South Korea is grappling with a plunging birth rate. According to the latest figures, births per woman have fallen to 0.72, the lowest since the nation broke the critical fertility threshold of 2.1 in 1984. The current number is significantly below the replacement fertility rate and represents the lowest rate among all OECD countries – and it’s projected to drop ever lower, to 0.68 for 2024.
How grave is this situation? Imagine a population size of 200, half men and half women. Assuming 70 percent of the women give birth to one child over the course of their lifetime, the population would add 70 children. If half of those (35) are women, and 70 percent of those women had one child, the number of new births would shrink to around 25 in the next generation. That is a whopping 88 percent decrease (from 200 to 25) in just two generations.
Dr. Lee Sang-lim, a population studies expert, warns that South Korea is facing an existential crisis due to these alarming demographic trends. As a principal researcher at the Seoul National University’s Population Policy Research Center and a civilian advisor to the Parliamentary Task Force on the Population Crisis, Lee brings extensive expertise to the issue.
The Diplomat recently interviewed Lee to gain deeper insights.
How serious is South Korea’s birth rate?
South Korea’s declining birth rate has unfolded in three stages. The first stage emerged around 2002 when the annual number of births fell below 500,000. This decline can be traced back to the economic hardships and restructuring that followed the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
The second stage, from 2005 to 2015, saw fluctuating fertility rates, but the trend took a sharper downward turn beginning in 2015. During this third phase starting in 2015, the number of married couples with children decreased, and so did the fertility rate of newlyweds. Around the same time, the migration of young people from non-Seoul metropolitan areas to urban cities also surged noticeably.
A fertility rate of 0.72 is historically unprecedented. Similar instances occurred when Germany reunified in 1990 – East Germany’s fertility rate dipped to 0.77 in 1994 – and during the Great Depression, when fertility rates in major European cities like Vienna fell below 1.00. But those contractions were temporary. What makes South Korea’s current situation unique is that this dramatic drop is happening in the absence of a specific economic or security crisis.
What are the main factors contributing to the birth rate decline since 2015?
In 2015, fertility rates across all age groups suddenly dropped, a phenomenon known as a period effect. Several factors contributed to this decline. One was a steep increase in rental prices, where young people found it increasingly difficult to afford a home with their earned income. This challenge was compounded in 2019 when housing prices began to skyrocket.
Policy missteps played a significant role in these developments. Starting in 2010, the government raised the maximum loan amount and expanded the availability of rental loans to stimulate the real estate market, inadvertently driving up both housing and rental costs.
In addition to tangible factors, a significant shift in perception emerged among the younger generation around 2010. This period coincides with the widespread adoption of smartphones and the rise of social media. As young people began comparing their lifestyles and consumption habits with others online, a new form of competition surfaced – one between consumption and procreation. Many have become increasingly materialistic, prioritizing the display of their lifestyles on social media over the traditional path of marriage and family life, the latter of which is often financially burdensome and less glamorous.
What consequences can be expected as a result of a low birth rate?
First, education and childcare will become increasingly problematic. Many kindergartens and schools in rural areas are already closing, and this trend is expected to intensify over the next decade. Universities across the country are also feeling the impact of declining enrollment.
Local industrial sectors will also face a severe crisis. Domestic industries such as construction, transportation, food and beverage, and accommodation will experience decreased production and a shrinking market. By the end of the decade, the elderly population will rise, exacerbating issues related to welfare. One thing to note is that the population aging will accelerate in tandem with the declining birth rate, compounding the challenges ahead.
Some experts suggest that immigration could help fill these gaps. Yet it is unlikely to be sufficient to mitigate the population crisis. South Korea’s immigration policy is geared toward addressing labor shortages rather than tackling broader population issues. While this approach can alleviate immediate workforce needs, it has its limitations.
The country’s shrinking society prioritizes productivity and efficiency, yet most immigrants arriving in South Korea are manual laborers who largely do not contribute to innovation or productivity gains. Therefore, expanding immigration under the current framework could actually exacerbate existing social conflicts.
Could you elaborate on the security implications that arise from a low birth rate?
The rapid decline in military personnel poses a significant challenge for South Korea, particularly given the highly structured nature of its armed forces. Each soldier has a specific, tightly organized mission, which becomes increasingly difficult to fulfill as troop numbers dwindle.
Such a situation necessitates a reorganization of the military system, involving the integration of more advanced and scientific machinery to maintain operational effectiveness. However, this transition comes at a challenging time. As the elderly population grows, a larger portion of the national budget will need to be allocated to social services, leaving insufficient funds for costly state-of-the-art weaponry. I refer to this as a clash between national security and social security.
If you look at Northeast Asia, the birthrate in China, Japan, North Korea, and even Russia has reached or is reaching a critical level. In the next 10 to 20 years, the balance of military and security forces in the region will need to be reconfigured to address these demographic realities. While some argue that a shrinking population might reduce the likelihood of conflict and contribute to regional stability, the absence of a recalibrated balance of power could lead to serious security consequences.
How do you assess the Yoon Suk-yeol administration’s policies?
The Yoon administration is focusing heavily on expanding funding for housing and childcare. However, these policies are primarily aimed at married couples with some assets and stable jobs, overlooking the broader population. To drive long-term change, deeper structural issues like job market instability, education reform, lowering housing prices, and addressing regional disparities must be addressed. Most importantly, though, a shift in the mindset of the younger generation is crucial to reversing the current demographic trends.
Can Japan serve as a blueprint for South Korea?
Many people look to Japan, which faced a declining birth rate and an aging population before Korea. True, Japan experienced population aging earlier than South Korea, but the pace and underlying problems are not the same.
For instance, if you take a look at social surveys, there are notable differences in how social values are evolving in the two countries surrounding family dynamics and gender roles. In South Korea, societal values and perceptions are shifting rapidly, creating a pronounced gap between older and younger generations. It’s no exaggeration to say that young and middle-aged populations live in almost entirely different worlds. In contrast, Japan’s social values are changing more gradually, resulting in a less obvious generational gap. This slower pace of change may help explain why Japan’s birth rate, while still low, remains more stable compared to South Korea’s.
However, this doesn’t necessarily mean that young people in Japan are better off than those in South Korea. Although Japanese youth might have a more solid outlook in economic terms, it’s difficult to argue that they are better positioned when it comes to gender equality or the influence of generational politics, where policymaking is often dictated by the older generation.
What state could serve as a model for South Korea, then?
It’s difficult to find a case similar to South Korea’s, but Germany stands out as a potential model. Under former Chancellor Angela Merkel [2005-2021], Germany implemented a range of policies to address its declining birth rate, leading to a gradual improvement in the situation. Germans approached the birth rate issue through a “demographic strategy,” which recognizes the complex interaction between population dynamics and society. These efforts included labor market reforms, strengthening of small- and medium-sized enterprises, and introducing various family policies.
In contrast, South Korea’s approach focuses largely on trying to control and manage its population – a strategy that is both risky and ineffective. Addressing the declining fertility rate is a challenge that demands the reconciliation of diverse interests, making the role of politics increasingly crucial.