Note: This article accompanies an earlier article about a poem that aired grievances about the conduct of some resistance groups in Myanmar’s central Dry Zone.
Saing Nai Gyi village, in Sagaing Region’s Wetlet Township, sits at the historic heart of Myanmar’s central Dry Zone, or Anyar. It lies 15 kilometers west of the Hanlin UNESCO World Heritage Site covering the ruins of one of Myanmar’s earliest city-states, and 12 kilometers south of Shwebo, the cradle and first capital of the pre-colonial Konbaung dynasty.
These days, the village is controlled by the local franchise of the National Unity Government (NUG)’s Pa-Thone-Lone (“Three Pa’s”) grassroots organs comprising the People’s Administration Teams (Pa-Ah-Pha, or PATs), the People’s Security Teams (Pa-La-Pha or PSTs), and the auxiliary People’s Defense Teams (Pa-Ka-Pha, or PDTs).
On July 8, the village was shocked by a grisly murder. Sixteen-year-old Myint Myat Oo, member of the anti-regime Wetlet Township Student’s Union, was found on his way home with his throat slit and body battered. The All Burma Federation of Student Unions (ABFSU) demanded that the NUG examine the case, and the latter’s Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration subsequently announced an investigation.
While not explicitly blaming anybody for the murder, the ABFSU accused the Wetlet PAT of targeting student union members and denounced its “authoritarian practices.” Its members recounted that the Wetlet PAT had dispersed a student protest using sound grenades and threatened to shoot at students for flying a drone. The ABFSU’s current chair said that there were “many undocumented civilian deaths” in resistance-controlled areas and that the NUG “repeatedly ignored” complaints against PATs’ “violent conduct.” His predecessor added that there had been numerous allegations of PATs and PSTs conducting extrajudicial killings “all over Anyar.” On top of these, the Saing Nai Gyi PST reportedly killed a villager while forcing a confession over Myint Myat Oo’s murder.
A Poem
The teen’s death came six weeks after a pro-resistance poet published an elegy lamenting Anyar’s destruction, mostly at the hands of regime troops. The poem also alleged that resistance organizations like the Pa-Thone-Lones and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) armed by the NUG were “oppressing” civilians in Anyar and implored the parallel government to address issues.
The poem alluded to three factors hinting at the messy reality of resistance rule in Anyar: frictions and factionalism among various groups; abuse allegations against Pa-Thone-Lone and PDF outfits alongside resentment towards resistance checkpoints; and the perception that jubilant proclamations by faraway pro-resistance voices are becoming harder to square with lived realities on the ground.
The poem gained traction among activists, journalists, and some netizens, as well as on pro-regime platforms. Others dismissed the poem as a smear against the NUG, countering that such problems either don’t exist or are isolated teething pains. Yet underneath the daily reports of junta-perpetrated atrocities, there is a constant drip of complaints lending credence to the poem’s allegations.
For context, Anyar is regarded as the NUG’s main theater of operations as it is the Bamar majority’s heartland and lacks substantive ethnic armed organization (EAO) presence. Reflecting the bottom-up evolution of the post-coup protest and subsequent armed resistance landscapes, a dizzying mosaic has emerged, comprising hundreds of anti-regime outfits.
The NUG’s Ministry of Defense (NUG-MOD) says that there are over 300 PDF “battalions” and over 250 township-based groups, a sizeable chunk of which operate in the central Dry Zone. Another tally estimates that there are around 150 PDF groups operating in the three regions comprising Anyar. These groups vary in size, capacity, modus operandi, and operational independence. Most struck out on their own with the NUG now working to corral them under its chain of command. Meanwhile, Pa-thone-lones are said to be present in 188 townships across the seven Bamar-majority regions.
Frictions and Factionalism
The multifarious evolution of Anyar’s resistance landscape has seen some areas devolving into fiefs. PDFs professing allegiance to the NUG or integrated into its chain of command on paper are not necessarily under its control, with some commentators claiming that there is no actual chain. This has manifested in squabbles, brawls, clashes, shootouts, competing detentions, turf wars and executions among rival resistance groups, which are riven by divergent priorities and personal loyalties. Similar incidents have occurred among PDF groups in the country’s deep south as well.
Frictions and clashes have been reported between NUG-affiliated PDFs, Pa-thone-lones, and independent Local Defense Forces (LDFs) or Local PDFs (LPDFs), as well as among and between themselves. Some NUG-affiliated PDFs and Pa-thone-lones are accused of bullying independent outfits, including curtailing the movement and threatening to forcibly expel or disarm such groups. One Magway-based journalist said that some groups have turned to “warlordism.” NUG supporters insist that groups will only gain legitimacy and broad public support by placing themselves under the parallel government’s chain of command. Local groups counter that they have been resisting the regime on the ground from the onset with whatever resources they could muster and at great personal cost, and thus deserve to be seen as partners rather than subordinates.
