A new report from the Center for the National Interest, “Afghanistan’s Qoshtepa Canal and Water Security in Central Asia,” underscores the main technical, financial, and legal challenges confronting the Afghan interim authorities in ensuring the effective and sustainable construction of the Qoshtepa Canal (sometimes written as Qosh Tepa). The canal poses particular concerns for downstream countries, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Agriculture is the dominant consumer of water resources in both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, accounting for roughly 90 percent of total water usage in each country. It contributes 17 percent to Uzbekistan’s GDP and 10 percent to Turkmenistan’s GDP, with a substantial share of the water dedicated to cotton production.
Afghanistan’s interim authorities estimate that the canal project – designed to span 287 kilometers in length, with a depth of 8.5 meters and an average width of 100 meters – will irrigate over 1.2 million acres of farmland and generate approximately 200,000 jobs, thereby making a significant contribution to agricultural productivity and national food security. Currently, the construction process, involving approximately 5,000 workers and 4,000 pieces of earthmoving equipment, is proceeding at an accelerated pace. The initial phase of the project has been finished, and the second phase is currently underway, with 81 percent of the excavation work for phase two already finished, according to Afghanistan’s National Development Corporation (NDC). The timeline for the completion of the main canal structure is estimated at six years – however, the construction of the entire canal network, including secondary and distributive systems, is expected to require a considerably longer period.
Initial plans for the canal date back to the 1970s, but the Soviet invasion in 1979 triggered more than 40 years of civil unrest and violence in Afghanistan, putting Qoshtepa on long hold. It was not until 2018 that USAID commissioned a feasibility study for the canal and the Ghani government launched construction of the canal before it fell in August 2021. In March 2022 the Taliban restarted the project as a flagship initiative, with a major public relations campaign highlighting its ambitious scope and potential impact. Visuals of extensive construction activity highlight the canal’s scale. As Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid stated in December 2023, the project symbolizes hope amidst economic hardship and represents Afghanistan’s potential for development and self-reliance.
The canal’s completion could exacerbate regional conflict as downstream countries, reliant on agriculture, particularly cotton production, stand to be most adversely affected by the canal’s construction. However, some experts believe such concerns may be overstated. A recent study by the German Economic Team indicates that even if the Qoshtepa Canal diverts 25 percent of the Amu Darya’s water it would only result in a 0.7 percent reduction in Uzbekistan’s GDP by 2030. One of the report’s co-authors, Water and Environment Researcher Najibullah Sadid, asserted that agricultural water usage will not be substantial at this stage, as the subchannels intended for transporting water to the fields have not yet been established and the agricultural fields are not prepared for cultivation.
Soviet Era Irrigation Projects: A Cautionary Tale for Qoshtepa
The Soviet Union’s construction of the Karakum Canal in the mid-20th century remains one of the most problematic irrigation projects in present-day Central Asia. Intended to divert water from the Amu Darya River to irrigate the arid Karakum Desert in Turkmenistan, the canal resulted in long-term environmental and economic repercussions, including the drastic reduction in the flow of the Amu Darya into the Aral Sea, which contributed to one of the world’s most infamous environmental disasters. We should acknowledge, however, that the environmental disaster of the Aral Sea was not solely the result of poor canal construction but also the Soviet regime’s wasteful water use practices and the over reliance on cotton, a very water intensive crop, as a source of export revenue flows to the USSR.
Parallels between the construction methods and accelerated pace of the Qoshtepa Canal and those of Soviet era irrigation projects, particularly the Karakum Canal, underscore the potential risk of repeating past mistakes. The construction of the Karakum Canal employed the rudimentary narodnaya stroika (“people’s construction method”: i.e. large numbers of laborers/prisoners) due to limited financial sources. The risk of structural failure, particularly the rupture of the canal’s banks, was evident even during its construction. To minimize costs, Soviet authorities adopted a simplified approach to earthworks, a method also applied to other large-scale water infrastructure projects throughout Central Asia. Furthermore, the canal’s waterproofing was carried out with outdated materials such as clay and sand, which were pulverized and spread across the canal’s bed and walls. Similar to the Qoshtepa Canal, the Karakum Canal was built without a concrete lining. Over time, the absence of concrete lining led to the canal becoming increasingly obstructed by silt. In early 2023, according to the Turkmen.news, the canal ruptured, releasing 100 million cubic meters of water into the surrounding dried sands.
The Taliban’s handling of the Qoshtepa Canal bears striking resemblance to past Soviet practices in its emphasis on the canal’s purported benefits, while downplaying the potential risks. Politically, the canal serves as a statement to Afghanistan’s ethnic minorities, signaling the Taliban’s commitment to improving the lives of all citizens, not just the Pashtun majority. Geopolitically, it is framed as evidence that Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, can successfully manage large-scale infrastructure projects and assert its national interests. These motivations drive a significant public relations effort surrounding the project, as seen in remarks made by Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the deputy prime minister for economic affairs, who emphasized the Islamic Emirate’s focus on agricultural development and water management, using the Qoshtepa Canal as a prime example of this commitment.
However, these political drivers, much like in the Soviet era, risk overshadowing critical environmental and technical considerations. The rushed nature of the project, combined with the prioritization of political messaging over careful planning, raises the possibility of repeating the costly mistakes made during the construction of the Karakum Canal that led to lasting ecological challenges.
