In his recent address to the 21st session of the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Military and Military Cooperation (IRIGC-M&MTC) in Moscow, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh reaffirmed New Delhi’s commitment to “not only continue close contacts… [but] also deepen and expand (our) cooperation” with Russia, despite “enormous pressure on India of a public and private nature.” While he did not clarify the nature of the pressure, or where it is coming from, such an admission from the highest echelons of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s cabinet is quite revealing.
Although carefully veiled, it is evident that Singh was alluding to Western pressure.
Washington has previously voiced concerns about India’s close ties to Russia, especially since the conflict in Ukraine. More recently, according to Indian media reports, U.S. officials in India have been trying to persuade India’s Ministry of External Affairs to ban the Russian state media television network, RT. But to no avail. Washington has also imposed sanctions on 19 Indian companies for allegedly dealing in items critical to Russia’s military-industrial base. U.S. officials have also taken issue with India’s large-scale purchases of Russian energy supplies, even threatening “consequences,” although clarifying that it would not set “red lines” for India’s oil imports from Moscow.
Data shows that India’s weapons imports from Russia significantly dropped in recent years. Between 2019-23, India accounted for only 34 percent of Russia’s arms export, down from 58 percent in 2014-2018 and 76 percent in 2009-2013. While it may be tempting to interpret this fall as an outcome of U.S. pressure on India, it could have more to do with the decline in the international competitiveness of the Russian arms export industry since the early 2010s. Notably, between 2014–18 and 2019–23, Moscow’s global arms exports fell by 53 percent, largely because of domestic challenges.
Another reason for the decline in arms imports from Russia could be changes in India’s defense policy, which places greater emphasis on domestic manufacturing and is now focused on boosting arms exports.
Interestingly, prior to the Ukraine war, in 2021, Russia accounted for only 2 percent of India’s total oil imports. Until 2017-18, Russia’s share in India’s crude imports was less than 1 percent. By 2023, India’s imports from Russia jumped to almost 40 percent. Large discounts in prices of Russian oil offered to India drove this surge in Indian imports of Russian oil. During fiscal year 2022-23, India purchased Russia’s Ural oil at an average price that was nearly 9 percent lower per barrel than that of its second-largest supplier, Iraq. By April 2023, this price difference widened to 14 percent, leading to a significant increase in India’s crude oil imports from Russia. However, as the discounts waned, Indian state refiners shifted focus back to traditional sources i.e. the Gulf countries, as transport costs were much lower due to geographical proximity.
Meanwhile, in 2024, the U.S. doubled its share in the Indian crude market, with some estimates suggesting that New Delhi bought over $1 billion of U.S. oil in August 2024 alone. With higher freight rates amid the current winter season and proposed hikes in the cost of freight shipments for the upcoming year, New Delhi may continue to look for cheaper sources of oil, and diversify away from Russia, unless Moscow can offer cheaper alternatives.
In this context, U.S. sanctions may prove to have limited effect on India as the latter has been able to successfully circumvent them so far. As a country with the fastest rate of growth in oil consumption and given the priority it accords to keeping its oil import bill low, India will stick to its stand of buying cheaper crude oil, wherever available.
The Donald Trump administration should rethink and recalibrate the U.S. approach to India’s relationship with Russia. During Trump’s first presidency, although India and the U.S. deepened strategic alignment, divergence on Russia generated some friction. This was evident when the Trump administration threatened CAATSA sanctions on India for its purchase of S400 air defense systems from Russia. It drew New Delhi’s ire.
Although continuing India-Russia arms transactions is a deterrent to full U.S.-India military interoperability, changing India’s strategic calculations through the threat of sanctions is self-defeating.
While the Narendra Modi government is keen on alignment with Washington, it will demand more autonomy. Any attempt to constrain New Delhi’s foreign policy choices will be seen as disregard for its sovereignty and provoke ire.
Washington needs New Delhi to maintain a favorable balance of power in Asia. It should therefore explore areas of cooperation, which take into account the durable nature of India-Russia ties. A constructive step in that direction would be to continue encouraging India to play a more active role in mediating the crisis in Ukraine. This is a role in which New Delhi has shown some interest in the recent past.