National People’s Power (NPP) leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake was sworn in as the ninth executive president of Sri Lanka on September 23. In the presidential election held on September 21, the NPP leader polled 5,740,179 votes (5,634,915 votes in the first count and 105,264 more votes in the second count). He secured close to 43 percent of the valid vote.
The growing support for Dissanayake, a center-left politician often wrongly labeled as a “Marxist” by the international media, is a reflection of Sri Lanka’s broader societal unrest. His advocacy for transparency and criticism of the political status quo struck a chord with young voters and those hit hardest by the economic crisis that has plagued the country for years. His vision for renegotiating the International Monetary Fund (IMF) deal, to make austerity measures more manageable for the working class, and his promise to root out corruption, have positioned him as a fresh voice amid the chaos.
Dissanayake’s election demonstrates that a significant portion of the electorate believes that traditional politics has failed to deliver stability, growth or relief from the economic hardship. Dissanayake’s NPP only secured about 3 percent of the vote in the 2020 general election.
His closest opponent, Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) presidential candidate, Sajith Premadasa, received 4,530,902 votes (4,363,035 votes in the first count and 167,867 in the second). He received close to 32 percent of the valid vote. This is a drop from his tally of 5.5 million (41.9 percent) votes in 2019 against Gotabaya Rajapaksa. While a frontrunner initially, Premadasa lost momentum toward the end due to party infighting, his inability to communicate effectively with the public, and a significant chunk of potential votes being taken by independent candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe, the incumbent president.
Given that no candidate received over 50 percent of the valid votes to secure the presidency straightaway, the Election Commission (EC) counted the second and third preferences for the first time in Sri Lanka. Dissanayake, who had polled over 1.3 million votes in the first count over Premadasa, had no trouble clearing this hurdle.
As expected, the support for Dissanayake came from the south, where people are concerned mostly about tackling corruption and there is widespread anger at the established political parties for decimating the country’s economy, declining living standards, and a stagnant economy. Dissanayake won the Kalutara, Galle, Matara, Puttalam, Anuradhapura, Kegalle, Gampaha, Colombo, Ratnapura, Hambantota, Monaragala, Kurunegala, Matale, Kandy, and Polonnaruwa electoral districts.
Premadasa won areas with large minority populations, including the north and east as well as Badulla and Nuwara Eliya districts. This, however, is mainly due to the fact that the political parties that traditionally represented these communities had an electoral alliance with the SJB. The NPP has decided to pursue a strategy of building their own grassroots structures in these areas, which would take a few more years.
Wickremesinghe secured 2,299,767 votes (17.27 percent) and Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) candidate Namal Rajapaksa received 342,781 votes (2.57 percent). P. Ariyanethiran, identifying himself as the “common Tamil candidate” secured 226,342 votes (1.70 percent), while all other candidates secured 556,772 votes (4.18 percent).
The election also saw the dramatic collapse of support for the nationalist SLPP, which has been long in the making. The political dynasty of the Rajapaksas was at the center of Sri Lanka’s economic collapse, with rampant borrowing and mismanagement pushing the country to default on its debt in 2022. The subsequent shortages of essentials – fuel, medicine, and food – along with the unrest that followed, led to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s exile and resignation, marking a turning point in public sentiment. The people’s anger toward the political elite has only intensified as the recovery has stalled, with many still grappling with high taxes, inflation, and austerity measures linked to the IMF bailout deal.
Wickremesinghe, the furthest to the right among the four main candidates, who stepped in to stabilize the country post-crisis, has also been unable to regain public trust. While his administration secured some progress on debt restructuring and economic recovery, the high costs of living and perceived catering to the IMF’s stringent demands have left many feeling betrayed. His image as a technocrat unable to connect with ordinary Sri Lankans further widened the gap between him and the electorate, leaving room for a figure like Dissanayake to rise.
Wickremesinghe is also seen as protecting the Rajapaksas and their allies, and the fact that close to 100 SLPP MPs joined him did aid his cause. He secured a little over 2.2 million votes. In the 2020 general election, his United National Party (UNP) secured fewer than 250,000 votes, and so his vote share this time marks a rise as dramatic as the NPP’s.
The Road Ahead
Dissanayake is expected dissolve Parliament soon, with a general election anticipated within two months. Currently, the NPP holds only three parliamentary seats, excluding Dissanayake himself. Until the elections, likely in November, Dissanayake will govern the country with a streamlined cabinet of three ministers and 15 ministry secretaries.
One of Dissanayake’s immediate challenges will be to reassure the Sri Lankan business community, foreign investors, and international capital markets that the NPP is not the radical force some media outlets have portrayed it to be. Supporters of former leaders Wickremesinghe and Premadasa have spent months portraying the NPP as inexperienced adventurers who would destabilize the country – a narrative that has gained traction, especially within some parts of the business community. Adding to this uncertainty is speculation that Sri Lanka’s IMF deal could falter under NPP leadership.
However, Dissanayake has been clear that his government will not withdraw from the IMF program. He has emphasized that if renegotiating the debt sustainability analysis (DSA) proves time-consuming or too costly, the NPP would adhere to the existing agreement. Furthermore, the NPP has shown a willingness to collaborate with the IMF and other international organizations to combat corruption. One of Dissanayake’s top priorities must be to quickly engage with the IMF, other multilateral organizations, and the business community to dispel any lingering doubts about the country’s economic stability under his leadership.
Additionally, Dissanayake faces accusations that the NPP is financially backed by China, a claim that has raised concerns about potential friction with the United States and India. In response, Dissanayake has consistently denied any financial ties to China and reassured both Washington and New Delhi that Sri Lanka will not be used to undermine their security interests. He has also emphasized the importance of maintaining strong ties with India, welcoming Indian investments as part of his economic strategy. As he moves forward, Dissanayake’s ability to balance domestic reforms with geopolitical pressures will be crucial.
Over the past decade, Dissanayake has demonstrated a pragmatic and adaptive political style. When he assumed leadership of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the main party in the NPP coalition, it had a reputation for radical politics. Since the 1970s, the JVP has undergone significant transformations, evolving from an anti-imperialist, socialist party that sought to overthrow capitalism to a Sinhala-nationalist platform in the 1980s, opposing Tamil self-rule and India’s involvement in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. The party was banned for trumped up charges of being involved in the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom but re-entered mainstream politics in 1994.
Under Dissanayake’s leadership, the JVP has broadened its appeal, reaching out to the middle class and diaspora communities. Although critics have accused it of abandoning its socialist roots, the NPP’s focus on grassroots mobilization gained momentum, particularly during the 2022 protests that led to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s resignation. Despite lackluster performances in the 2019 presidential and 2020 parliamentary elections, where it was mocked as the “3 percent party,” the NPP rebranded itself as a voice for the people, capitalizing on public frustration with the political establishment and advocating for systemic change.
Having inherited a country in deep economic distress, Dissanayake’s presidency will be defined by whether he can deliver on his promises of reform and systemic change while maintaining stability. His leadership, marked by pragmatism and adaptability, will be put to the test as he faces the monumental task of steering Sri Lanka through its current crisis and restoring public confidence in governance. The coming months will reveal if Dissanayake can manage this delicate balancing act, ensuring both economic recovery and political reform while maintaining his broad support base.