Olaf Scholz’s visit to Central Asia from September 15 to 17 was long overdue. Fourteen years had passed since a German chancellor last set foot in Kazakhstan – and more than two decades for Uzbekistan.
Scholz looked a bit like a latecomer, as his visit was preceded by other well-known European leaders: France’s Emmanuel Macron, the Netherlands’ Mark Rutte, Hungary’s Viktor Orban, and the president of the European Council, Charles Michel – they all were in Central Asia before the German leader.
But Germany’s foreign minister and president had already laid some groundwork with trips to the region in 2022 and 2023. Exactly one year ago, in Berlin, Scholz became the first European head of government to establish a “regional strategic partnership” with Central Asia, foreseeing regular meetings with the five regional leaders in the so-called “C5+Germany” format.
The second meeting with the “C5” (or “Z5,” as they are called in Germany), served as the right occasion for the head of Europe’s largest economy to visit the region, which finds itself wrenched between Russia, China, Iran, and India. Scholz’s three-day trip nevertheless demonstrated the country’s unequal engagement with the five countries, which differ in size and political openness. On day one, the chancellor traveled to Uzbekistan; on day two he arrived in Kazakhstan. For Scholz, it seemed to suffice to meet the other three leaders on the third day, on the sidelines of the multilateral “Z5” summit in the Kazakh capital, Astana.
Oil, Green Hydrogen, and Critical Raw Materials
This prioritization came as no surprise: Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are the region’s demographic and economic powerhouses – and Germany’s most important trade partners in Central Asia. Scholz was accompanied on his trip by a large business delegation.
Kazakhstan has become Germany’s third-largest supplier of crude oil after Berlin stopped oil imports from Russia last year. Ironically, however, the Kazakh oil flows through the Russian Druzhba pipeline, providing Moscow with transition fees.
Berlin and Astana extended the contract for one more year this week. Yet Germany chose to expand its volume only marginally – despite the Kazakh side offering many more barrels.
It’s not just about the oil business, though. The trade volume between Germany and Kazakhstan rose by 41 percent in 2023, and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev welcomed the 64 percent increase in German direct investment, expressing hopes that German companies would expand their presences and produce products “made in Kazakhstan with German quality.”
In this vein, business and state institutions signed 36 agreements and declarations worth $6.3 billion, ranging from finance over green hydrogen to agricultural machinery. The Kazakh transport ministry sealed a $500-million agreement with a Kazakh-German consortium to build a cargo-passenger airport in Khorgos, a major logistical hub close to the border with China.
Tokayev also praised plans by Germany’s mining company HMS Bergbau to explore and process lithium in East Kazakhstan. The company has acquired licenses for copper, lithium and other rare earths over the past two years. But its CEO warned that more money and co-investors were needed; he also pointed to the political risks of doing business in the authoritarian state. At the same time, German companies face strong competition from Chinese actors, who appear willing to take larger financial risks in exploring critical raw materials.
Thus it would be a promising step if the German Mineral Resource Agency (DERA) and Kazakh partners would set up a consortium for purchasing critical materials soon. The plan was announced by Tokayev at a bilateral business forum on Monday.
The German delegation’s discussions in Uzbekistan, too, had a strong emphasis on cooperation in critical raw materials and green hydrogen. Addressing the “Z5+1” summit two days later, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev suggested a stronger involvement of the German Mineral Resource Agency in the region.
Tajikistan’s president, too, pitched his country’s hydroelectric potential and ambition to produce green ammonium, copper, and lithium to the German business delegation.
Kyrgyzstan’s president, speaking about the green potential and need for a regional approach to tackle climate change and water shortages, proposed establishing a regional center for energy-efficient and resource-saving technologies (of course, in his capital, Bishkek). The Kyrgyz president also asked the German chancellor for debt relief for the financing of green projects and, like his Tajik counterpart, advertised a large-scale hydropower project.
A “Mobility Partnership” or Just a Bargaining Chip for Deporting Afghan Nationals Through Uzbekistan?
