By nominating Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz as his secretary of state and national security adviser, respectively, U.S. President-elect Donald Trump appears to be signaling that his overtures to North Korea during his first term might not be repeated. However, Trump’s longstanding penchant for deal-making and his desire to cement a legacy as president suggest that attempts to denuclearize North Korea may still be on the table.
Drawing lessons from the back-channel diplomacy of his first term, Trump – now bolstered by an unprecedentedly loyal inner circle – may well reengage North Korea through secret negotiations.
The Back Channel That Made History
On June 30, 2019, Trump became the first sitting U.S. president to set foot in North Korea. Accompanied by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, Trump crossed a low concrete marker into North Korean territory, marking a historic moment. At the same time, the two leaders agreed to have their negotiators resume efforts toward achieving what has long been an elusive nuclear deal.
Nevertheless, this milestone was not achieved overnight. It was the culmination of nearly two years of behind-the-scenes contacts between the United States and North Korea. During multiple rounds of secret negotiations, then-CIA Director Mike Pompeo made covert trips to North Korea in 2018. These missions not only secured the release of three American hostages from Pyongyang, but also paved the way for the landmark Kim-Trump summits in 2018 and 2019, as well as a high point in North-South Korea relations: a 2019 summit in Pyongyang. Kim greeted South Korean President Moon Jae-in at the airport with a hug and allowed Moon’s speech to be broadcast nationwide.
Trump was not the first U.S. president, nor the only one, to adopt back-channel diplomacy for foreign policy breakthroughs. His predecessor, Barack Obama, used secret negotiations to secure his signature diplomatic achievement: the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Given the absence of formal diplomatic relations for over 30 years and the domestic political sensitivities surrounding Iran-U.S. relations, public negotiations were not feasible. It was these clandestine talks that enabled U.S. officials to assess Iran’s willingness to engage in formal negotiations, free from the pressures of public scrutiny.
While the negotiations with Iran were challenging, negotiating with Kim’s “Hermit Kingdom” presents even greater obstacles. The United States and North Korea remain technically at war, as the Korean War ended with an armistice rather than a peace treaty. Furthermore, every past denuclearization agreement between the two nations has collapsed. Even after Trump took office in 2017, his interactions with Kim oscillated between insults and threats.
Against this backdrop, dispatching a secret envoy to Pyongyang to lay the groundwork for productive talks was a prudent strategy – and it paid off.
The Prospect of Another Round of North Korea-U.S. Back-Channel Diplomacy
Speculation has emerged about a potential shift in Trump’s North Korea policy during his upcoming second term. This shift would entail abandoning efforts to convince Kim to fully dismantle his nuclear arsenal and instead, seeking to persuade Pyongyang to freeze its nuclear program and halt the development of new weapons. In exchange, North Korea would receive economic sanctions relief and potentially other forms of aid. The rationale behind this pivot is pragmatic: avoiding futile disarmament talks to concentrate on the broader strategic goal of competing with China.
Trump, however, has adamantly denied such claims. In a Truth Social post, he dismissed reports of his softened stance on North Korea’s nuclear weapons as fabricated. But Trump knows that in order for his North Korea policy to succeed in a second term, he will need to revive back-channel diplomacy, and the two key conditions necessary for its initiation – his strong determination and domestic opposition to engagement with Pyongyang – would almost certainly be in play.
Trump’s determination to improve North Korea-U.S. relations is evident. While he has not explicitly outlined his second-term North Korea strategy, it is reasonable to assume that, like most second-term presidents, he will be driven by a desire to cement a lasting legacy. If his domestic political ambition is to dismantle the “deep state,” his foreign policy objective could well center on achieving a denuclearized North Korea – a goal that carries both significant geopolitical weight and a degree of feasibility compared to other potential diplomatic endeavors.
Trump’s confidence in his personal rapport with Kim further reinforces this determination. On the 2024 campaign trail, Trump repeatedly claimed credit for averting nuclear conflict with North Korea, contrasting his approach with what he characterized as the Obama administration’s brinkmanship. Believing that he “got along very well” with Kim, Trump is convinced that he has the unique ability to achieve a breakthrough with Pyongyang on the nuclear issue.
