Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Ulaanbaatar in early September placed Mongolia under the harsh glare of the international spotlight – a position in which Mongolia has little experience and from which it sought a swift retreat. Facing criticism, even threats, from Western states over its decision to host Putin, Mongolian policymakers have been working to mitigate the political fallout while reaffirming their support for international law.
Yet, there is good reason to believe that Mongolia’s decision to welcome Putin was the right one for its national security interests. It also indicates that Mongolian foreign policy has become more sophisticated and adept at navigating the complex geopolitical and geoeconomic environments in Asia. While Western media suggested that Mongolia’s unwillingness to arrest Putin – despite being a signatory to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court – is a sign of capitulation, it is rather a reflection of a rebalancing in Mongolian foreign policy that has been a long time coming.
Since the end of the Cold War, Mongolia’s has pursued a “third neighbor” policy in its foreign relations, which aimed to limit its dependence on China and Russia through direct outreach to states like India, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. A key element of this strategy was Mongolia’s participation in any international organizations that would accept it – a strategy of political liberalization that closely mirrored its embrace of free-market capitalism.
However, just as the country’s economic liberalism led to widespread corruption, intense environmental destruction, and a breakdown in traditional industries like animal husbandry, the third neighbor policy resulted in mixed outcomes. The more Mongolia worked with the United States on defense issues, for instance, the more it risked antagonizing Moscow and Beijing.
For post-Cold War generations – particularly those in urban areas – this trade-off was seen as worthwhile, as Westernization and modernization appeared preferable to socialism and state-driven industrial policies. Having been a Soviet client state for nearly 70 years, many Mongolians were eager to embrace Western liberalism, especially as it promised a more modern path to economic development. If closer cooperation with Washington alienated Russia, so be it.
Over the past decade, however, the value of the third neighbor strategy has shifted, as Russia and China have increasingly collaborated on security and economic issues, often bypassing Mongolia in their plans. While Mongolia’s engagement with the United States and other third neighbors like Japan has helped diversify its foreign relations and provided access to international organizations, it has offered few concrete security advantages to make up for the lost opportunities resulting from its relative isolation from Moscow and Beijing.
At the same time, a growing number of Mongolians have come to reject the principles of free market capitalism, seeing economic integration with China and Russia around a trilateral economic corridor as a preferable means for economic exchange. Mongolian trade dependency with both states has increased in recent years, contributing to the sense among Mongolians that the countries’ economic futures are closely (and positively) interconnected.
Younger generations of Mongolians, in particular, have come to see Russia and China in more positive terms, while their desire for strategic autonomy and partnership with Western states has somewhat diminished.
The war in Ukraine compounded these shifts in public opinion and policy, primarily as Mongolia resisted U.S. and European pressure to condemn Russia, opting instead to remain neutral – a position on the Ukraine war it shares with most non-aligned Asian states. Mongolia’s principal reasons for neutrality was its acceptance of Russia’s threat perceptions toward NATO enlargement, its view that Ukraine carried responsibility for starting the war, and its desire to maintain good ties with Moscow, even at the cost of its relations with the global West.
These shifts in strategic thought and posture also reflect a growing acceptance among Mongolian strategists that geography remains a significant determinant. While Mongolia will continue its outreach to Western states as part of a diversifying foreign policy approach, it will do so with a greater sense of realism toward its northern and southern neighbors.
Mongolian policymakers and the public remain committed to maintaining their independence from foreign influence, but they now recognize that their national interests are best advanced through cooperation in Asia, including with countries like Russia and North Korea, which the global West views as pariah states. This shift does not signal antagonism toward international law or institutions, but rather reflects Mongolia’s growing confidence in managing its foreign relations on its own terms.
Mongolia has not grown indifferent to U.S. national security interests in Asia, nor has its willingness to work with Washington on shared concerns diminished. Ulaanbaatar continues to refer to the United States. as its “strategic third neighbor” in English-language statements. However, Mongolian leadership has adopted a more strategic approach to foreign policy, while public opinion has increasingly favored Russia and China as Mongolia’s most reliable partners. This new direction in foreign policy carries significant implications for the United States.
At the bilateral level, Washington no longer has as much influence over Mongolia’s strategic calculus as it once did, particularly on defense matters. While Mongolia still values the U.S.-co-hosted Khaan Quest military exercise, it no longer views U.S. defense support as a critical component of its national security. The fact that Mongolian Foreign Minister Battsetseg Batmunkh did not reference defense relations – a key area of U.S.-Mongolian bilateral relations in the past – during her joint press conference with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in August was notable in this respect.
At the strategic level, Mongolia’s policy realignment weakens the U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific, particularly toward China. For decades, Washington relied on Ulaanbaatar’s antipathy toward China as a key feature of U.S. strategy in Northeast Asia, believing that Mongolian policymakers would resist closer ties with Beijing as a matter of course.
This assumption no longer holds, as Mongolian policymakers and the Mongolian public now prioritize engagement with China over relations with the United States, whether on economic, political, or even security matters. This preference will likely deepen as Mongolia’s and China’s economies become more intertwined.
Operationally, Mongolia’s strategic realignment will limit the U.S. ability to project power in Northeast and Inner Asia, areas of high strategic importance for Washington. While the United States has never stationed troops in Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar’s support for U.S. activity did provide it a degree of access into a key geographic area between Russia and China. As Mongolian policymakers draw increasingly closer to Russia and China, including through its participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), they will correspondingly limit their non-economic engagement with Washington.
Mongolia’s shift away from the U.S. is also emblematic of a larger trend across the Indo-Pacific that bodes ill for Washington’s long-term influence. Like other non-aligned states in Southeast Asia, Mongolia is less receptive to the U.S. strategic narrative than it once was. Whether on the Ukraine war, the Gaza conflict, Russia’s role, or the perceived threat posed by China, Mongolia simply does not share Washington’s foreign policy priorities.
The Biden administration seemingly understands the changing nature of Mongolia-U.S. relations and is adapting its policies accordingly. During his August 2024 visit to Ulaanbaatar, Blinken outlined a framework for bilateral cooperation that highlighted economic relations and downplayed the countries’ differences on strategic matters. The secretary of state rightfully pointed to areas in the two states’ bilateral relations where goodwill remains strong, such as the Peace Corps’ longstanding program of English-language education.
While such measures may never restore the level of strategic influence the U.S. once enjoyed in Mongolia, they will help ensure the two states maintain good relations. As Mongolia becomes more integrated into Asia’s emerging geoeconomic order, this could be the most realistic outcome Washington can expect for now.