Apart from trade and energy, the chancellor also tried to work on one of the grave domestic troubles his unpopular coalition government is grappling with: migration.
Germany’s Minister of Interior Nancy Faeser accompanied Scholz to Uzbekistan to sign a “Comprehensive Migration and Mobility Partnership,” which had been negotiated for about a year and a half. The deal is part of a wider system of bilateral migration agreements, in which partner states pledge to readmit nationals who have no right to stay in Germany. A few days earlier, Germany inked such a document with Kenya.
In the case of Uzbekistan, however, it is not Uzbek migrants that are of concern, but Afghans.
While the German government refused to comment on the negotiations, the first reports on Germany’s attempt to strike a deal emerged during the summer. Like most countries, Germany does not recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan and thus rejects any official cooperation with them. As Tashkent is said to have stable working relations with Afghanistan, Berlin sought it as a middleman for the planned deportations. In August, with the help of Qatar, Germany deported Afghan nationals for the first time since the Taliban took over the country after the U.S. withdrawal. More deportation flights were planned, said Faeser.
Yet it is still unclear if and how Uzbekistan will fulfill its role. After signing the agreement, both Scholz and his minister remained tight-lipped on this matter when pressed by journalists. According to a media report, however, the signed document includes a general provision for the transfer of criminal offenders via Uzbekistan. Reportedly, both sides already discussed plans to transfer deportees to Uzbekistan with the Afghan Airline Kam Air; Berlin also considered direct flights between Leipzig and Kabul.
But why should Tashkent be interested in helping Germany to deport Afghans? Because Germany offered to ease restrictions on Uzbek nationals in return.
In theory, the agreement addresses Germany’s severe shortage of skilled labor. Faeser mentioned health care, the construction sector, and IT as sectors that could benefit from hiring Uzbek workers. Yet no figures or targets were presented to illustrate how many Uzbeks could be covered by the agreement, and no plan was presented on how to integrate workers into German labor markets – casting doubt on whether Germany is genuinely interested in hiring skilled workers strategically, or just using eased regulations as a bargaining chip for readmissions.
Visa regulations, in general, have been highly asymmetrical between Europe and Central Asia. While most Central Asian states allow European nationals, including Germans, to roam their countries for 30 days without a visa, their nationals face severe travel restrictions. This has caused much dismay, and the countries have been pushing the EU to start negotiations on visa liberalization. This was also echoed in a joint declaration concluding Scholz’s visit, in which Germany vowed to support the EU Commission’s negotiations with Kazakhstan. Furthermore, the first meeting of a German-Kazakh working group on readmissions was announced for 2025.
Deeper Cooperation, Even With NATO?
A look at the joint declarations endorsed by Scholz is quite instructive. The one with Kazakhstan is twice as long as with Uzbekistan, listing more concrete initiatives and institutionalized collaboration. In particular, Germany and Kazakhstan established strong ties between universities and research institutions, especially in the technological sector. New projects are in the pipeline, including a German-Kazakh school in Astana, an institute for sustainable engineering, and potential exchanges of German and Russian language teachers at the university level. The German side also committed to further supporting environmental initiatives, green energy transition, and digitalization in both countries.
Interestingly, the second item of the joint declaration adopted between Germany and Uzbekistan concerns defense and security, an area in which the EU and Germany mostly provide training and light equipment to border guards and police forces. Germany’s main development agency, GIZ, for example, cooperates with four Central Asian governments – all but Turkmenistan – on the “prevention of violent extremism in Central Asia”.
In the German-Uzbek declaration, however, Berlin and Tashkent further agree on “exploring opportunities… within the framework of the Partnership of Peace Program,” referring to NATO’s main initiative for cooperation with third states, which Uzbekistan joined in 1994.