Domestic opposition to North Korea-U.S. engagement is the second condition conducive to back-channel diplomacy – and it is firmly in place. While Trump’s first term emphasized dialogue, the Biden administration has taken a harder line, prioritizing deterrence in coordination with South Korea. This strategy includes unilateral sanctions and the deployment of nuclear-capable assets to the Korean Peninsula.
Furthermore, members of Congress have pressed for increased pressure on Pyongyang, especially in response to its growing partnership with Russia during the Ukraine conflict. Figures like Rubio and Waltz, who are to serve as secretary of state and national security adviser in a second Trump administration, have long advocated a hawkish approach toward North Korea. While their loyalty to Trump may appear solid for the time being, their hardline stances could lead to internal clashes, echoing Trump’s first-term tensions with former National Security Adviser John Bolton over Pyongyang.
With the aforementioned two key conditions met, another crucial factor for back-channel diplomacy to materialize is North Korea’s anticipated positive response. This appears plausible, as Pyongyang still has not deviated from its longstanding goal of normalizing relations with the United States.
It is true that the Kim regime has grown in both capacity and confidence, bolstered by new allies. These developments complicate any U.S. administration’s ability to offer minimal inducements to secure concessions from North Korea. Nevertheless, despite the collapse of the 2019 Hanoi summit, Pyongyang remains committed to improving relations with the United States, which it considers its “foremost foreign policy strategy.” North Korea views the U.S. as holding the key to lifting sanctions while tacitly accepting its nuclear arsenal.
Moreover, a potential resolution to the Ukraine-Russia conflict under a Trump administration could introduce uncertainties into the North Korea-Russia partnership. Under such circumstances, it would be strategically prudent for Kim to seek détente with the U.S., should Trump extend an olive branch.
How Would South Korea Respond?
Under the conservative leadership of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, whose hardline stance against Pyongyang has contributed to a diplomatic deadlock, inter-Korean relations have reached a standstill. Tension has escalated to such an extent that 71 percent of South Koreans now support the development of domestic nuclear weapons.
Amid this bleak backdrop, Trump’s efforts to rekindle talks with Pyongyang could offer a path toward easing the strained inter-Korean relations. His prior success in initiating dialogue with North Korea during his first term suggests the potential for a renewed agreement encouraging Pyongyang to take steps toward denuclearization.
Moreover, changes in South Korea politics could lend momentum to North Korea-U.S. diplomacy. If the Constitutional Court upholds the National Assembly’s decision to impeach Yoon over his controversial and short-lived declaration of martial law, South Korea would need to hold a presidential election within 60 days. A Democratic Party candidate is likely to emerge victorious. If so, South Korea’s new president would most probably prioritize peaceful engagement with North Korea, in line with the policies of former liberal presidents such as Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in.
That said, improved North Korea-U.S. relations under Trump could still raise significant national security concerns for Seoul. Should Trump prioritize arms control over the complete denuclearization of North Korea during negotiations, the continued presence of U.S. troops in South Korea could reignite contentious debates over defense cost-sharing, an issue that Trump frequently pressed during his first term. Trump might also use the prospect of improved inter-Korean relations, mediated through his diplomacy, as leverage to demand that South Korea pay more to sustain the South Korea-U.S. alliance.
In addition, Trump’s reaction to potential North Korean demands for the withdrawal of U.S. troops remains uncertain. Such a withdrawal, reminiscent of the U.S. troop pullout in 1949 that preceded the Korean War, would pose a severe security threat to South Korea. Given Trump’s past characterization of joint South Korea-U.S. military exercises as “war games” and “very provocative,” there is also a possibility that he might cancel these exercises to favor North Korea-U.S. negotiations, leaving Seoul vulnerable.
The worst-case scenario for Seoul would involve Trump officially recognizing North Korea as a nuclear state to facilitate nuclear arms negotiations. Such a diplomatic deal would create a profound security dilemma for South Korea, forcing it to navigate an increasingly precarious regional landscape. Considering Trump’s likely intention to reopen back-channel diplomacy with North Korea, this scenario, while extreme, cannot be entirely ruled out.