The “Whole-of-Society” (WoS) concept was first introduced in 2010 by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), a U.S. Department of Defense institute. At the time, WoS primarily focused on helping “societies prevent and prepare for, respond to and recover from natural disasters and other crises.”
As European countries have increasingly been exposed to the threat posed by authoritarian regimes engaging in hybrid warfare, they have come to understand that these hybrid threats differ from traditional ones. Hybrid threats operate more frequently and continuously, imposing a lasting impact on the targeted nation. In response, European countries have adopted a strategy that enables them to withstand threats on a daily basis. Consequently, the concept of resilience has gained importance, and WoS resilience has been taken as a vital approach for enhancing defense capability and resilience.
In May 2021, the report of the European Parliament, “Best Practices in the Whole-of-Society Approach in Countering Hybrid Threats,” explicitly stated, “Societal resilience is the desired product of a well-functioning whole-of-society approach in countering complex and interconnected dangers such as hybrid threats.” This report highlighted WoS as the most effective way to counter hybrid warfare, an idea also affirmed in NATO’s reports on hybrid threats.
WoS has evolved from addressing natural disasters to combating hybrid or nontraditional threats. It functions as a framework aimed at integrating governmental and societal capabilities to meet defense needs, strengthen resilience against disasters or aggression, and bounce back from such challenges. Taiwan has adopted a similar framework to respond to threats from China.
China’s threat to Taiwan is not limited to traditional military actions but also includes influence operations, psychological warfare, and legal warfare, also known as “The Three Warfares.” Taiwan must carefully develop a comprehensive strategy in response to these challenges. Additionally, because Taiwan does not have a vast territory, the entire island would be under military threat in the event of an invasion by China. Ensuring the readiness of the entire population is a critical task for the Taiwanese government.
In light of the more complicated situation, the Taiwanese government recognizes that, in extreme scenarios, it will require the entire population to participate in defending Taiwan. In June 2024, President Lai Ching-te announced the formation of the Whole-of-Society Defense and Resilience Committee. The committee invites civil society groups and experts to offer policy suggestions, ensuring that governments incorporate civilian perspectives and adapts policies to meet real-world needs. The committee’s first meeting, held on September 26, included members from diverse professional fields and generations, with attention given to gender balance.
At the meeting, a member of the National Security Council outlined key priorities in the scenario of a disaster or military contingency, including maintaining government operations, ensuring the functioning of essential societal services, and, when necessary, supporting military efforts. To that end, the committee focused on five main policy areas : “civilian mobilization and training,” “strategic material stockpiling and distribution,” “energy and critical infrastructure maintenance,” “preparation of social welfare, medical, and shelter facilities,” and “cybersecurity for communication, transport, and financial networks.” The committee meeting is just one of Taiwan’s steps in taking full responsibility for its defense.
The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) expressed its support for Lai’s Whole-of-Society Defense and Resilience Committee, highlighting its potential to advance coordination across Taiwan’s government, private sector, and civil society. Also, many experts recognize the initiative’s role in helping Taiwan address unprecedented threats.
These endorsements show a need for more accurate criteria to gauge Taiwan’s resolve in defense. The aim is to properly reflect Taiwan’s preparation for and resolve in defense, prevent underestimation, and, therefore, strengthen deterrence.
The current standard – the military budget as a percentage of GDP – primarily focuses on military-related expenditures, but this metric originates from the United States’ defense posture, in which projecting power abroad is a major issue. Under this standard, Taiwan might get an above-average score, with its defense budget having increased by 80 percent over the past eight years to reach 2.5 percent of GDP – higher than Japan’s 2 percent goal and the median of NATO member states.
However, the relative size of its defense budget does not fully reflect Taiwan’s preparation for its arduous challenges. A nationwide paralysis of communication, command and control, and food supply in the contiguous United States has not been a major concern, but these are the scenarios that a small island at a close distance from its adversary would face. Maintaining governmental and societal operations is an indispensable part of Taiwan’s defense strategy. Ultimately, the goal is to sustain its forces to defend Taiwan until China’s invasion fails.
Therefore, when spending on defense is used to measure a nation’s commitment to self-defense, the components of what constitutes defense spending would look different in Taiwan and the United States. Beyond military activities, the calculation of Taiwan’s defense budget should also include “defensive expenditure,” such as spending on efforts to secure energy supplies, communication networks, material stockpiles, civilian mobilization, and the toolbox for people to persevere in a contingency. In a defense scenario, preserving the willingness of people to fight against invaders is as important as maintaining the capability of the military, which is why more countries have come to emphasize the WoS framework.
Although Taiwan’s WoS resilience framework is still in its early stages, the budget of the central government in 2025 already includes initiatives to strengthen and diversify the power grid, upgrade the equipment of firefighters, enhance police capabilities to protect critical infrastructure, and strengthen the resilience of airports or harbors. These investments aim to mitigate extreme risks and should be regarded as part of Taiwan’s defense efforts. However, that budget is listed under different ministries, which means the actual defense expenditure in Taiwan might be underestimated.
The key to defending Taiwan is not solely based on how much of the GDP is allocated to defense but also on how these funds are spent. For example, Ukraine’s experience demonstrates that small, survivable, and lethal weapons are worth Taiwan’s further investment. Maintaining communication systems, food and power supply, people’s willingness and capabilities to fight, and so on, are also necessary for the effective implementation of an asymmetric defense strategy.
Several polls – and Taiwan’s recent defense reforms – have shown that Taiwan is more than willing to invest in its defense. Taiwan’s investment in asymmetric capabilities and preparation only grows along with its increased defense budget every recent year. However, utilizing an inaccurate, simple standard to argue that Taiwan is not spending enough only sends wrong signals to China and, therefore, undermines deterrence.
If U.S. policymakers can propose a more context-specific evaluation framework – one that considers the preparedness outlined in the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience framework – to assess Taiwan’s efforts in protecting its homeland, it would help Taiwan expand its defense capabilities and present a Taiwan well-prepared across every domain that China would find it difficult to overcome.