Simultaneously, the Qoshtepa Canal project is advancing under constraints of limited resources and pressure for rapid results. However, hydraulic experts warn that failure to adhere to modern engineering standards could lead to significant environmental degradation. As noted in a 2023 article by CABAR.asia, experts are particularly concerned that the canal’s bottom is not lined with concrete or geotextile materials, which are essential to prevent substantial water loss through seepage into the sandy soil. There is also concern that the unlined canal’s operation could intensify soil salinization. Another critical issue is the lack of desilting mechanisms in Amu Darya waters, which already are heavy in sediment. This sediment buildup will likely reduce the canal’s operational efficiency over time.
Combined with Afghanistan’s agro-industrial expansion, this may lead to extensive land degradation and heightened salinity in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya River. In layman’s terms, not only will Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan be receiving less water from the Amu Darya, but the quality of the water will also be reduced.
While it is true there are many reasons for serious concern about Afghanistan’s current canal construction methods, there is still time to address these shortcomings. However, the window of opportunity for doing so will close in the coming years. Our concern is that Afghanistan may not have an adequate number of trained personnel on both the research side as well as adequate financial resources to build a better canal. This situation is greatly complicated by the fact that the interim authorities are not recognized as a legitimate government, and that financial transactions are deeply constrained by international sanctions, including the freezing of about $10 billion in international reserves.
Legal Issues
Given the increasing water scarcity in Central Asia and the potential environmental and geopolitical consequences of the canal project, Afghanistan and its Central Asian states need to engage in dialogue and collaborate on sustainable water management practices. This is especially critical as the region faces mounting pressures from population growth, climate change, and agricultural demands, all of which threaten to further deplete the Amu Darya’s water resources.
The history of water allocation in Central Asia is defined by obsolete Soviet-era agreements, most notably Protocol 566, signed in 1987. However, Afghanistan was notably excluded from the agreement, which was forged when the Soviet Union was embroiled in its military conflict in the country.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Central Asian countries signed the Almaty Agreement in 1992, which continued to follow the framework established in Protocol 566. Afghanistan was also excluded from this agreement, and this exclusion means there are no existing legal restrictions on Afghanistan’s use of Amu Darya waters.
The canal’s construction underscores the need for a new, more inclusive agreement on water management in the Amu Darya basin. The outdated water-sharing arrangements stemming from the Soviet era no longer reflect the realities of the region, where Afghanistan’s growing water usage must be addressed. A comprehensive Amu Darya basin agreement that includes Afghanistan, along with the other Central Asian states, is essential for ensuring long-term water security and preventing future conflicts over water resources.
All Amu Darya Basin states will also need to engage in more efficient water use practices. The combination of rapidly growing populations and more dry arid weather resulting from climate change already are putting greater stress on diminishing resources.
The Urgent Need for Greater International Support and Regional Cooperation
The Qoshtepa Canal project, of course, has not gone unnoticed by Afghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors. In 2023, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for a careful study of the canal’s construction, warning that it could “radically change the water regime” in the region. This sentiment was echoed by Turkmenistan, which has demanded that Afghanistan employ a “science-based approach” to water management, ensuring that the canal’s construction is carried out by qualified personnel to mitigate environmental risks.
Despite these concerns, there has been no formal objection from Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, likely due to their broader geopolitical interests. Both countries are engaged in important infrastructure projects with Afghanistan, including the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, the extension of rail links to Pakistan, and transboundary electrical power-sharing, which require cooperation with Kabul. The fact that Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are already pragmatically engaged with Afghanistan on other critical infrastructure projects sets a good precedent for coming together on addressing shared water use challenges with the imminent construction of the Qoshtepa Canal.
In late October 2024, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan established a bilateral joint commission to address issues related to the Qoshtepa Canal. The commission has met twice already and will reconvene early in 2025. So far, these meetings have taken place in a closed format, but the fact that they are happening is what is important. The World Bank’s country director for Afghanistan, Faris Hadad-Zervos, has also met with Afghanistan’s Chamber of Commerce to discuss a number of issues including the Qoshtepa Canal.
These are both promising developments, but the bilateral talks must be multilateralized, and ideally the World Bank and other international development financial institutions should move beyond preliminary talks to concrete projects that promote better canal construction, regional water-sharing agreements, and more efficient irrigation and water-use practices. Our report outlines recommendations on this score.
The time to act is now. Ideally the incoming Trump administration would take on regional water scarcity as an opening for greater U.S. engagement in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Increasingly scarce water resources will contribute to greater instability and governance challenges and transboundary terrorist threats. We saw how this movie turned out in 2001. The United States’s Uzbek partners are well aware that the Taliban regime, while a difficult partner, is on the same side in fighting the threat from the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and other groups across their border. Washington should listen to them regarding pragmatic engagement with Kabul, and the Qoshtepa Canal is an ideal place to start.
This article is adapted from the Center for the National Interest’s recent report, “Afghanistan’s Qoshtepa Canal and Water Security in Central Asia,” with revisions made for style and clarity to align with The Diplomat’s readership. The report explores the longstanding issue of water security in Central Asia, a challenge exacerbated by decades of mismanagement and ecological decline. It also addresses concerns about potential conflict and environmental degradation linked to the construction of Afghanistan’s new canal, Qoshtepa. The complete report is available here.