China has consolidated its presence in Latin America in the outer space sector. China is the main partner in the space sector for numerous countries in the region, including Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and also has important collaborations with Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. This is the result of Beijing’s strategy of cooperation since the 1980s with countries of the Global South in the space sector, especially in the satellite sector. Latin American countries have seized the opportunity offered by China to access satellite technology, and are increasingly aware of the strategic advantage of having this technology.
Meanwhile, U.S. efforts to reduce China’s influence in the region are apparently insufficient. Washington has yet to propose avenues of cooperation that are more attractive to Latin American countries.
While there is much attention paid to the competitive relationship between China and the U.S. in the space sector, there is not much debate about the role of countries in the Global South – and specifically about Latin American countries’ cooperation with China in outer space and whether this could have implications for U.S. interests. This lack of debate is striking since there is some evidence that China’s bilateral cooperation with Latin American countries may be challenging the hegemonic role of the U.S. in space affairs. Cooperation in the space sector reinforces Chinese power in the international arena and could see Latin American governments supporting changes in the international governance of outer space. On the bilateral level, space cooperation can involve the signing of defense agreements and the potential dual use of satellites, as well as agreements with exclusive economic benefits granted to China.
A country that integrates a space system multiplies its power and is more effective in terrestrial conflicts. The utilization of outer space and the maintenance of its peaceful use is and will continue to be vital to the normal development of our daily lives. Although space technology has so far been providing its services regularly, concerns have arisen, especially from global powers, about the sustainability of the use of outer space. In this situation, minor countries with access to space technology, such as Latin American countries, are relevant to consider in the analysis. China recognized the importance of Latin American countries – and other members of the Global South – in the space sector decades ago, while the United States is just beginning to look at them, but without a clear strategy of approach.
China, Latin America’s Traditional Space Partner
China has been developing its own technology and has invested heavily in space technology and the satellite sector, becoming one of the most relevant players and a competitor to U.S. hegemony in this field. China recognizes that access to and utilization of outer space is fundamental to its national strategy. An important aspect of China’s strategy for its development in the space sector is to collaborate with countries in the Global South, such as Latin American countries.
Latin America has been considered a region of direct U.S. influence, while Washington has been a traditional partner of its southern neighbors. However, in the outer space sector specifically, China is the traditional partner of the region. Beijing has been collaborating for decades with Latin American countries in the access and development of space technology, with the collaboration between Brazil and China as the iconic example.
Economic relations between China and Brazil have been the most visible and analyzed aspect in the academic literature, while Brazil-China space cooperation has been less explored – despite the fact that it is precisely cooperation in this sector that laid the foundations for the growing commercial and political-diplomatic partnership between the two countries. In the 1980s, Brazil was the first Latin American country to partner with China in the satellite sector. China showed special interest in collaborating with Brazil, since this Latin American country had the largest space program in the region, and China became its main partner in terms of the number of satellites jointly built and the volume of investments.
Satellite cooperation between Brazil and China was initiated and formalized in 1984, when both countries agreed for the first time to incorporate the satellite sector into a scientific and technological cooperation agreement. Both countries created the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite program (CBERS). In 1993, bilateral cooperation was expanded, leading to the establishment of the first strategic partnership between Brazil and China. This instrument strengthened the bilateral relationship in other sectors, including trade, while maintaining the CBERS program as an important pillar of the partnership. Brazil and China’s cooperation in this sector is consolidated and includes long-term collaborations. Among the joint projects are the construction of two more satellites, CBERS-5 and CBERS-6, in addition to a Bilateral Cooperation Plan stretching from 2023 to 2032.
Argentina also has important collaboration in the space sector with China. The two countries signed a space cooperation agreement in 1988, but no real progress was made for decades. In 2004, the two governments reactivated the intention to cooperate in this sector and signed some bilateral agreements to that end. However, the most important advance in space cooperation between Argentina and China came in 2014, when the National Council for Space Activities, the government of Neuquén, and China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control agreed to install a deep space observation ground station in the province of Neuquén. This generated a great deal of debate in Argentina about the implications for national sovereignty, as well as concern in U.S. circles about the possible dual use of the ground station.
In other Latin American countries, China has made it possible to acquire their first satellite. This was true for Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela; China has also supported the creation of their space agencies. For instance, in 2005 China and Venezuela agreed to expand their collaboration to the space sector, including cooperation in research, development of the satellite industry, cooperation in telemetry, tracing, and command, as well as training of professionals for satellite operation. In 2008 Venezuela created its Bolivarian Agency for Aerospace Activities, with China as its central partner.
The collaboration between China and Latin American countries includes several trade preferences granted to China in the space sector. To cite one of the most significant examples, agreements signed between Brazil and China include preferential clauses in the sale of parts, services, and personnel training. Furthermore, both countries have agreed to jointly establish the prices of CBERS satellite products in the international market. Exclusive preferences granted to China are also observed in those countries to which China has sold its satellites.
