Amid ongoing border tensions with China, India commissioned its second nuclear-powered submarine, INS Arighaat, at Visakhapatnam on August 29, in the presence of Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and other senior defense and military officials. While the Arighaat was commissioned into the Indian Navy, the new submarine will operate under the Strategic Forces Command, which oversees India’s nuclear arsenal.
The induction of India’s second nuclear-powered submarine (SSBN) enhances India’s options to maintain credible second-strike capabilities against its nuclear-armed neighbors. Singh, in his address at the commissioning ceremony, exuded confidence that the 6,000-tonne Arighaat “will further strengthen India’s nuclear triad, enhance nuclear deterrence, help in establishing strategic balance and peace in the region, and play a decisive role in the security of the country.”
The defense minister also highlighted the importance of self-reliance in defense production amid geopolitical tensions. “It is essential for us to develop rapidly in every field, including defense, especially in today’s geopolitical scenario,” Singh said. “Along with economic prosperity, we need a strong military.”
“Arighaat” is a Sanskrit term that means “destroyer of the enemy.” INS Arighaat is capable of launching a K-4 ballistic missile with an operational range of 3,500 km. The SSBN can carry up to four K-4 missiles – or up to 12 medium-range K-15/Sagarika missiles – for use during second strike retaliation.
India has long pursued the development of a second-strike capability to complete its nuclear triad and deter India’s major rival: China. The unfolding geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China is slowly resulting in a nuclear arms race where both countries are increasing and modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Such developments in a fragile multipolar nuclear order have compelled India to focus on second-strike capabilities so it can deter China during a nuclear escalation.
India’s quest to develop second-strike nuclear capabilities found its origin in the Advanced Technology Vessels (ATV) program, which was officially acknowledged in the Indian Parliament by former Defense Minister George Fernandes. The 25-year project resulted in the development of the Arihant class of SSBNs. India commissioned its first nuclear-powered submarine, INS Arihant, in 2016, with operational deployment in 2018. The Arihant is capable of launching K-15 missiles with a maximum range of 750 km.
The induction of the second SSBN of the class, the Arighaat, last week marked further strategic progress.
India wants to bridge the gap with China and project itself as a credible player in the Indian Ocean against the Chinese SSBN threat. Although Indian second-strike capabilities are mostly aimed toward China, India’s progress has also created a troublesome situation for arch-rival Pakistan. The technological gap between India and Pakistan is becoming ever-wider as far as the development and deployment of nuclear capabilities are concerned.
Pakistan has condemned India’s moves to maintain strategic deterrence with the nuclear triad, and declared India as a destabilizing factor. According to Islamabad, India’s development of its strategic assets is deteriorating the complex security scenario between both countries and can further lead to a strategic arms race within South Asia.
The growing security dilemma for Pakistan is also giving anxiety to New Delhi. Islamabad is looking for Chinese assistance to develop its second-strike capabilities against India. China is helping Pakistan to develop stealth attack submarines, the Hangor class, capable of launching the Babur 3 cruise missile with a range of 450 km. The submarine-launched variant of the Babur 3 has put India into a tricky situation, as the missile can easily target India’s strategic assets.
That said, the Indian strategic community in New Delhi sees China, not Pakistan, as the main threat to India’s strategic interest in the region. The shift of the Indian mindset from Pakistan to China is visible in India’s strategic maneuvering, particularly in India’s quest to achieve second-strike capabilities to maintain the strategic deterrence between both the nuclear neighbors. Many Indian scholars believe China is a larger threat to India’s overall security and China’s growing footprint in South Asia is further raising the question of intent among the strategic community and policymakers of New Delhi.
China is rapidly building its nuclear arsenal and improving its delivery capabilities. For example, China’s Type 094 SSBNs are larger than the India’s Arihant-class submarines, with a nuclear reactor capable of producing 150-175 megawatts of energy (as compared to the Arihant and Arighaat, which are equipped with a 83 MW pressurized water reactor).
The China’s navy currently operates 60 submarines, including 12 nuclear-powered submarines with a missile range of more than 13,000 km. China is consistently building new submarines, including SSBNs, with its fleet expected to reach approximately 80 submarines by 2035. There’s a huge possibility many of them will be deployed in the Indian Ocean. China is continuously engaging with Pakistan in naval warfare exercises as a part of a strategy to encircle India within South Asia.
The Chinese pattern of deploying and developing SSBNs compels India to match the Chinese threat within a limited time frame. As a result India is also ramping up its production, with the possible induction of a third nuclear-powered submarine within the next six months.
Many Indian scholars have argued that India should make partnerships with other major powers operating SSBNs, primarily the United States and France, so that India can improve and enhance the operational range of its nuclear-powered submarines. Though India is building partnerships with French companies to develop its conventional submarines under Project P-75, India is relying on a public-private-partnership model to develop its homemade nuclear-powered submarines. This fits the dream of Prime Minister Narendra Modi for “Atmanirbhar” or self-reliance in defense production, as emphasized by the defense minister at the Arighaat’s commissioning.
India’s emphasis on developing indigenous capabilities derived from the Russian experiment. India leased Akula-class nuclear-powered submarines from Russia, but strategic arms export control mechanisms halted the Indian progress with Russian technologies. Thus India started building its home-grown capabilities to develop and run a nuclear submarine that is able to provide credible deterrence against India’s adversaries.
As India positions itself as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean region, the country must develop the necessary capabilities – including strategic weapons as a tool of deterrence – so it can secure the key strategic sea lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean region, which is vital for India’s overall economic growth and security. The major hurdles for India’s aspirations to catch up with China and its rapidly growing SSBN fleet are budgetary constraints, lack of cohesion between different stakeholders involved in strategic planning, and lengthy technology transfer processes that result in further delays.
Still, India is determined to develop and deploy more capabilities to maintain its strategic leverage over both Pakistan and China – with further consequences of nuclear asymmetry in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region at large.