Chinese and Thai mythology feature majestic flying beasts: the dragon and the half-human, half-eagle Garuda, respectively. When the two countries conducted their first joint air-force exercise in 2015, they aptly named it the “Falcon Strike” exercise, a nod to both states’ rich mythologies.
In August, China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) announced the upcoming Falcon Strike 2024, set to take place at Udorn Thani Air Base, a former U.S. military installation near the Gulf of Thailand. The exercise, which opened on August 19, will see the two air forces take part in drills simulating “cross-border support, forces deployment, joint air defense, [and] joint strike.”
Analysts have often criticized China’s joint military exercises as largely performative, heavily scripted events lacking in realistic training. However, past iterations of the Falcon Strike exercise have involved air-combat training between the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) and the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), including the deployment of advanced combat aircraft by both countries. Given the absence of territorial disputes or a common threat perception, what motivates these ongoing air combat exercises?
For China, these exercises not only enhance the PLAAF’s capabilities but also send a signal to the United States that military containment of China is not feasible due to its close defense relations with U.S. allies. On the other hand, Thailand’s participation serves to deflect potential U.S. criticism of its governance while extracting concessions from Washington.
Deflecting U.S. Criticism
Thailand and China conducted their first joint military exercise, codenamed “Strike,” in 2005. This exercise involved 60 special forces units from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Royal Thai Army (RTA). At the time, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra aimed to use such exercises to strengthen bilateral relations with China, which was increasingly becoming Thailand’s largest trading partner. Following the successful Strike exercise, Thailand and China signed the Joint Plan on Strategic Cooperation in 2007, outlining 15 areas of cooperation, including military and security collaboration.
Both countries agreed that the objective of these joint military exercises was to address common nontraditional security threats, such as transnational terrorism, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and natural disasters. Despite this agreement, Thailand was hesitant to engage in more substantive joint exercises with China, citing language barriers and differing military doctrines. Consequently, the scale of joint exercises remained relatively small compared to Thailand’s Cobra Gold exercises with the United States. For example, the Strike 2007 exercise involved only 30 special forces troops from both the PLA and the RTA, whereas the 2007 Cobra Gold exercise featured nearly 4,000 troops.
The joint military exercises between Thailand and China intensified following the deterioration of Thailand-U.S. relations after the 2014 coup. In response, the United States scaled down the annual Cope Tiger air force exercise, which also involved Singapore, while criticizing the Thai government for its democratic shortcomings. In this context, Thailand turned to alternative training partners, leading to the first Falcon Strike air combat exercise in 2015. Through the additional drill with China, Thailand was signaling to the United States that it had other options for military collaboration.
Similar dynamics can be observed in other branches of Thailand’s joint training with China. For example, between 2007 and 2014, the China-Thailand Exercise Blue Strike involved between 60 and 200 troops with limited participation of naval assets and aircraft. After the 2014 coup, the bilateral Blue Strike exercises expanded to nearly 500 troops, including naval assets and attack helicopters.
However, as the U.S. increasingly required its partners and allies to counter China’s growing influence in the region, it reinstated the original scope of the Cope Tiger air force exercise with Thailand and provided loans to Thailand for purchasing a fleet of F-16 fighter jets.
China’s Motivations for Air Combat Exercises With Thailand
Before 2005, China’s joint military exercises were primarily centered on Central Asia, driven by concerns over transnational terrorism following the 9/11 attacks. In 2005, China expanded its focus to include Thailand, marking its first joint military exercise with the country as part of its peripheral diplomacy. This strategy aimed to address regional concerns about China’s rise as a military and economic power by emphasizing cooperation on common nontraditional security challenges. For instance, the Blue Strike 2023 exercise included a maritime search and rescue component.
While most of China’s joint military exercises with Thailand have centered on counterterrorism, the Falcon Strike exercises have increasingly shifted toward conventional air warfare training between the RTAF and the PLAAF. This shift can be attributed to two key factors.
First, since assuming power in 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping has launched an ambitious “world-class” military modernization program aimed at ensuring the PLA can “fight and win wars” by 2050. A key element of this program is enhancing the PLAAF’s warfighting capabilities, especially given the ongoing military tensions with the United States in the South China Sea.
According to China’s 2015 Defense White Paper, “the PLAAF will boost its capabilities for strategic early warning, air strikes, air and missile defense, information countermeasures, airborne operations, strategic projection, and comprehensive support.” Joint air combat exercises with Thailand are particularly valuable for this goal, as Thailand’s air force adheres to U.S. military doctrines, providing the PLAAF with an opportunity to practice and refine its capabilities.
For example, during Falcon Strike 2015, Thailand’s air force decisively outperformed their Chinese counterparts in a simulated air combat exercise, prompting Chinese pilots to revise their tactics and procedures. Moreover, in the 2024 edition of the Falcon Strike exercise, China deployed an array of advanced combat aircraft such as the J-10C, the Y-20 transport aircraft, and the JH-7A fighter-bomber to compete against Thailand’s pilots.
Second, the Falcon Strike exercises also serve as a signal to the United States and its regional allies that military containment of China is unlikely to succeed. Thailand, a key U.S. ally in the region, demonstrates its reluctance to take sides in the China-U.S. competition through its participation in these exercises.
China has traditionally used joint military exercises with other states as high-profile signaling tools to assert its resolve in defending territorial integrity and to deter regional adversaries. For instance, in 2016, China and Russia conducted a joint naval exercise in the South China Sea following the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) ruling in favor of the Philippines.
The 2024 edition of the Falcon Strike exercise occurs amid escalating geopolitical tensions between the United States and China over the South China Sea. In April 2024, the U.S., Japan, Australia, and the Philippines conducted joint naval exercises in the region to counter China’s actions. Additionally, in May 2024, the U.S. and the Philippines held their largest-ever bilateral Balikatan Exercise, involving nearly 16,000 troops.
Against the backdrop of these developments, the Falcon Strike exercise allows China to demonstrate that a U.S.-led military containment is unlikely to succeed due to its close military ties with Thailand, a key U.S. ally in Southeast Asia.
The Garuda Meets the Dragon
Inevitably, there are limits to China’s Falcon Strike exercises with Thailand, as they are recent and smaller in scale compared to the United States’ Cope Tiger exercises. The Cope Tiger exercise, conducted annually since 1994, is estimated to involve more aircraft than the China-Thailand Falcon Strike exercise. Additionally, the U.S. has prohibited the RTAF from using F-16 fighter jets in joint training with the PLAAF, citing concerns over leaking military secrets.
Nevertheless, China’s commitment to deploying increasingly advanced fighter aircraft in the Falcon Strike exercises suggests that the scale and scope of these drills are likely to intensify in the coming years. This also signals a gradual shift toward more realistic, combat-oriented training to build up the PLAAF’s warfighting capabilities in Southeast Asia.
On Thailand’s end, recent political developments, such as the replacement of Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin by Paetongtarn Shinawatra, could draw criticism from the United States, particularly in light of the 2023 election outcomes. While Paetongtarn’s Pheu Thai Party finished second, her assumption of the premiership follows a complex political process in which Srettha was initially chosen as a compromise candidate. In this context, Thailand’s engagement in joint military exercises with China could be viewed as a strategic effort to strengthen ties with China while potentially alleviating concerns from the United States.