The increasing polarization of international politics indicates that the future will be characterized by an intensification of conflicts. And, as the tensions intensify between the world’s two largest nuclear weapons states, Russia and the United States, and potential nuclear near peer, China, the underpinning principle of the nuclear revolution theory will only grow in salience: nuclear wars cannot be won, and therefore should not be fought.
However, the return of great power competition has also galvanized skeptics of the nuclear revolution theory, who reject the logic and tenability of nuclear deterrence and advocate instead for nuclear superiority and a shift toward war-winning nuclear postures.
An understanding of nuclear deterrence, as engendered by the nuclear revolution theory, is critical in preserving peace and strategic stability. States may choose to pursue superiority, but this article argues that the nuclear revolution theory can more adeptly provide the requisite insights for policymakers and scholars alike to better navigate the challenges inherent in the return of great power competition between China, Russia, and the United States.
Nuclear deterrence can be defined as the threat of nuclear retaliation against an adversary for an attack on a state’s vital interests, thereby imposing costs that would significantly outweigh any potential gains. The material reality of nuclear weapons – that is, their limitless destructive potential – informs the principle that nuclear wars cannot be won. Bernard Brodie stated in 1946 that “the factor of increase of destructive efficiency is so great that there arises at once the strong presumption that the experience of the past concerning eventual adjustment might just as well be thrown out the window.”
In other words, pre-nuclear age major power war strategy became obsolete with the advent of nuclear weapons. Whereas once superiority in the size and breadth of forces had a decisive effect on warfighting, in the nuclear age the size of a nuclear weapons state’s forces is of less significance.
Nuclear superiority is of secondary importance with regards to nuclear deterrence, as even states with small nuclear forces can inspire restraint in larger nuclear weapons states. Because all it takes is for one nuclear weapon to penetrate a state’s defenses to cause unacceptable levels of damage, the battlefield and political utility of nuclear weapons in a nuclear war-fighting scenario is limited. As Susan Martin put it: “Nuclear warfighting is not a strategy for survival.” This irrefutable reality will remain important in understanding the geopolitical dynamics of the future. Indeed, this outlook is collectively echoed by the five nuclear weapons states recognized in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
A key concept informing this logic is Robert Jervis’ nuclear danger, which argues that the risk of nuclear war, rather than the nuclear balance of forces, reinforces the value of deterrence. To quote Jervis: “Since having more nuclear weapons or more nuclear options than the adversary cannot provide much assistance in terminating war, this posture should not provide a great peacetime advantage.”
This dynamic was observable in South Asia, when Pakistani forces crossed the Line of Control into India-controlled parts of contested Kashmir in 1999 (commonly known as the Kargil War). Instead of waging all-out war, India restrained from retaliating with nuclear force despite its advantage over Pakistan. Concomitantly, while Pakistan also possessed the capability to credibly retaliate with nuclear force, the Kargil War eventually de-escalated, and a reversion to crisis stability was achieved.
Because nuclear war would yield no victors, nuclear powers historically loathe to wage direct war against each other. The Cold War provides compelling evidence for this assertion. The Cuban Missile Crisis, arguably the closest the Soviet Union and the United States came to fighting a nuclear war, eventually ended in compromise between the superpowers. The resulting decision to undertake confidence-building measures, such as establishing a direct hotline between the states’ leaders, is emblematic of the aversion both the USSR and the U.S. had toward risking nuclear war.
Additionally, questions over whether new nuclear weapons states will emerge persist, with Iran touted by many as being on the brink of acquiring nuclear weapons. An emerging security dilemma in East Asia suggests that a new nuclear weapons state is a distinct and imminent possibility. But, as Kenneth Waltz stated, “History has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability.”
Indeed, in an era of re-emerging major power competition, the deterrent utility of nuclear weapons bodes well for the future of stability. Additionally, as the nuclear balance of forces plays a limited role in the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence, new nuclear weapons states need only possess a credible minimum deterrence capability to protect their vital interests.
