The active U.S. election-season debate on China policy that was anticipated last year has not materialized. Partially this is due to the low priority of foreign policy overall in the 2024 campaign. For instance, the 2024 Democratic platform’s treatment of foreign policy, including China issues, came in the last of ten sections setting overall policy priorities. The 2024 Republican platform markedly played down China dangers when compared to Republican platforms in the 2016 and 2020 elections. And within the already-limited space for foreign policy debate, the controversy over the ongoing war over Gaza with 40,000 dead has undoubtedly overshadowed China matters and other foreign issues.
But perhaps of more importance in reducing any debate over China policy has been President Joe Biden’s solid record of constructively engaging bipartisan majorities in Congress. The Biden administration shepherded through Congress spending measures amounting to over $2 trillion to strengthen U.S. infrastructure, high technology industries, and advanced capacities in electric vehicles and related industries – all with a focus on competing with China. And the administration, with strong bipartisan congressional support, has established a wide range of so-called positions of strength in security, economic, and diplomatic relations throughout the Indo-Pacific region and with strong support from European allies and Canada, to counter China’s adverse ambitions.
In short, China policy is not controversial in considerable measure because Biden’s firm positions are in line with bipartisan congressional majorities, and his stance on the sensitive Taiwan issue is even tougher than that of any Republican presidential candidate in 2023-2024.
Against this background, some partisan outlets have recently criticized the Democratic ticket of Vice President Kamala Harris and Minnesota Governor Tim Walz for alleged pro-China leanings, which supposedly endanger U.S. national security. The evidence has focused on Walz’s engagement with China as an English language teacher in 1989-1990 and as a leader of student exchanges to China during his tenure as a high school teacher prior to entering Congress 20 years ago.
The partisan attacks have largely ignored Walz’s consistently strong criticism of the authoritarian Chinese government on human rights and oppression in Hong Kong and Tibet, among other issues. His service on the Congressional-Executive Commission on China is particularly noteworthy as this U.S. commission, since its inceptions in 2000, has been more consistently and sharply critical of authoritarian Chinese practices than any other U.S. government body.
The House of Representatives Oversight Committee has opened an investigation into Walz’s engagement with China for evidence of practices possibly endangering the United States. Yet Democratic partisans have been slow to point critically to much more tangible dangers for the United States in former president and Republican candidate Donald Trump’s uniquely ambiguous approach to China. Trump is well known for promising much higher tariffs on Chinese imports, but at the same time he has repeatedly departed markedly from bipartisan majorities in Congress and U.S. media and public opinion.
Trump has a tendency to play down China’s role in threatening the security and well being of the United States. His platform in 2024, noted above, not only departed from the harsh criticism of China’s threats seen in Republican platforms in 2016 and 2020, but it also avoided any reference to strong U.S. support for Taiwan prevalent in those earlier documents.
Also, candidate Trump has remained truly exceptional among contemporary U.S. leaders in repeatedly making very positive statements about Chinese leader Xi Jinping. At a July 21 campaign speech in Grand Rapids, Michigan, Trump used fawning language and made clear his respect for Xi – describing him as “brilliant,” “smart,” and “a fierce person because he controls 1.4 billion people with an iron fist.”
Trump’s seemingly obsequious rhetoric appealing to Xi reached a new high on August 8 when responding to a question at a press conference at his Mar-a-Lago estate about misinformation during the campaign. Trump said, “You have a lot of misinformation spread about China… I think I’m going to get along great with China. President Xi of China and I are very good friends, we met right here…”
If elected, he predicted more moments negotiating with the Chinese leader, saying, “I think we’re going to have a great relationship and I think it’s going to be mutually beneficial.” In Trump’s telling, the only issue in the China-U.S. relationship was that Trump “held him [Xi] responsible for COVID.”
Trump’s uniquely positive treatment of China and Xi has come in tandem with the former president’s equally unique ambiguity about defending Taiwan. He has repeatedly declined to say what he would do as president if China attacks Taiwan, asserting that answering the question would weaken his leverage in dealing with the crisis. Added to the weak support for Taiwan is Trump’s repeated criticism of Taiwan for allegedly taking advantage of the United States to overtake the U.S. in production of advanced computer chips.
One possible explanation of Trump’s behavior sees the former president maneuvering to reach an agreement with China’s leader that would greatly advantage the United States. Trump followed this practice in reaching his administration’s interim trade agreement with China in January 2020, but the promises made in that accord still remain unfulfilled four years later.
More important, the president’s exceptional rhetoric on China, while largely ignored in U.S. election debates, has had deleterious effects on U.S. influence in Asia. It’s now widely reported in specialist outlets and broader media that Asian governments, particularly U.S. allies and partners in the region, are moderating their policies toward China and tempering support for U.S. countermeasures against Chinese challenges. This trend is caused notably by Trump’s China policies, which raise regional doubts that the United States, if Trump is re-elected as president, can be counted on to help Asian partners in case they face serious challenges posed by rising China.
Going forward, it’s seems unlikely that the above issues will result in a significant China debate in the remaining months of the presidential election campaign. Nevertheless, the results of Trump’s posturing on China have weakened U.S. influence in the region. The situation adds complications to already difficult challenges for U.S. policy in seeking effective ways to counter challenges posed by China’s rise and regional and global ambitions at the expense of the United States and the prevailing international order.