On October 8, those closely monitoring China’s foreign policy in the Middle East over the last year heard a statement that might well have bewildered them. Asked about the conflict in Gaza that had just hit the one-year mark the day before, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning replied, in part, that the “legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people need to be realized and the reasonable security concerns of Israel need to be paid attention to.”
If Mao’s dual recognition of the Palestinian plight and Israel’s security dilemmas seems like a cliched diplomatic contrivance to ensure equidistance – the standard Chinese policy in the Middle East prior to the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023 – that’s because it is. But the absence of similar rhetoric from October 7, 2023 until Mao’s comment over a year later, afforded her remarks a value uncommon to such diplomatic platitudes. The acknowledgement of Israel’s “reasonable security concerns” signaled a break with China’s year of one-sided diplomacy that won it sympathies within the Arab world but naturally estranged it from Israel. It might be the beginning of a paradigm re-shift in China’s diplomacy in the region.
China Sours on Israel
In the wake of Hamas’s horrendous terrorist act on October 7, 2023, which opened the gates of hell in the conflict-ridden Middle East, Israel saw all the countries it counted on for backing condemn the attack in the strongest terms – with one exception. To Israel’s dismay, despite the cordial state in their bilateral ties up to that moment, China bluntly expressed concern over the “current escalation of tensions and violence between Palestine and Israel,” declining to even mention Hamas, let alone condemn it.
It was the first in a series of intentional policy-shifting remarks on the part of China that seemed fixed on risking a temporary (or so Beijing likely hoped) rift with Israel if that served it to better juxtapose China in the geopolitical competition in the Middle East. Amid the United States’ unflinching support to its embattled ally, and the unprecedented suffering in Gaza that this support enabled, China leapt to construct an anti-American narrative. It sought to portray Washington as an irresponsible warmonger, deaf to the pleas of the Palestinians for an end to the war that is killing them in droves. In this way, not only would China elevate its global status as a peaceful, responsible actor but it would also endear itself to the disappointed Arabs, hopefully driving a wedge between them and the United States – or so the logic went.
In concert with its anti-Israel – and thus anti-U.S. – narrative, China did not shy away from justifying Iran’s April missile and drone attack against Tel Aviv as a legitimate response to the latter’s bombardment of the Iranian consulate in Damascus earlier that month. In the same spirit, Beijing called out Israel for its “indiscriminate” strikes in Lebanon in September and sternly opposed any violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty, while failing to chastise Hezbollah for its role in the conflict as Israel might have hoped.
In these indicative flashpoints, as well as in other instances, China showed remarkable reflexes in pinpointing Israel’s wrongdoings but not quite the same zeal in condemning those of Israel’s foes.
The Impact on China-Israel Relations
It is likely that China gravely miscalculated the effect of its partial conduct on Israel. What for Beijing was another conflagration in a habitually tumultuous region was for Israel the deadliest massacre against the Jews since the Holocaust. This perception gap meant that the more China drifted away from Israel, convinced that after the war relations could be quickly restored, the more Israel felt betrayed, disrespected, and alienated by an erstwhile friend who now slammed it while fighting for its very survival.
Israel responded accordingly. Government statements expressing disappointment soon gave way to threats targeting Chinese companies operating in Israel’s ports and to flirtation with Taiwan, all aimed at sending a harsh message to Beijing. These moves were in sync with Israeli public opinion. Recent polls show that more than half of Israelis consider China unfriendly or hostile to Israel, with about a third of them adopting this view only after October 7, 2023.
Israel’s disgruntlement with China is also illustrated by the sharp decline in their bilateral trade, although this can be attributed to other factors as well, such as the political instability in Israel and the across-the-board decrease of Israel’s total imports in 2023 that came naturally after successive increases.
China Re-calibrates; Why Now?
Acknowledging Israel’s “reasonable security concerns” is a far cry from atoning for the partisan rhetoric of the past year, but nevertheless hints at China’s intention to mitigate the damage in the Sino-Israeli relations. One might wonder what leads to China’s tweaking its stance now.
