas leader. They accused Iran, the U.S., and Israel of committing genocide against Muslims in Gaza, thereby spreading anti-Jewish, anti-Shia, and anti-Western sentiments.
Conclusion
In conclusion, it is crucial to recognize that Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination has markedly influenced the radicalization of global Sunni jihadist organizations, including al-Qaida and the Islamic State, as well as their Central Asian regional affiliates. Despite their intense competition for global jihadi leadership and ideological differences with Hamas, both al-Qaida and the Islamic State have adeptly leveraged the October 7 attack, the ensuing conflict, and Haniyeh’s assassination to incite their followers to commit further attacks.
Although these groups, along with Central Asian jihadists, cannot directly affect the conflict in Gaza, the ongoing turmoil may exacerbate lone-wolf terrorist activities by radicalized Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek Salafi migrants in both Russia and the West, potentially mirroring incidents such as the Crocus City Hall attack.
It is essential to remember that recent post-Soviet terrorist attacks carried out by Tajik, Ingush, Chechen, and Dagestani Salafi lone-wolf operatives in France, Iran, Turkey, Moscow, and Dagestan as well as the foiled terror plots in Germany and France, were ideologically connected to the religious undertones of the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza.
The conflict in Gaza differs significantly from those in Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan, where Central Asians traveled to directly participate, collaborate with local insurgents, and thereby influence the conflicts from within. As demonstrated by the reactions of pro-Islamic State and pro-al-Qaida Central Asian Salafi-Jihadi groups to Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination, although unable to participate directly in the Israel-Hamas war, both factions are endeavoring to propagate their narratives to incite supporters against the Shia rafida axis and the U.S.-Israel “Crusader-Zionist” alliance.
The longer the Israel-Hamas war continues, the greater the threat of lone-wolf attacks among Central Asian Salafi migrants will become. Therefore, EU and U.S. intelligence agencies should delve deeper into the Salafi migrant environment and meticulously analyze their radicalization process, as their involvement in the Palestinian issue is felt more acutely in the West than in Central Asia.