In 2024, Vietnam’s political stage was dominated by dramatic leadership shake-ups and a cascade of high-profile anti-corruption cases. As 2025 begins, all eyes are on the sweeping bureaucratic reforms (tinh gọn bộ máy) led by General Secretary To Lam of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), a bold move that could reshape the country’s governance.
Unlike the piecemeal administrative adjustments of the past, these reforms are unprecedented in terms of their scale and speed, targeting every level of government. On November 25, 2024, the CPV’s Central Committee approved the plan, with the changes expected to be finalized by April 2025. At the central level, the reforms will reduce Vietnam’s administrative structure to fifteen government ministries, four party commissions, and five National Assembly committees. At the local level, from the provincial to communal tiers, various party and state agencies will also be streamlined and merged.
In this article, we will analyze the possible incentives behind these ambitious reforms and enumerate some challenges that To Lam and the CPV may encounter as they embark on what are deemed to be historic and revolutionary changes to Vietnam’s political system.
The Reforms: Why Now?
The CPV’s official narrative casts the reforms as a “revolution” that is of “existential vitality” to the regime. It is hoped that the sweeping changes will bring modernity and transparency to a cumbersome political machinery fraught with inefficiencies and low levels of accountability. The ambition is to best prepare the country for what the propaganda apparatus advertises as an “era of national rise” (kỷ nguyên vươn mình) – a period in which the CPV envisions Vietnam transforming into a modern, industrialized, high-income country with an elevated status on the global stage. While many might dismiss these statements as hyperbolic, they are not entirely without substance.
In fact, the reforms align with the CPV’s broader desire to safeguard its performance-based legitimacy – one that rests on its ability to deliver sustained economic growth. Despite Vietnam’s post-COVID-19 economic success, marked by stable GDP growth, robust FDI inflows, booming export volumes, and a growing reputation as an attractive trade partner for Western countries, the country’s appeal remains limited by chronic structural issues. Foreign investors frequently highlight concerns about rampant corruption, the country’s complex bureaucratic system, and its sluggish and non-transparent government decision-making processes. As To Lam eyes the strategic economic goals of achieving “modern industry” status by 2030 and becoming “a developed, high-income country” by 2045, he understands that the country cannot afford to lose the trust of foreign investors. Winning over discerning investors requires much more than the sagas of anti-corruption victories – stories that have begun to stir up worries of political instability. The administrative reforms are the CPV’s bid to deliver meaningful structural changes and reassure investors of the government’s commitment to building an investment-friendly political environment.
Administrative reforms would also allow Vietnam to climb up the global value chain – a prerequisite if the country is to continue reaping the benefits of a potentially intensified U.S.-China rivalry during U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term. Since the U.S.-China trade war broke out in 2018, Vietnam has been touted as a major beneficiary of the rerouting of supply chains away from China.
However, such optimism warrants some caution. First, Vietnam’s overreliance on foreign input for production and especially on Chinese intermediate goods has fueled suspicions over it being a backdoor for China’s products to escape U.S. tariffs. Second, most of the exporters that actually benefit from the trade war are foreign-owned companies, while domestic Vietnamese companies still struggle, constrained by their focus on low-value-added products. By restructuring the bureaucratic system, the CPV and its government can foster a more efficient public sector to help local firms thrive. Moreover, downsizing the government means lower operational costs (the government currently consumes 70 percent of state budget revenue) and more money to invest in science and technological innovation, things that Vietnamese firms require if they are to enhance their competitiveness.
Another possible rationale behind the administrative reforms is Lam’s hope to root out corruption at its core, rather than relying solely on his predecessor’s “blazing furnace” campaign, which while effective, has inflicted a lot of collateral damage on the CPV and its government. Not only have prosecution cases of high-profile leaders tainted the image of the party in the eyes of the public, they have also caused fears among party cadres themselves. As noted by Nguyen Khac Giang, government officials now often express hesitance in making key economic decisions, such as signing approvals for projects or licenses due to fear of being entangled in corruption investigations.
The authors’ recent conversations with several citizens in a province whose top leaders were recently arrested and investigated confirm this phenomenon. Local correspondents describe their provincial government as “paralyzed.” By eliminating intermediary levels and streamlining bureaucratic procedures, the reforms are hoped to reduce interactions between officials and citizens, thus, removing opportunities and incentives for corruption. Moreover, as the reforms progress, the Vietnamese government is increasingly expressing zeal over e-governance. Such a shift towards automating government processes will naturally increase transparency. In essence, Lam seems to advocate for a more preventive approach toward corruption, moving away from the double-edged sword of fear-mongering crackdowns.
The administrative reforms might also represent Lam’s ambition to step out of his predecessor’s shadow. As the successor to the late General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, who was widely admired for his incorruptibility and the “blazing furnace” campaign, Lam faces the pressure of proving his mettle. Despite being widely known as the trusted “executor” of Trong’s anti-corruption campaign, Lam has struggled to win the same level of popularity. Rumors have swirled around whether his role as the right-hand man has afforded him enough power to sideline intra-party political opponents. Besides, speculation surrounds whether his past tenure as minister of public security foreshadows an iron-fisted ruling style now that he has been appointed party chief. The bold and dramatic institutional reforms seem to be his attempt to redefine himself as a technocrat rather than an ideological torch-holder, to show off his vision and capability, to win respect from within the party-state, and to bolster his public image ahead of the 14th Party Congress in 2026.
Potential Roadblocks to Reform
However, Lam’s reforms might be more easily said than done, and the CPV continues to face mounting challenges.
To begin with, the sweeping changes will result in early retirements or positional shifts for numerous government and party officials at both the central and local levels. For a regime in which rent-sharing is essential to its survival, such abrupt push-outs may cause discontent. The government has demonstrated its seriousness in addressing the financial implications of this streamlining effort, proposing a budget of 130 trillion VND (around $5.1 billion) to support affected officials. However, it remains an open question whether this measure will be sufficient to mitigate dissatisfaction. Moreover, doubts linger about the criteria that will be used to decide who stays and who is forced to leave. Some of our interviewees expressed worries that well-connected individuals or those with wealth might exploit their advantages to secure positions. The CPV seems to be informed about these concerns and has expressed a commitment to ensure that reforms are conducted in a corruption-free manner, but these promises do not guarantee public understanding or trust.
Adding to the strain, civil servant recruitment has been halted nationwide since December, causing concerns about rising unemployment. At least until reforms are finalized, young university graduates may struggle to find jobs in the public sector. Social norms about the party-state as a reliable source of stable employment may change, potentially diminishing the CPV’s popularity among the broader population.
Next, there is the risk that early retirements or positional downgrades could be wielded as a political weapon in order to sideline opponents, deepening internal power struggles. The consolidation of ministries into “super ministries” could strip current ministers of their authority over previously distinct portfolios. Such shocks may provoke factional conflicts within the CPV and government, potentially doing more harm than good for Lam himself.
Last but not least, for Vietnamese citizens, reforms might mean delays and hold-ups in service delivery. Whether these problems are temporary or become entrenched due to government downsizing remains uncertain. The CPV’s intention to rely more on e-governance may be too ambitious, especially given the slow adoption rate of citizens, alongside the lack of user-friendly e-services, unequal e-governance infrastructure development across different regions, and other challenges.
In a nutshell, while Lam and the CPV have reasons to be optimistic about the administrative reforms, they must be ready to navigate the complexities these changes unleash and encounter over the long run.