The reelection of Donald Trump as the next president of the United States was met with celebratory responses from the Hungarian government. Yet, as the main policy directions of the upcoming Trump administration start to take shape, there is less reason to celebrate in Budapest. Shortly after announcing “economic neutrality” as the master strategy of Hungary, and with an increasingly heavy reliance on Chinese investments, Prime Minister Vikto Orbán might find that Trump’s “America First” strategy is the exact opposite of how he sees the ideal future global order.
Budapest Announces “Economic Neutrality” as Grand Strategy
In September 2024, Orbán announced “economic neutrality” as the geopolitical grand strategy of Hungary. This, to a large extent, builds on the earlier “connectivity” discourse, which stipulates that Hungary must become a bridge between East and West instead of engaging in “bloc formation.” Accordingly, Hungary was among the five EU nations that voted against imposing additional tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles on October 4, 2024.
Representatives of the Hungarian government have been regular guests in Beijing in recent months to strengthen economic cooperation and secure future investments from China. At the recent China International Supply Chain Expo, Hungary was represented by both Foreign Minister Péter Szíjjártó and Viktor Orbán’s political director Balázs Orbán (no relation). In his keynote address, Szíjjártó noted that “a great meeting of the Eastern and Western economies has been created in Hungary… Our strategy of economic neutrality will make 2025 a fantastic year for the Hungarian economy through the enhanced cooperation between China and Hungary,” as quoted by Global Times.
The optimism about the future of the economy is not universally shared in Hungary, as the country entered a 0.7 percent economic recession in the third quarter of 2024. Also due to frozen EU funds over the ongoing rule-of-law disputes with Brussels, the Orbán regime is likely to become increasingly reliant on Chinese investments to make its economic indicators look better.
While putting into practice Hungary’s “economic neutrality” strategy, ties are strengthened in a number of other strategic fields as well. Following Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Budapest in May 2024, Hungary’s leadership continued to strengthen relations with Beijing in the political, economic, and media realms.
Beijing Seeks Greater Influence in Hungary’s Legislation
On the day of Trump’s election victory, the speaker of Hungary’s National Assembly, László Kövér, was on a week-long official visit to China. In Beijing, Kövér met with China’s top legislator, Chairman of the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee Zhao Leji. According to the NPC’s report, Zhao proposed to Kövér to implement a memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the legislative bodies of the two countries, to “further strengthen exchanges and contacts between high-level legislative bodies, special committees, bilateral friendship groups, NPC deputies and parliamentarians, and local legislative bodies.” Zhao also referred to the creation of a suitable business climate in Hungary as a result of trust and friendly cooperation between the two legislative bodies.
Based on the NPC report, Kövér was less ambitious, calling for more “friendly cooperation” between the two sides without giving support to the signature of an MoU. Perhaps for this reason, no MoU between the two sides was signed during the meeting. Nevertheless, Kövér did not leave without handing over some rhetorical gifts to his counterpart, assuring Zhao about Hungary being a “dedicated supporter of the One China principle” and expressing appreciation for “China’s efforts to reduce international conflicts.”
In addition to Zhao, Kövér also met with Wang Huning, often described as Xi Jinping’s “chief ideologue” and currently acting as the chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. According to Xinhua’s report, Kövér emphasized the extent to which the two sides share similar value systems regarding development and peaceful resolution of conflicts.
The joint meetings with Kövér show Beijing’s interest in influencing Hungary’s legislative processes to accommodate Chinese investors and also to influence EU politics via Budapest. In fact, to influence Hungary’s legislation, Beijing has little more to do than to build favorable relations with the Orbán regime, as Orbán’s Fidesz party controls two-thirds of the National Assembly and thus has the power to modify the country’s constitution without the approval of the opposition.
Enhancing R&D Cooperation and Creating Friendly Media Narratives
Beyond Hungary’s government, state-controlled academic institutions as well as representatives of pro-government media outlets have also been active in building closer ties with Chinese counterparts recently. Four of Hungary’s so-called “foundation universities” – managed by government-affiliated state foundations – have entered into partnerships with various Chinese institutions in the tech, AI and automotive fields. These include an AI research partnership between the Corvinus University of Budapest and the Chinese University of Hong Kong in Shenzhen; the joint establishment of a High-Tech Innovation Center between the University of Óbuda, Budapest and China’s Wuxi High-Tech Zone; the signing of a cooperation agreement between the University of Miskolc and China’s top EV battery maker CATL, as well as the signing of an MoU on cooperation between the Széchenyi István University of Győr and the Chinese EV maker Nio.
To further enhance friendly narratives on China-Hungary relations, various representatives of Hungary’s pro-government media have been invited to China in recent months. In August 2024, journalists from the popular pro-government media platforms Mandíner and Demokrata participated in a trip to Xinjiang, after which they published several reports on China’s successful development model in the region. “They are fine, thanks,” one journalist of Demokrata wrote in his report, supposedly representing the views of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.
The executive director of the Demokrata media group, Dávid Bencsik attended various media cooperation events in China recently, among them the 2024 Belt & Road Media Cooperation Forum in August 2024. At the event, Bencsik called for an enhanced role of media to “boost understanding” between China and Europe, also criticizing the “Western globalist doctrine” pushed by U.S. elites and the supposed lack of press freedom in Europe.
Between Trump and Beijing: Finding a Coherent Narrative
There seems to be a clear contradiction between being pro-Beijing and pro-Trump at the same time. How will the Orbán government manage this?
So far, there has been little reaction to Trump’s victory in terms of how the incoming U.S. administration will impact the Hungarian government’s China policy and visions of “East-West connectivity.” Gergely Gulyás, minister of the Prime Minister’s Office, said in his press briefing on November 14 that “the [next] U.S. administration will have its own China policy, but the Hungarian government will also follow its own interest, and our interest is to trade with China.” Gulyás also added that in his view “Trump will not freeze China-U.S. trade relations, he just wants to improve the balance [between the two sides].”
A deeper analysis of Budapest’s recent interactions with Beijing suggests that the Hungarian leadership will continue to prioritize economic interests over security considerations. Due to its worsening economic outlook, Budapest has high expectations for the continuation of large-scale Chinese investments, especially in the electric mobility sector. To secure Beijing’s goodwill, Budapest will also likely remain ready to deepen cooperation in a range of other fields, including the political, research and development, and media fields.
The Orbán government will make sure to show another face when communicating with Washington during the upcoming Trump 2.0 presidency. In that context, favorite topics will include the common interest in finding a solution to the Ukraine war, fighting illegal migration, and various topics related to the “anti-woke” agenda of both parties. It remains to be seen whether decision-makers in Washington will be willing and able to see through this double game and will pay attention to the other sides of Orbán’s foreign policy as well.