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Taiwan’s Political Divide on UN Resolution 2758 

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Taiwan’s Political Divide on UN Resolution 2758 

Can Taiwan’s political parties find common ground to strengthen the global campaign against China’s misrepresentation of U.N. Resolution 2758?

Taiwan’s Political Divide on UN Resolution 2758 
Credit: Flickr/ Velkiira

The United Nations General Assembly is back in session, yet Taiwan is once again unrepresented in this global forum that promises to “ leave no one behind.” In protest of its exclusion this year, Taiwan’s government has launched an international campaign to push back against the People’s Republic of China’s misinterpretation of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758 (hereafter Resolution 2758), which the Beijing uses to further its claim over Taiwan and restrict its participation in U.N. bodies.

The success of Taiwan’s awareness campaign is reflected in recent legislative action undertaken by its like-minded partners around the world. This includes the Australian Senate’s motion rejecting China’s interpretation of Resolution 2758 and a similar motion passed by the Dutch House of Representatives. 

Earlier this year, the United States House of Representatives also passed the Taiwan International Solidarity Act, which recognizes that Resolution 2758 does not address the issue of Taiwan’s representation in the U.N. or the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell reaffirmed this position in his testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee last week.

While global friends and allies, across party lines, are responding to Taiwan’s call for meaningful participation in U.N. bodies through legislation that publicly rejects China’s misinterpretation of Resolution 2758, a consensus on this resolution is paradoxically lacking within Taiwan’s own political arena. 

Not one, not two, but three competing versions of a motion to clarify Taiwan’s position on Resolution 2758 have been introduced for consideration in the Legislative Yuan – each backed by a different political party. Whether these parties can find common ground and pass a mutually agreeable motion will ultimately determine the strength of Taiwan’s message in challenging China’s misleading narrative on the international stage.

Resolution 2758, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1971, recognized the PRC as the “only lawful representative of China” and “one of the five permanent members of the Security Council.” It also “expel[led] forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek.” In effect, Resolution 2758 transferred the “China seat” in the U.N. from the Republic of China (ROC) to the PRC, but nowhere in its texts is “Taiwan,” or even the “ROC,” explicitly mentioned. 

Beijing, however, increasingly claims that Resolution 2758 supports its “One China” principle, that “Taiwan is part of the PRC.” A report published by the German Marshall Fund documented China’s strategy to conflate its “One China” principle with Resolution 2758 to legitimize its claim over Taiwan, even though the resolution provides no such legal basis. The report includes recommendations for a coordinated effort by Taiwan and other like-minded U.N. member states to counter the PRC’s misinterpretations on a global scale.

Seeing the legislatures of Taiwan’s partners heed the call, the  legislative caucus of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) proposed to pass a motion in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan to similarly clarify that “U.N. Resolution 2758 does not involve Taiwan” and protest Beijing’s mischaracterization of the resolution as an endorsement of its “One China” principle to block Taiwan’s international participation.

The Kuomintang (KMT), which holds a majority in the Legislature when combined with the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), initially expressed reluctance to support this motion. KMT legislators raised concerns about its impact on cross-strait relations and questioned whether the motion was motivated by the DPP’s goal of seeking “Taiwan independence” by joining the U.N. under the name of Taiwan.

Instead, the KMT caucus introduced its own motion that similarly protested Resolution 2758’s “unjust exclusion” of the ROC from participation in the U.N. The KMT’s motion also called on Beijing to “face the objective reality” of the ROC’s existence and its de jure sovereignty.

Both the DPP and KMT motions recognize the ROC as a sovereign, independent country, and both ultimately seek Taiwan’s inclusion in the U.N. However, the KMT’s version primarily protests Resolution 2758’s role in excluding Taiwan, while the DPP’s motion calls out Beijing’s role in distorting the resolution to facilitate Taiwan’s exclusion. Furthermore, the KMT’s motion explicitly calls for the ROC’s return to the U.N. under that name, whereas the DPP’s motion leaves the issue of the title ambiguous.

DPP legislators have dismissed the KMT’s motion as “meaningless,” arguing that the recent surge in global attention on Resolution 2758 stems from China’s distortion of its meaning, while the ROC’s long-standing opposition to the resolution is an established fact. Given these comments, the DPP is unlikely to support a motion that does not identify Beijing’s role in excluding Taiwan from international participation.

If both parties ultimately choose to vote along partisan lines, the deciding vote will rest with the TPP, which has also introduced a motion. Unlike the previous proposals, the TPP caucus’ motion emphasizes urging the executive branch to actively pursue Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and to report its progress to the legislature. It applauds the efforts of Taiwan’s allies in recognizing that Resolution 2758 does not pertain to Taiwan, but it does not make a statement on the resolution itself or address China’s mischaracterization. For this reason, the TPP’s proposal could easily be combined with either the DPP or KMT motions through negotiations.

All three motions have now been sent directly to the legislature’s second reading process, bypassing the lengthier examination in legislative committees. This signals that all parties recognize the urgency of passing a motion. Cross-party negotiations have been scheduled to resolve the differences among the three proposals. If those negotiations break down, the proposals will be debated and voted on during the second reading, where only one version can pass. There is ample opportunity to build consensus before then. 

To reach any agreement, substantive negotiations must focus on the motion’s precise language regarding China – particularly its role in Taiwan’s exclusion from international organizations – and on how Taiwan should return to the U.N.: as the ROC or as Taiwan. A successful motion achieved through compromise may not carry the strongest language, but the unity projected by a unanimous vote in the legislature would speak volumes.

The worst-case scenario would be the failure of all three motions, sending mixed signals to current and future allies about how best to support Taiwan. In such a case, the progress of Taiwan’s successful awareness campaign on Resolution 2758 this year would have been for naught, and Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations would remain a pipedream for as long as its political divide continues to undermine such efforts.