It might be that Beijing has come to terms with the limitations of its ties with the Arab states and deems it futile to try to score further gains at the expense of Israel. While China can boast of favorable public opinion polls and the consistently soaring trade and investment partnerships with big fish like the two major Gulf states, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Beijing also understands that the U.S. security guarantees in the region will invariably trump financial deals.
Washington will have the leverage to arrest the deepening of China-Gulf relations by simply asking its Gulf allies to divest from Beijing if ties were to extend to sensitive areas, such as critical technologies. The turning point for this realization must have been the revitalization of the Saudi-U.S. defense pact, which would most likely involve clauses on the restriction of Saudi-Chinese cooperation.
Further, China’s diplomatic support of Iran does not sit well with the Gulf monarchies, which still consider Tehran an eminently dangerous threat despite the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement mediated by Beijing.
It might also be that after the ground invasion of Lebanon by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and their successful advancements thereafter China is considering the possibility of a crushing victory by Israel – and fearing it might find itself on the loser’s side. Understanding that Israel’s military might is likely to determine the outcome of the conflict, China endeavors to maintain some bridges with the most powerful warring party lest it be left out of the post-conflict Middle East.
Another reason for China’s dampened tone on Israel is likely related to an anticipation that the conflict might be over not long after the new U.S. president takes office. Either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump will certainly place the settlement of the Middle East war high in their foreign policy priorities, increasing the pressure for the resolution of the conflict (although each would-be president has different preferences on what means will be employed to achieve this end and what peace will look like). In any case, China will want to play peace-broker and to do so it will need to talk to everyone – including Israel.
The Day After the War
China is too big to be put on ice. Israel knows that severing ties completely is not an option. While China’s re-found consideration vis-à-vis Israel’s security concerns is a step in the right direction from Israel’s point of view, Beijing’s overtures, even if sustained, are not likely to change much.
On one hand, China’s investments in Israel’s critical infrastructure, its export-driven economy, and its large market characterized by a steady demand of high-tech products underpin a firm commercial partnership between the two countries, now and in the future. But this would stand true even if China resumed its skewed rhetoric.
On the other hand, China’s opportunistic choice to turn its back on Israel – using it as a pawn in Beijing’s anti-U.S. narrative – cannot be undone. China’s pragmatism reverberates in the Gulf capitals as a reminder that Beijing’s foreign policy is driven less by a commitment to bilateral ties than by systemic motives in the context of the competition with the United States. Every state that now enjoys a cordial partnership with China cannot rule out that someday it might be treated like Israel – for example, if there is a crisis between the Gulf monarchies and Iran.
Israel itself might feel obliged by the circumstances to forgive, but it’s not likely to forget. China can live with that. Not unlike its transactional relations with the Gulf states, China’s ties with Israel are fraught with all the limitations stemming from the latter’s special relationship with the United States. Aware of the fact that its primary rival may put a ceiling on the Sino-Israeli ties, China knew that the quid pro quo nature of its relations with Israel wouldn’t be likely to change fundamentally for the better. Hence, not expecting any meteoric progress in bilateral relations, it chose to sour on Israel until the point where this strategy imperiled its position in a Middle East post-conflict environment.
Given Beijing’s geopolitical and economic heft, its gambit is likely to succeed. One caveat is that Israel might be less inclined to – and more suspicious of – doing business with China.
Conclusion
The war in Gaza tested China’s balancing act in the Middle East. Between maintaining neutrality and seizing the opportunity to undermine the United States, Beijing opted for the latter, purposely endangering its relations with Israel. In doing so, China acted on its awareness that ties with Israel were always subject to limitations.
Now, China is indicating an intent to re-adjust its stance, at least rhetorically, taking into account Israel’s security dilemmas. Either because the one-sided rhetoric of the past year no longer serves its purpose or due to pragmatic considerations about its future in the post-war arrangements, China is slowly returning to a more balanced approach. The thawing of Sino-Israeli ties, albeit unlikely to attain pre-war levels, is a possible scenario dictated by China’s gravitas and Israel’s financial needs. Beijing’s changing tone might precipitate this thaw, but it is bound to come after the war even without it.