After talks with the Taliban held during Donald Trump’s first presidency, the United States signed a “peace agreement” with the insurgent group, which set in motion a series of developments that culminated in the Taliban’s capture of power in Afghanistan in August 2021. With Trump’s return for a second presidential term, the Taliban will have a familiar face in the White House.
In an interview with The Diplomat’s South Asia editor Sudha Ramachandran, Ahmad Shuja Jamal, a senior Afghan civil servant in the Office of the National Security Council of the Ashraf Ghani government and co-author of “The Decline and Fall of Republican Afghanistan” (Oxford University Press, 2023), discussed the likely approach of Trump 2.0 toward the Taliban regime, humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, and Afghan migrations to the United States. He also discussed China’s position on militant groups sheltering in Afghanistan. Beijing’s priority is the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, he said, not the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan: “To the extent that Beijing cares about the TTP in Afghanistan, it is the potential of their collaboration with ETIM.”
Looking back, who was more responsible – the Trump or Biden administration – for the fall of the Afghan Republic in August 2021?
In striking a deal with the Taliban, the first Trump administration sought to coordinate its exit with Taliban leaders based in Doha instead of its allies in Kabul, who were frozen out of all negotiations. The Biden administration, which had the opportunity to course-correct, chose not to do so. To be clear, the Afghan government made its own mistakes. But one key lesson is that when the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan were out of alignment and Afghanistan was abandoned, the Taliban benefited from it.
The Trump administration has the benefit of hindsight and of observing three years of Taliban rule. There is a real opportunity to take a different tack with the Taliban regime for its massive human rights violations and its actions that have harmed U.S. interests.
With Donald Trump set for another term in the White House, the Taliban, it is said, will have a familiar face in Washington. However, Marco Rubio, Trump’s pick for secretary of state, is a strong critic of the Taliban and wants the group designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Broadly, what is the relationship of the U.S. with the Taliban regime likely to be during Trump 2.0?
Not only are the dynamics of the incoming administration still taking shape, we are also yet to see the policy processes that will be put in place. In the first administration, Afghanistan policy was largely the bailiwick of one person, the special representative [Zalmay Khalilzad], who reported directly to Secretary [of State Mike] Pompeo. But neither Khalilzad nor Pompeo is going to be in the incoming administration, and the publicly expressed views of high-level nominees point to a different approach toward Afghanistan and the Taliban.
Is the U.S. under Trump likely to recognize the Taliban regime and/or unfreeze Afghan assets?
While we have to see the Afghanistan policy shape up, it is hard to see recognition as a realized outcome in the near term. Trump has himself said the Taliban have breached the terms of the deal that Khalilzad signed on behalf of his administration in Doha. Trump’s own statements, the views of his senior Cabinet nominees, and the dynamics in Afghanistan do not make recognition a likely outcome in the foreseeable future.
The U.S. has been the largest humanitarian aid donor to Afghanistan since August 2021. But that aid has been declining over the past two years. Will it drop further during Trump 2.0?
U.S. and other humanitarian assistance has helped feed millions of Afghans and provide life-saving medical care. Further reduction of this assistance will have disastrous consequences for the people in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Taliban regime has pilfered the humanitarian aid by propping up their own fake NGOs, pressuring existing NGOs, seeking to force U.N. organs to divert aid, and imposing taxes on humanitarian assistance. That has directly hurt the people who deserve the assistance, with women and minority communities who have been sidelined from public life affected most severely. This has harmed the goodwill of countries providing assistance. With so many pressing humanitarian situations in the world, any group in charge of Afghanistan would be expected to do all it can to attract more aid, but the Taliban are doing the opposite.
How is the Trump administration likely to impact Afghan migrations to the U.S.?
The clearest policy outline that has emerged so far is that there will be large-scale deportations of undocumented refugees and immigrants. Afghans are a small portion of people in that situation. But there’s also an overall disposition to limit the number of migrants and people seeking asylum. That can impact the steady but increasing flow of Afghans coming through the Darién Gap and the southern border of the United States. Afghans in the U.S. seeking to sponsor their family in Afghanistan and the thousands whose SIV, P1, or P2 protection cases are still pending are also concerned about the knock-on effects of the overall disposition. There is a real opportunity for the incoming administration to show its commitment to its allies in Afghanistan and reassure them that the people in these categories would not be affected.
Coming to Afghanistan’s neighbors, China and Pakistan. Has China not been able to get the Taliban regime to stop supporting the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)? Or isn’t this a priority for Beijing?
The priority for Beijing is the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Their longstanding demand has been to round up ETIM members, disrupt their ability to gain a foothold in Afghanistan, and militarize the narrow strip of the Wakhan in the Pamirs to prevent it from serving as a corridor for the group. To the extent that Beijing cares about the TTP in Afghanistan, it is the potential of their collaboration with ETIM. Any action by China with respect to the TTP in Afghanistan as it relates to Pakistan’s concerns is secondary.
India’s engagement with the Taliban regime has grown over the years. In the process, it has lost Afghan public goodwill. What has New Delhi gained?
India is maintaining a forward-leaning posture like a rising power that is increasingly confident in its place in the world and seeking to shape the affairs in its neighborhood. But in trying to keep its enemies closer, India is engaging with the devil. As Pakistan is finding out, any gains from engagement with the Taliban have been very modest, if that. The Taliban are a fanatically ideological group that deploys the mutually assured destruction (MAD) tactic of the suicide bombing. And not just when they were a terrorist insurgency — they have incorporated their suicide bombing battalions into their special forces. The MAD tactic is an integral part of their policy repertoire.
The Taliban have also repeatedly demonstrated that they are only takers in a relationship — they will not bite you only as long as your hand feeds them. With a group like that, the mutual interest approach borne out of realpolitik can only take you so far. You also need some form of ideological alignment. Look at what happens when the Taliban see such alignment: for the sake of al-Qaida, they lost power in 2001, and they’re still seeing air strikes for harboring al-Qaida leadership in Kabul. For the TTP, the Taliban have accepted a breakdown of their relations with Pakistan, which has supported them for decades.
India’s outreach to the Taliban was accompanied by a suspension of all people-to-people ties with Afghanistan. After August 2021, Pakistan and Iran resumed visa, medical tourism, and educational programs, which have been important lifelines for Afghans under existential pressures. India did not.
What gains New Delhi sees from its engagement with the Taliban, perhaps only Delhi can explain. But Delhi has options to make gestures for the people of Afghanistan. There is room for goodwill to grow because unlike with the Taliban, there is a natural affinity for India in the rest of Afghanistan.