Although the formulation is fairly general, it taps into the most explosive policy area. It comes at a time when NATO states and Russia face high noon in Ukraine and security relations with China are increasingly hostile, including with Germany whose navy now participates in freedom of navigation missions in the Taiwan Strait. Any move by NATO in Central Asia will be monitored closely. It thus speaks of Uzbekistan’s balancing act and self-confidence to signal openness to further security cooperation with NATO while expanding trade, energy, and cultural relations with Russia.
Tokayev: “Russia Cannot Be Defeated”
Nevertheless, it does not mean that Germany’s chancellor found like-minded partners. The Uzbek and Kazakh presidents generally avoided critical questions in public as they held no joint press conferences after their bilateral meetings with Scholz.
According to the Kazakh presidential administration, Scholz even faced a strong rebuff from Tokayev, who was asked about his opinion on the war during the closed meeting.
“In military terms, it is a fact that Russia cannot be defeated,” the Kazakh president was quoted as saying. “The further escalation of the war will lead to irreparable consequences for all humanity and, above all, for all countries directly involved in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.”
His remarks that “a good chance to achieve at least a truce was missed with the refusal to conclude the Istanbul Agreement” might be read as a veiled criticism of Germany’s position. Tokayev backed the Sino-Brazilian initiative, which called for negotiations as the only viable solution in May (and was subsequently slammed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy). While the German side named Russia the aggressor responsible for the continuation of the war, Tokayev reminded Scholz of the growing relations and “strategic partnership” between Kazakhstan and Russia.
Different Views on Afghanistan and How to End the War in Ukraine
Tokayev’s call for negotiations may shock some transatlantic observers, who have previously focused on incidents where he seemed to snub Putin in public by holding up Ukraine’s territorial integrity, speaking Kazakh, and vowing that his country would comply with sanctions imposed on Russia. Yet it has been largely overlooked that, at the first Z5+Germany meeting in 2023, he already opposed what he called “sanction confrontations.”
“We believe that the time has come for constructive diplomacy to find a mutually acceptable formula for peace and cooperation,” Tokayev said last year.
In August this year, Kazakhstan’s deputy prime minister stated bluntly that his country “won’t blindly follow sanctions” if they hurt domestic companies that function as main employers in their areas.
In the end, Scholz may return home with the right impression that Central Asians neither align with Russia, nor the West. Instead, the five regional states have demonstrated confidence and a strong sense of self-interest. They engage happily with any partner available, especially when it helps them to modernize their economies and infrastructure. But Europe is one partner among many. And when it comes to promoting good governance and addressing the grave human rights situation, Germany may have to come to terms with its limits, too.
Tellingly, the Uzbek and Turkmen presidents urged the German chancellor to normalize relations with Afghanistan and take a more pragmatic approach to the Taliban-ruled country.
Lack of Strategy, Lack of Leadership
Most unfortunate, however, was that Scholz’s visit gave off the impression that the chancellor traveled with the business delegation, and not the other way around. Scholz displayed what he is criticized for at home: a lack of vision and leadership. Although the trip was announced to “bring to life” the strategic regional partnership, he failed to send any memorable messages or signal a commitment that would go beyond the already established bilateral and multilateral trade and development ties.
Suspiciously, it was the Kazakh president who announced the upcoming establishment of a German consortium for critical raw materials, not his German guest. And while it seemed convenient to engage with the apparently “less important” Central Asian states through the multilateral Z5+1 format on the last day, Scholz had to listen to lengthy speeches in which five assertive presidents promoted their countries rather than a tangible, multilateral strategy.
EU representatives, however, will read the final joint declaration by the “Z5+1” with some satisfaction, as the EU’s Central Asia strategy and regional platforms visibly provide the backbone for Germany’s diplomatic engagement with Central Asia.
In the end, Scholz succeeded in institutionalizing the Z5+Germany framework as an annual opportunity for discussing a patchwork of initiatives and dialogues. But to breathe life and strategy into the regional partnership, it requires more political investment, showing that Central Asia is a true priority. There will be opportunities: the summit concluded with an announcement of a civil society conference in Berlin in November and a foreign ministers’ meeting in spring 2025.