The recent visits of Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk to Islamabad marked the continuation of growing Pakistan-Russia ties in recent times. This quiet yet tectonic regional development first drew global attention when Pakistan’s then-Prime Minister Imran Khan visited Moscow on the eve of Russia’s Ukraine invasion in February 2022.
The geopolitical discourse within and about South Asia is usually dominated by Sino-Indian rivalry or India-Pakistan tension. However, the warming up of Pakistan-Russia ties indicates not only the changing geopolitical landscape of the region but also a continuation of a historical trend.
Hiccups of History
Since the time of the Cold War, Pakistan-Russia relations have followed a recurring pattern of being subject to the rhythms of great power dynamics in South Asia. Joseph Stalin was critical of both the new republics of India and Pakistan and considered them an extension of Western imperialism. In the early 1950s, South Asia was at the fringe of Cold War rivalry, whose main battles were fought in theatres of Eastern Europe, Germany, the oil-rich Middle East, Indo-China, and the Korean Peninsula.
Soviet interest in South Asian affairs began after the death of Stalin in 1953 and the implementation of John Foster Dulles’ “Northern Tier” strategy. The United States’ plan to create a defense arrangement of Turkiye, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan to contain communism forced the Soviets to throw their weight behind India to prevent U.S. domination of South Asia. On the other hand, Pakistan was keen to drag Americans into the region to offset the power differential with India. Hence, rather than any material interest like oil, great power politics laid the foundation of Soviet engagement with South Asia.
In the subsequent decades, Pakistan-Soviet bilateral relations remained subject to Russia’s extraregional calculus. The Sino-Soviet split over doctrinal differences within communism, an accentuation of their territorial disputes, and partial relaxation of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States due to the signing of agreements like the partial test ban treaty changed the Soviet objective in South Asia from checking the Americans to preventing Chinese domination. This tactical shift opened the door for more positive Pakistan-Soviet bilateral relations, which resulted in the opening of the Karachi steel mill with Russian assistance, a trade boom between Pakistan and the USSR following the Tashkent agreement, and a visit by then-Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin to Pakistan in 1968.
However, this bonhomie didn’t last long since the Sino-American rapprochement of the 1970s and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 again put Russia and Pakistan in opposite camps. The American-Chinese backed, and Pakistan-led, “Afghan Jihad” of the 1980s played a critical role in the eventual demise of the Soviet Union. The bitterness of the Afghan Jihad and the changed priorities of Russia in the post-Cold War era, as articulated by Andrey Kozyrev in his famous “three circles” doctrine, put the Pakistan-Russia relations in a state of hiatus.
Revival and Resurgence
The current thaw in Pakistan-Russia relations started a decade back when Russia, after years of failing to make any meaningful progress in its relation with the West, started looking toward its Asian counterparts with its “pivot to the East” policy. The sea change in South Asia’s external and internal geopolitical landscape in the last decade has provided a conducive environment for the upward trajectory of Pakistan-Russia relations.
In particular, China’s deeper involvement in South Asia through its flagship China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, part of the broader Belt and Road Initiative; the emergence of a “no limits” partnership between China and Russia, and the deepening of ties between the United States and India to check Chinese assertiveness has provided a fertile ground for reimagining relations between Moscow and Islamabad. Pakistan’s joining the China- and Russia-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2017 provided an institutional platform for greater Pakistan-Russia engagement.
The upswing in relations was reflected via initiatives like signing a pact for the Karachi-Lahore gas pipeline and the first-ever military exercise between the Russian and Pakistan military in 2016. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 further accelerated this process, with bilateral trade breaching the $1 billion mark in 2024. On regional issues like the recognition of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, there is a growing convergence between Russia and Pakistan, as evidenced by Russia’s recent decision to remove the Taliban from the list of terrorist organizations.
The Slip Between the Cup and the Lip
For all the change, there is one constant: Pakistan-Russia relations have always acted as a subset of the regional geopolitical pentagon composed of Russia, the United States, China, India, and Pakistan. With that in mind, the relationship is limited to areas like energy, food security, and counterterrorism. Any attempt to venture into domains like arms sales can complicate the Pakistan-Russia relationship since it affects Indian sensitivities.
India has performed a very delicate diplomatic balancing to maintain its traditional ties with Russia by refusing to participate in Western campaigns to isolate Russia economically through sanctions. As India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar has described India-Russia relations as the only constant in world politics, New Delhi expects the same reciprocity from Moscow around its neighborhood.
On Pakistan’s part, its chronic dependency on Western institutions like the International Monetary Fund for economic bailout limits its attempts to infuse new vigor into bilateral ties with Russia. This was evident when Pakistan ex-army General Qamar Javed Bajwa had to toe the Western line by condemning Russian actions in Ukraine. Reports of Pakistani arms and ammunition reaching Ukraine in exchange for an IMF bailout expose the limits of Pakistan’s strategic autonomy to foster an independent bilateral relationship with Russia.
Pakistan’s weak infrastructure and institutional capabilities are also a hindrance, as was evident when Islamabad’s plan to import Russian crude oil went adrift because of a lack of technical upgrades in its oil refineries.
However, the biggest hindrance in taking the relationship to the next stage is for the pro-Western orientation of Pakistan’s elites. Unlike Russia’s other regional partners, like China and Iran, Pakistan’s ruling class and liberal intelligentsia have idolized the Western liberal democratic model and have high personal stakes in courting the West. They are hesitant to join Russia in the contest between “democracy vs. autocracy” conceptualized by U.S. President Joe Biden.
The Way Ahead
Unlike in the previous Cold War, today South Asia is central to the emerging geopolitical contestation between the United States and China. Hence, the previous bilateral and regional actors are adapting to the new realities, including by reimagining older ties. The newly gained momentum in Pakistan-Russia relations is an example of this. How much Russia and Pakistan can shed their baggage to formulate a new understanding is yet to be seen.
As Mark Twain once famously said, “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.” Any formulation for Pakistan-Russia ties will have to overcome history, but we can expect that the roadmap of the future lies in the kaleidoscope of the past.