The NUG-MOD has reportedly entrusted PDTs with greater authority over frontline PDF units. This has contributed to tensions, given that the PDTs are often seen as inexperienced pencil-pushers or people appointed from afar on the basis of loyalty rather than competence. On top of this, activists allege that NUG officials retain personal “pocket armies” exclusively loyal to them. One commander said that the lack of an interim revolutionary government in Anyar was due to pervasive factionalism and nepotism while an NUG-affiliated broadcaster argued that factionalism is mainly driven by groups being more interested in canvassing donations by posting unsubstantiated attacks on social media.
A frequent source of friction is between NUG-aligned groups and the Burma National Revolutionary Army (BNRA, formerly the Myanmar Royal Dragon Army), a purportedly 3,000-strong independent outfit led by Bo Nagar and based in Sagaing’s Pale township. With a strong social media following, its eloquent commander through his frequent videos has accused the NUG-MOD of “acting just like the regime” and turning a blind eye to abuses by its subordinates within the chain of command. He also said that NUG-affiliated groups frequently accuse the BNRA of extrajudicial killings to torpedo his standing, and claimed that local Pa-thone-lone authorities “consistently ignored” his efforts to “foster unity.” A recent incident involved a Pale township PAT official detaining a BNRA commander for allegedly abducting a colleague, only for the abductee’s body to be discovered in the PAT functionary’s cellar. Villagers later protested when the PAT claimed that the person had died of natural causes.
NUG supporters counter that the BNRA only attacks regime forces selectively. It has instead become a vehicle for Bo Nagar’s personal power. A NUG-aligned commander based in Pale cryptically alluded that “groups threatening people hinder the revolution and must be opposed just like the regime.” Last August, Bo Nagar also had a very public spat with an extremely popular NUG-affiliated militant influencer over a purported lack of NUG support, with their respective online supporters eagerly fanning the online flame war. NUG-BNRA spats are also a popular font of social media content.
Abuse Allegations
These tensions and clashes are a source of disappointment for resistance supporters but the larger, more serious issue, as well as the poem’s main complaint to the NUG, is the string of abuse allegations made against various Pa-thone-lone franchises and PDF units. Problems in Anyar have reached the point that the term “Pa-thone-lone problem” is now used by local activists, news pages, and villagers as a catch-all for all sorts of grievances against the constituent branches. This was also a key discussion point at the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC)’s Second People’s Assembly, though it became a touchy subject with the NUG and its legislative arm reportedly boycotting the last day of the assembly over the matter.
Debris is seen in the St. Peter Baptist Church-Kanan, which was struck by the suspected military’s aerial attacks in Kanan village, Khampat town, Sagaing region on Jan. 8, 2024. (David Htan via AP, File)
The best-known single case of abuse involves members of the Chaung-U PDT raping and executing seven youths in August 2022. Another unit gained notoriety for repeated abuses and executions. In July, brawls erupted after 200 truckers protested against a PDF unit in Sagaing’s Maharmyaing forest for detaining and using them as human shields. The PDF later arrested some drivers and reportedly threatened to make them walk over minefields.
Other allegations include intimidation, the forcible dispersion and arrest of protesters, physical violence, forced donations, sexual abuse, torture, deaths under interrogation, and extrajudicial killings. At times, these incidents are covered up as hits on regime targets with netizens accepting and celebrating the claims at face value. Businesses have complained of outfits ransoming owners or demanding hefty sums as protection money, and labeling those who fail to pay as regime supporters. A commentator also said that the prevalence of Pa-thone-lone problems is tied to taxation opportunities, with certain outfits pocketing revenues and doctoring figures. Pa-thone-lone and support groups are also accused of profiteering by engaging as weapons smugglers. PDFs in southern Myanmar have also been accused of similar behaviors.
A particular irritant is the proliferation of resistance-manned tollgates to the extent that the rhyme, “Twelve inches one foot, three feet one gate,” is now used to mock the checkpoints. These gates are often manned by different outfits, with some villages allegedly having multiple posts. The tolls are said to range from about 5,000 kyats ($1) up to millions depending on the situation. The outfits tend to ignore the NUG’s orders not to tax civilians, arguing that they receive inadequate funding. Villagers counter that some outfits squeeze ordinary civilians at such gates while protecting illegal logging, gold mining, and charcoal production. Others further allege that the gates take a cut of food supplies, which in combination with the regime’s own predatory gates, further worsen spiraling prices in Anyar.
