Bangladesh is currently governed by an interim government. A cursory examination of its functioning indicates that there is nothing “interim” about its governance.
While this is not the first time that such transitory arrangements have been made in Bangladesh’s politics, the exercise of power by the current interim government is unprecedented.
Since gaining independence in 1971, Bangladesh has witnessed multiple forms of government, including one-party dominance, a brief period of a single-party system, over 15 years of military rule, and a parliamentary representative democratic republic model of governance. After the ouster of General Ershad and the end of military rule in 1990, a Non-Party Caretaker Government (NPCG) was constituted to facilitate elections. The NPCG was headed by a chief adviser, with an objective to smoothen the election process in the country. However, the neutrality of the NPCG was always under intense scrutiny until it was finally abolished in 2011, ahead of the 2014 general elections.
Interim governments often come into play in the run-up to the elections with a short expiry date and an explicit mandate to ensure smooth elections and transfer of power. During its time, the NPCG was mandated to hold elections within 90 days and hand over power to a newly elected government.
The current interim government headed by Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus assumed power on August 8 and claims to draw its legitimacy from the student uprising and popular protests that gripped the country over the summer, leading to Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s forced departure. Protests constitute an expression of discontent in society and rarely bestow legitimacy on specific individuals to govern. If protests were to become the barometer of legitimacy, then the periodicity of protests would define the longevity of the government, which becomes a recipe for instability. Therefore, organizing nationwide elections is critical to constitute a legitimate government, but so far, there has not been any indication of a definite timeline for conducting elections.
The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) secretary general has already urged the interim government to hold elections at the earliest, also stressing the “need for reform of the Election Commission.” Supporters of the current interim government may argue that given Hasina’s years of alleged misgovernance, it may not be possible to organize nationwide elections in a few weeks.
Nevertheless, the interim government must have a specific timeline to organize elections and hand over power to a newly elected government, of which there is no indication so far.
Meanwhile, the interim government has taken significant policy decisions and is seeking to alter the very nature of the state apparatus. Such decisions include the setting up of six commissions, including the Constitutional Reform Commission, Judicial Reform Commission, and Police Administration Reform Commission, among others.
This points to an ongoing attempt to alter the character of the state apparatus by bringing about large-scale changes in the personnel manning the administrative apparatus. Some Bangladeshi diplomats have been relieved of their duties, while the chief justice of the Supreme Court and other judicial members were forced to resign in August amidst the protests. Supporters may argue that the pragmatic need to ensure regime survival prompted such actions, all the while ensuring that the judiciary does not become a platform to undermine the interim government.
However, it would be difficult to validate targeted attacks on doctors and teachers. There was a case of hospitals being targeted, as 41 medical staff were declared “unwanted,” leading to several patients not receiving treatment. The Daily Star reported that at least 49 teachers belonging to minority communities in Bangladesh were forced to resign in August.
Meanwhile, attacks against minorities and their places of worship have continued in pockets, including against Sufi shrines. This has corresponded to religiously inclined political parties gaining ground in Bangladesh. The removal of the ban on the Jamaat-e-Islami indicates that even though the interim government may call for religious tolerance, its actions suggest otherwise.
In many political systems, whenever new political parties and leaders come into power, there is an attempt to appoint a few ideologically-aligned bureaucrats at senior levels. However, in Bangladesh, a large number of appointments are being made to ensure that the people manning the administrative apparatus at all levels belong to favorable political parties.
In terms of international commitments, the approach of the interim government has generated concern about whether it would abide by the commitments made by the previous government. Russia has demanded that Dhaka pay over $630 million to settle interest payments for the loan used to fund the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant. There are also reports that Indian businesses have sought clearances of dues from Bangladesh, including the Adani Group, which is owed $800 million by the Bangladesh Power Development Board for power supply.
Dhaka expressing a desire to renegotiate deals agreed upon by the previous government will increase uncertainty and worry current and potential stakeholders. Any sustained long-term political turmoil in the country will continue to impact international investors.
Yunus has spoken publicly about his desire to revive the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) grouping. While such comments are welcome to increase cooperation in the region, the larger question remains whether an interim government has the mandate to decide on foreign policy issues that involve broader regional dynamics.
India will look to use its past experiences in handling rapid transitions in the neighborhood to continue to build upon its healthy relationship with Bangladesh. While the ethos of power lies in Dhaka, the cultural linkages, people-to-people relations across large border areas, and the trade and connectivity initiatives suggest that there are enough co-dependencies to keep both polities invested in working together.
The functioning of the interim government raises a few important questions as to whether it has the legitimacy to constitute commissions seeking a reform of the constitution and the government, compel constitutional functionaries and administrative officers to resign without due process of law, and attempt to renegotiate international agreements. If the interim government continues with such an agenda, it is essentially performing the functions of a constituent assembly as well as implementing decisions that are generally the role of an elected government.
Yunus and his interim Cabinet are seeking to alter the very nature of the separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judiciary and are indulging in state-building by stealth. In a context defined by a deteriorating law and order situation, such state-building efforts may result in an institutional vacuum. In the post-Cold War era, the attempts to redesign state apparatuses without adequate stakeholder participation and in an arbitrary manner have often failed to yield adequate results. Will the experience of Bangladesh be any different? Only time will tell.