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Time is Running Out For Victims of Thailand’s Tak Bai Massacre

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Time is Running Out For Victims of Thailand’s Tak Bai Massacre

A Thai court has accepted a case against officials for their role in the 2004 massacre in the country’s Deep South – but justice is far from assured.

Time is Running Out For Victims of Thailand’s Tak Bai Massacre

Thai Muslim villagers unload the bodies of demonstrators at Ta Loh Ma Noh cemetery in Bacho district of Narathiwat province, southern Thailand, Thursday, Oct. 28, 2004. Villagers buried 22 of the 78 Muslims who died in military custody after a protest in Thailand’s rebellious south, while authorities promised to tell diplomats “the truth” amid allegations of excessive force used to quell the demonstration.

Credit: AP Photo/Apichart Weerawong

On August 23, the Narathiwat Provincial Court in southern Thailand agreed to accept a criminal lawsuit against seven officials, including former high-ranking military personnel and police officers. The lawsuit concerned their alleged involvement in the deaths of 85 Malay Muslims during a protest on October 25, 2004 in the town of Tak Bai, Narathiwat.

The court ruled that there were sufficient legal grounds for a case to proceed against seven security officials, while another two were acquitted. The defendants stand accused of murder, attempted murder, and unlawful detention. Pornpen Khongkachonkiet, director of the Cross-Cultural Foundation, a Thai human rights NGO, told BenarNews that the case was “historic” in that it was “the first time high-ranking state officials will enter the justice system for a protest crackdown case.”

The events that came to be known as the Tak Bai massacre began when over 2,000 reportedly unarmed protestors assembled outside the town’s police station to demand the release of six Malay Muslims who had been arbitrarily detained by Thai security forces on suspicion of providing firearms to local separatist insurgent groups. After negotiations with the protesters failed, security forces used water cannons, tear gas, and live rounds to disperse the crowd. Seven protestors were subsequently killed, including five that were shot in the head.

In the ensuing crackdown by security forces, around 1,370 Malay Muslim men were detained and 78 suffocated or were crushed to death as they were stacked on top of each other, reportedly sometimes up to four high and transported in trucks to a military camp in Pattani province, some 150 kilometers away. Many of the survivors of the ordeal were left with severe injuries and permanent disabilities. While the government made compensation payments to some of the victims and their families in 2007 and 2012, none of the police, military, or officials involved were ever held to account.

The Tak Bai massacre is perhaps the most egregious and well-known instance of human rights abuse committed by Thai security forces in the southern border provinces. It is also considered to be one of the sparks that contributed to the reignition of the region’s Malay Muslim insurgency, which dates back to the 1960s.

In 2004, the year that the protest in Tak Bai took place (along with the Krue-Se mosque incident), there was a dramatic increase in violence across the provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala, and four districts of Songkhla province, which are commonly referred to as the Deep South. The deaths that occurred during the Tak Bai massacre and the Krue-Se mosque incident have remained potent recruiting tools for separatist insurgent groups in the region and lasting reminders of what many Thais perceive to be a two-tiered justice system and a prevailing culture of impunity for officials.

Thaksin Shinawatra, who returned to Thailand from self-exile last year, was the prime minister when the Tak Bai massacre occurred and has been heavily criticized for his response to the incident, along with his heavy-handed, security-focused approach to the Deep South conflict in general. In a twist of fate, the Narathiwat Provincial Court accepted the criminal lawsuit only days after Thaksin’s daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra was confirmed as Thailand’s new prime minister. Bringing the issue even closer to home for Paetongtarn, one of the defendants in the case is Gen. Pisarn Wattanawongkiri, who is currently a serving member of parliament for her Pheu Thai Party.

While the levels of violence in the Deep South have abated since 2016, insurgent attacks, bombings, and assassinations still occur and the region remains heavily militarized, with over 70,000 military personnel stationed there. According to the local think tank Deep South Watch, more than 7,622 people were killed in the conflict between January 2004 and July 2024. A further 14,234 were injured.

The court’s decision came only two months before the statute of limitations for the case was due to expire on October 25, which is exactly 20 years after the tragic events that transpired at Tak Bai occurred. Pornpen also told Voice of America (VOA) news that the court would begin issuing  subpoenas for the accused to appear on September 12, but was concerned that the defendants may attempt to stall proceedings or avoid making an appearance altogether so that the statute of limitations expires.

In a statement following the ruling, the human rights group Amnesty International said that at least one of the defendants must front the court to acknowledge the lawsuit before the statute of limitations expires in order for the case to begin. If the defendants do not appear before the court on September 12, arrest warrants may be issued.

Anchana Heemmin, the director of Duay Jai Group, an NGO that monitors human rights abuses in the Deep South, echoed Pornpen’s concerns in relation to the possibility of the statute of limitations expiring before the case can be heard and told VOA that she is worried the defendants may yet avoid trial despite the court’s decision.

Such concerns are understandable, as Thai security forces have long been accused of benefiting from a culture of impunity. This impunity has been a defining feature of security operations across the Deep South. Since 2004, the region has been under martial law, which grants sweeping powers to local authorities. Locals and rights groups claim that security forces have repeatedly abused martial and emergency laws. To date, despite persistent allegations of unlawful detainment, extrajudicial killings, or torture of suspected insurgents in the Deep South, not a single member of the security forces has ever been prosecuted.

The overall security situation in the Deep South is likely to remain relatively calm leading up to the September 12 court hearing, though instances of civil unrest and attacks cannot be ruled out. If none of the defendants appear before the court, tensions throughout the region may begin to rise and if the statute of limitations expires without any of the defendants appearing in court there is an increased risk of attacks being carried out by local insurgents, particularly younger members. Even before the publicity surrounding the court case and the statute of limitations expiring, there was a heightened risk of civil unrest and insurgent attacks taking place on or around the twentieth anniversary of the massacre.

If the court case does not go ahead, this could also possibly undermine recent progress that has been made in peace negotiations between the Thai government and Malay Muslim separatist rebel groups. In February, the government and the Barisan Revolution Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN), the largest insurgent group in southern Thailand, agreed to a roadmap for a resolution to the long running conflict, in negotiations that Malaysia facilitated. However, despite the positive progress that has been made, doubts have remained, particularly concerning the Thai military’s influence over the civilian-led government and the negotiation process itself.

The lingering sense that none of the accused will appear in court on September 12 and that Thai authorities will essentially allow the statute of limitations to expire the following month is understandable considering the lack of accountability for past human rights abuses. In an article for Fulcrum in January, Paul Chambers stated that “government prosecutors seem ready to allow the Tak Bai case to lapse in 2024, meaning that military perpetrators of that massacre will escape punishment.”

If the authorities choose to protect some of their own from prosecution rather than genuinely supporting efforts at achieving some degree of justice for the victims of the Tak Bai massacre, it will signal their acceptance of a culture of impunity for state violence and further erode the public’s trust in the rule of law. Such an unjust outcome would be felt even more poignantly in the Deep South where it would further exacerbate long-running mistrust and animosity between the Thai state and Malay Muslims, while also possibly undermining the ongoing peace negotiations.

On the other hand, if proceedings do in fact begin before the statute of limitations expires, then the victims of the Tak Bai massacre may still have a chance of receiving some measure of justice.