Villagers are also increasingly protesting against Pa-thone-lones over issues such as taxation, arbitrary detentions, opaqueness, and corruption, as well as demanding reforms. On top of these complaints, there has been at least one documented incident of PDFs beheading prisoners of war and civil servants. Pro-regime telegram channels sporadically post videos of purported PDF executions of civilians that are impossible to verify, but some appear genuine. PDF units have also targeted and abducted civil servants, monks, passenger buses and microfinance workers, threatened companies for complying with regime rules, and appear to copy the regime’s tactics of targeting women, children and family members when attacking pro-regime villages or alleged informants (dalans).
Messy Realities
While mainly grieving about the situation on the ground, the poem also calls out “mercenary lobbyists harping from the safety of afar.” This tapped into the sentiment that even though there is universal animosity towards the junta, the romanticized portrayals of conflict dominating social media and the exuberant narratives spun from safe distances do not reflect the messy realities of war.
Influencers write rousing posts glorifying conflict while protests “pray for more war.” Constantly promising imminent victory, they become conflict cheerleaders celebrating urban battles as towns being “sold out.” Others claim that international donors are waiting in the wings to throw money at post-war reconstruction efforts even as Myanmar’s humanitarian requirements have been consistently underfunded.
Pro-resistance netizens also tend to be very defensive of anti-junta groups, either dismissing allegations or pleading for “understanding.” They claim that they “cannot wait” to embrace resistance fighters when battles reached their towns while berating elder people unenthusiastic for conflict as “Gen Lee” (meaning “Generation Penis”). A few even assert that they are ready to make the ultimate sacrifice and urge fellow citizens to wager everything for the revolution. Often, such voices emanate from the safety of Yangon or abroad and bear little consequence for their rhetoric.
Popular and influential news channels serve as de facto propaganda platforms providing reductionist coverage, obfuscating inconvenient issues, and fostering a toxic media space. One commentator said that “some” abuses are “unsuitable to be disclosed” as they could “harm the revolution.” A PST official said that “two-thirds” of Pa-thone-lone abuses are not reported, as villagers self-censor for fear of being labeled as dalans, which often leads to attacks and forced disappearances. Sources from Shwebo, Monywa, and Pakokku districts separately told the author that local communities have given up airing “many” abuse grievances to media platforms as it is both ineffectual and risky.
This brew of self-censorship, a hyper-partisan media landscape, and militant influencers mean that it is probable that the aforementioned allegations represent only the tip of the iceberg.
Going Forward
It is important to stress that the scope and scale of allegations directed at resistance units pale greatly when compared to the mountain of accusations made against regime forces. The poem vividly depicts the depravity and impunity with which the junta is trying to stamp out resistance. And nobody is talking of switching sides, with communities still petitioning for the NUG to address their grievances.
Recent events have kicked the Pa-thone-lone problems out of focus, yet the problems persist. Local resistance officials admit that Pa-thone-lone issues are widespread across most townships, with the franchises now “widely loathed” by “most villages.” One PDF member said that some outfits are now forced to buy rations as terrified villagers now refuse to donate.
A key protest leader recently said that Pa-thone-lone problems have worsened and urged the NUG to quickly address the matter or risk losing public support. This is echoed by other activists and local media platforms. One Sagaing commentator said that addressing the problems will take a year at most but failure to do so will result in catastrophic consequences within the same timeframe as well. The abuses, combined with sentiments that the NUG remains stuck in “Zoomtopia” and is slow in responding to allegations, are fueling perceptions of “bothsideism.”
In some ways, Anyar’s messy situation shouldn’t be seen in a completely negative light. It is a manifestation of the country’s bottom-up, organic revolution, with villagers’ protests showing that local communities are still willing to defend democratic ideals. However, amid the chaos, some netizens and commentators are holding up EAOs, particularly the Three Brotherhood Alliance, as exemplars and praising their “decisiveness” and the “obedience” of ethnic communities. But these epithets and cherry-picked admirations ignore the fact that many major EAOs have increasingly displayed authoritarian, antagonistic and unaccountable behavior as they have gained more territory.
Resistance supporters insist that the only way forward is to strengthen the NUG through recognition and support. They argue that improving its capabilities not only against the regime but also vis-à-vis powerful EAOs and independent outfits will ensure that the armed revolution remains true to democratic and inclusive ideals.
For its part, the NUG is reporting some progress. It has launched probes into complaints and has also established three complaints committees. In April, the NUG’s home affairs minister pledged to crack down on unruly outfits while also pledging to establish a guiding mechanism to resolve frictions and abuses. Officials have also pledged to strengthen the chain of command and coordination mechanisms, and point to recent battlefield performances as proof of such efforts.
No revolution is perfect. And for families of people like Myint Myat Oo and Anyar communities like Saing Nai Gyi, whether a resistance victory translates into a victory for democracy, accountability, and justice remains to be seen.