China is taking unprecedented steps to assert itself in the Pacific region. At the 2024 Pacific Islands Forum Leaders Meeting (PIFLM), one of the region’s most important diplomatic gatherings, China’s special envoy to the Pacific raised strong objections, leading to the removal of any mention of Taiwan in the final communique. Taiwan, an acknowledged Pacific developmental partner for over 30 years, was further sidelined when the Solomon Islands called for its exclusion from future events, a move many believe was directed by China.
With Beijing and Honiara strengthening ties, the Solomon Islands could further expand Chinese influence. One important case could be at the 2025 PIFLM, where the Solomon Islands can, as a host, limit Taiwan’s presence, increase China’s role, hinder the participation of Taiwan’s regional allies, and steer the conversation toward China’s interests.
China has been steadily expanding its influence in the Pacific region using its economic largesse, with particular success in the Solomon Islands. Between 2000 and 2021, China has committed 780 grants and 115 loans to Pacific Island nations, over half of which were committed after 2015. Its efforts prompted the Solomon Islands along with Kiribati to shift diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 2019, and Nauru to follow suit in 2024. Under the leadership of former Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, the current minister of finance, the Solomon Islands signed two security agreements with China in 2022 and 2023. The 2022 agreement marked China’s first bilateral security pact with a Pacific Island nation, and both deals have raised alarm bells in the West.
With Honiara set to host this year’s PIFLM, China is well-positioned to leverage its relations with the Solomon Islands to advance its own interests. As the host, the Solomon Islands can tighten procedural rules and cite logistical or diplomatic concerns that limit the presence of Taiwan’s officials at the 2025 PIFLM. By doing so, the Solomon Islands would reinforce Beijing’s “One China” principle and its goal to diplomatically isolate Taiwan.
The marginalization of Taiwan could undermine regional unity and set a precedent for other Pacific Island nations to follow suit to win China’s favor. In the broader international context, this would reinforce China’s strategic aim of eroding Taiwan’s international legitimacy, potentially leading to greater diplomatic pressure on Taiwan’s few remaining allies worldwide.
The Solomon Islands could also invite a larger delegation of Chinese officials to participate and enhance China’s presence. The hosting nation has significant discretion in shaping the guest and observer list. By welcoming a larger delegation of Chinese officials and representatives from Chinese businesses and civil society, the Solomon Islands could allow China to dominate the discussions through sheer numbers. This would amplify China’s presence and influence, which could lead to the promotion of policies that align with Beijing’s strategic interests, from infrastructure projects to economic partnerships. For the Pacific region, this risks skewing the forum’s agenda in favor of Chinese-funded initiatives, potentially sidelining critical local concerns such as climate adaptation, fisheries management, and drug trafficking.
Perhaps more disruptively, the Solomon Islands could seek to undermine the participation of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in the Pacific: the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Tuvalu. This could be done through bureaucratic delays, diplomatic maneuvers, or even limits and hindrances on the island nations’ ability to voice key concerns in the forum’s agenda. This would signal a shift in regional alignments, making it increasingly costly for nations to support Taiwan diplomatically. The isolation of Taiwan’s allies would also weaken regional diplomatic cohesion and increase their vulnerability to Chinese economic and political overtures. At the global level, this tactic would serve as a microcosm of China’s broader goal to isolate Taiwan internationally and could have ripple effects by encouraging other countries to reconsider their stance on Taiwan’s diplomatic status, further reducing its global standing.
Finally, the Solomon Islands could prioritize issues that align closely with Chinese interests during the PIFLM. China has been actively involved in infrastructure development and digital connectivity through the Belt and Road Initiative and resource extraction in the Pacific. By steering conversations toward these topics, the Solomon Islands could ensure that Chinese-funded projects and Chinese-preferred policies dominate the forum’s discussions. This might also include downplaying concerns over contentious issues such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which is often linked to Chinese fishing fleets, or minimizing focus on debt sustainability related to Chinese loans in the Pacific. On the global stage, this would reflect China’s growing ability to shape multilateral agendas, challenging the influence of traditional powers like the United States and Australia in the Pacific.
The 2024 PIFLM in August marked a pivotal shift in the region’s diplomatic landscape, underscoring China’s growing influence. The Solomon Islands’ role as host of the next forum presents a strategic opportunity for China to further solidify its presence and shape the regional agenda. With this power, the Solomon Islands could limit Taiwan’s involvement, expand Chinese presence, marginalize Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, and advance policies aligned with China’s strategic interests. These actions pose multifaceted challenges to not only other Pacific Island nations but also powers with stakes in the region, including the United States and Australia. As China continues to seek influence in the Pacific, the region’s diplomatic dynamics are likely to undergo significant changes, with far-reaching implications for both the Pacific and the broader international order.