China’s Push to Influence Space Governance
In addition to the commercial and strategic aspects of the cooperation China has established with Latin American countries, Beijing requires partners in its efforts to influence the reconfiguration of international space governance. Although China insists that it maintains the central role of the United Nations in the administration of outer space affairs, it is actually proposing an alternative international governance regime. China influences the shaping of the international outer space order at two levels of action: bilateral and multilateral. At the bilateral level, Beijing’s efforts include collaborations established by China with, for example, Latin American countries, including political coordination to reach common positions on what regulation there should be on the use of outer space.
At the multilateral level, China has promoted the creation of the BRICS Joint Committee on Space Cooperation, of which Brazil is a member. Cooperation includes the establishment of a constellation of detection satellites, where not only data is shared, but also its application is promoted.
Another example where Latin American countries also participate is the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, which was established in 2008. The members of this intergovernmental organization based in Beijing are: Bangladesh, China, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, and Turkey, plus Indonesia as a signatory state and Mexico as an observer country. According to China, it is a cooperation organization for developing countries offering a free data exchange network among its members, the creation of a satellite constellation, the monitoring of natural disasters, and the installation of telescopes in Iran, Pakistan, and Peru. It also grants master’s and doctoral scholarships for citizens of member states, which is also supported by the China Scholarship Council.
In addition to the multilateral agreements established by China, there are cooperation initiatives with the region, such as the first China-Latin America and the Caribbean Space Cooperation Forum, which was held in April 2024 in Wuhan, during the China Space Day organized by the China National Space Administration.
Implications for the United States
In 2011, the United States identified China as the main actor challenging its dominance in outer space due to the so-called Three Cs: the contestation, competition, and congestion of outer space. These challenges are understood as strategic and defense, commercial, and operational issues, respectively. The U.S. recognizes that there is a triangular relationship between itself, the Latin American countries and China in the satellite sector – this means that the bilateral cooperation of any two of the actors necessarily has implications for the third actor involved. The perceived threat to U.S. national security stems from multiple factors, such as the potential dual use of space technology, coalition building, and commercial implications for U.S. interests.
The potential dual use of space cooperation is a central concern of the United States when looking at collaborations between China and Latin American countries. For instance, satellites are inherently dual-use technology, and satellite cooperation between Brazil and China has been explicitly extended to the defense sector. In July 2014, the Brazilian Ministry of Defense and the Chinese State Administration of Science, Technology, and Industry for Defense signed the Protocol on Defense Satellite Cooperation, a complementary agreement to the Defense Cooperation Agreement also signed by Brazil and China in 2011. In this 2014 document, both partners declared their intention to expand satellite cooperation related to security, environmental protection, and sustainable development.
Another example of potential dual use is China’s installation of a deep space observation ground station in Argentina’s province of Neuquén. One of the main perceived threats to the United States is that China could use this station for espionage purposes. Given the repercussions, in 2017 Argentina requested to sign a complementary agreement with China to stipulate that this ground station would not be used for military purposes, and also that in case of a conflict between China and a third country, Argentina was exempt from any responsibility for China’s activities using the station.
Another U.S. concern is the formation of coalitions between China and Latin American countries to influence international governance of outer space. One of China’s strategies to achieve favorable changes in international governance is precisely by enlisting the support of the countries in Latin America. For instance, China seeks partner countries to sign bilateral memorandums of understanding for its International Lunar Research Station project, as a way of generating an alternative bloc to the United States’ Artemis agreements. What is happening is that Latin American countries are signing both agreements, which may generate different contradictory regimes and will not be an effective response to the regulation of access and use of outer space.
Regarding the commercial implications for the U.S., China and some Latin American countries have signed bilateral agreements stipulating limitations on the participation of third parties in satellite building projects, restrictions on the exchange of information, exclusive contracts for personnel training, as well as priorities in the sale of parts, services, and others. For the United States, this implies restrictions to certain markets for U.S. companies. Moreover, in the case of Brazil, the prices of CBERS products for third countries must be jointly stipulated by China and Brazil. This brings the risk that if the aforementioned contractual clauses and conditions are also a common practice in the satellite agreements signed by China with other countries in the Global South, it would point to the intention of forming cartels.
To conclude, it is necessary to emphasize that, although Latin America is one more arena in the strategic competition between China and the United States, it is also a region made up of individual countries pursuing their strategic autonomy. Despite the widespread collaboration between China and Latin American countries around space technology, most Latin American countries have no real intention of forming coalitions with either of the two global powers, be it China or the U.S., but rather seek to develop their space technology with the collaboration of the partner that offers the best prospects for their national interests. If the United States does not want to lose the region in such a strategic sphere as the space sector, it will have to broaden its proposals for collaboration with Latin American countries.