Reporting on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Delaware trip for the Quad Summit came with a fascinating bundle of contradictions.
On the one hand, the “India Rising” story continued. The negotiations on the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies, and Cancer Moonshot, among others, came out as net positives for India, and Modi engaged in a slew of important bilaterals on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly in New York after the Quad summit.
On the other hand, a U.S. Court summoned the Indian government and National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval in connection with alleged Indian government involvement in a plot to murder Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, who is associated with the pro-Khalistan organization “Sikhs for Justice.” Tellingly, Doval, who is a regular on trips of such significance, was conspicuously absent at the prime minister’s Delaware outing — the official reason cited was his preoccupation with the security situation in Jammu and Kashmir.
Ahead of Modi’s meeting with President Joe Biden, senior officials in the U.S. State Department met Sikh activists to discuss “threats facing Sikhs in the United States,” wherein the alleged role of the Indian government in the Pannun case was reportedly discussed. “Transnational repression” – a term used to refer to government actions that harm, threaten, or harass people on foreign soil – also came up, as officials assured the community of their commitment to the inviolability of the 2024 Transnational Repression Reporting Act.
The timing of the summons to the Indian government and the NSA couldn’t be more important. It is difficult to believe that every recent positive India-U.S. development is only coincidentally accompanied by what sounds like a note of caution. When the allegations on the role of Indian national Nikhil Gupta were released publicly last year, it embarrassed India, whose rising star was shining in the wake of its adroit diplomatic victory in clinching the 2023 G20 New Delhi Consensus. Adding to its ignominy was that credible Five Eyes’ intelligence also flagged other cases of alleged black operations by Indian operatives.
Consider also U.S. Ambassador Eric Garcetti’s comment when Modi embraced Putin on the same day as a fatal attack on a Ukrainian school. “There is no such thing as strategic autonomy during a conflict,” he said. Irrespective of whether Garcetti meant the statement at face value, or he was imputing a deeper meaning, it hinted at U.S. dissatisfaction with India’s constantly mealy-mouthed responses to situations where Washington was expecting more.
Of course, this would have been nothing for India to worry about, if it is the only game in town vis-a-vis the Indo-Pacific. However, Washington has already sought to reinvigorate the new “Squad” with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines, which it is likely to develop complementarily to (and not as a replacement for) the Quad.
Plus, there is much more at stake for India than just its bilateral partnership with the U.S. this time around.
It is becoming increasingly clear that India is eyeing a larger role in the resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The rhetorical flourish of being a vishwamitra (a friend of all) will not find a better case study to justify its substantiveness. At different points in time, all players in the conflict have expressed a desire for India to take up the role of a mediator.
Until now, the conditions to mediate did not exist – the presence of a potential mediator is no substitute for the absence of the desire for peace among combatants. The MEA, on its part, seemed to be aware of this. Only since Modi’s latest Ukraine visit is the scenario looking somewhat plausible: Modi “briefed” Biden telephonically regarding his meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, just like Doval “briefed” President Vladimir Putin a few days ago.
By many accounts, broader Europe is now shifting its perception of the conflict, articulating it in much more acceptable terms for its global partners to find common ground. More recently, India’s Minister for External Affairs S. Jaishankar said: “We keep talking to both sides as well, measured and circumspect about what we are doing, we are not hyping it.” He added that there is “no peace plan as such,” but India is trying to do something helpful in the resolution of the conflict.
Unfortunate as it is, no useful efforts, let alone outcomes, can come out of any attempt at a solution to the vexed question of Kyiv’s plight without Washington (the first step to the broader ‘West’, including Europe) being on the same page. Moreover, New Delhi does not even need to be the trump card that resolves the protracted conflict – it only needs to make sure it has an important role to play in the process, as a rising power that seeks to bolster relationships with all parties involved.
This does not mean that India is in any way obliged to temper its reactions as per the American expectation, but it does necessitate taking the currently unpredictable nature of Washington’s strategic perception into account. The upcoming American election is very tightly contested, with the latest polls predicting that it will go down to the wire. A new administration in Washington is unlikely to be inimical to Indian interests, there are trade-offs for India in both cases. A Kamala Harris win would signal a victory for the wing of the Democrats that is more sensitive to human rights, while Trump’s recent comment on India being a “very big abuser” of trade tariffs (even as it was accompanied by praise for “fantastic” Modi) has highlighted his penchant for unpredictability – in or out of power.
No two nations are entirely congruent in their interests. The ability of two countries to overcome differences is directly proportional to the fortitude of the bilateral relationship. In this case, nimble backdoor diplomacy is crucial to minimize the public fallout of the Pannun case. This would inevitably involve reaffirming India’s commitment to the rule of law and having uncomfortable conversations with counterparts in Washington. The space for those conversations is a testament to the stability of India-U.S. ties.
India must ensure that the “high-level” inquiry committee constituted late last year is accepted as credible by both sides. Undoubtedly, the interlinkages and benefits of the India-U.S. relationship are too vast for Washington to consider any serious downgrading of the Indian partnership. However, paying attention to the right caveats is not only important for the bilateral relationship: it might just end up lessening the friction India faces in problem areas like Ukraine, where it aspires to define its rising-power clout.