The rising tensions in East Asia bring the concept of nuclear danger and the irrelevance of superiority into sharp focus. China’s nuclear capability is roughly 10 times smaller than the United States’, yet nuclear deterrence in East Asia remains stable. The Cuban Missile Crisis, the Kargil War, and an understanding of nuclear revolution theorists’ arguments regarding the material reality of nuclear weapons reinforce the idea that superiority is not required for nuclear weapons to have an effective deterrent effect.
Indeed, superiority is not the decisive factor in crisis de-escalation; rather, it is the possibility of nuclear retaliation that inspires restraint. That over 50 nuclear threats were made in the 20 years following the end of the Cold War, with none of them resulting in all-out war, is testament to the deterrent value of nuclear weapons and to the restraint the reality of deterrence imposes. This pattern suggests that the next 20 years could be no different, if superiority is not pursued.
However, if superiority is asymmetrically pursued by a nuclear weapons state, this would not give them an advantage. Instead, it would precipitate an inconclusive arms race, intensifying tensions and plunging the global security landscape into an indefinite state of danger and instability.
In recent years, prominent advocates of U.S. nuclear superiority – among Matthew Kroenig, Daryl Press, and Keir Lieber – have highlighted that technological advancements have eroded nuclear deterrence, arguing that U.S. nuclear strategy should reorient toward adopting a war-winning posture. The data compiled by Lieber and Press is compelling: “In 1985 a US intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) had only about a 54 percent chance of destroying a missile silo… in 2017 that figure exceeds 74 percent. The improvement in submarine-launched weapons is starker: from 9 percent to 80 percent.”
Nevertheless, the idea that improvements in the qualitative capabilities of nuclear weapons should warrant such drastic changes in strategy ignores the historic deterrent value and utility of nuclear weapons.
In their theses, Lieber and Press advocated for the United States to conduct a disarming first-strike, which would have a devastating effect on stability. “Today,” they wrote, “the United States stands on the verge of attaining nuclear primacy vis-à-vis its plausible great power adversaries. For the first time in decades, it could conceivably disarm the long-range nuclear arsenals of Russia or China with a nuclear first strike.”
A perfect first-strike, however, relies on an improbable best-case scenario for the nuclear aggressor. To discount any potential margin of error or miscalculation is imprudent, even with the most accurate intelligence and delivery systems.
Furthermore, as recent developments in international politics demonstrate, alliances between nuclear weapons states such as China, North Korea, and Russia, would exponentially increase the number of counterforce targets required for a disarming first strike to be successful. This undermines Lieber and Press’ logic of a new counterforce strategy, as outlined in their book “The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution.” In this new multipolar nuclear age, such shifts to the kinds of nuclear postures advocated by Lieber and Press would compromise the survivability of U.S. nuclear forces and make the United States less secure.
Any U.S. leader who would contemplate adopting Lieber and Press’ nuclear strategic prescriptions would risk jeopardizing U.S. vital interests in the process. As Kenneth Waltz poignantly stated: “Wars start more easily because the uncertainties of their outcomes make it easier to entertain illusions of victory. Contemplating war when the use of nuclear weapons is possible focuses one’s attention not on the probability of victory but on the possibility of annihilation.”
However, concepts such as nuclear deterrence and nuclear danger will continue to provide a strategic roadmap for policymakers and scholars alike. Nuclear weapons have served most effectively as a deterrent, preventing nuclear powers from engaging one another in direct conflict. “Nuclear weapons,” wrote Waltz, “dissuade states from going to war.” The historical evidence demonstrates that the reality of nuclear deterrence has facilitated peace and stability. Therefore, calls for a change in U.S. nuclear strategy, from one of strategic deterrence to one of offensive nuclear warfighting, are misguided. Thus, the role nuclear weapons must play in the future of international politics is as a strategic deterrent, securing vital interests, preventing conflicts, and dissuading acts of aggression between nuclear weapons states.
The advancements in nuclear weapons technology do not alter the material reality of nuclear weapons or eradicate the “possibility of annihilation.” Hence, nuclear weapons states will continue to be averse to risking nuclear escalation. As China and Russia strive to challenge the United States for global predominance, the underpinning principle of the nuclear revolution will become ever more salient: nuclear wars cannot be won, and therefore should not be fought.
An abridged version of this article was published by the Royal United Services Institute.