One of the final initiatives of the Biden administration in the United States was the announcement of the first vision statement that outlined the priorities of the Department of Defense in Southeast Asia. Then-U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced the “Vision Statement for a Prosperous and Secure Southeast Asia” in November 2024 during the 11th ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) in Laos.
The statement also highlighted Washington’s willingness to provide Timor-Leste with “capacity-building assistance in the defense sector” to help the youngest country in Southeast Asia attain full membership in ASEAN.
According to a 2024 paper on Timor-Leste-U.S. relations by the Congressional Research Service, the U.S. Defense Department provides International Military Education and Training (IMET) courses to the Timor-Leste Defense Force. Military engagements between Timor-Leste and the United States thus far seem more substantive than the former’s engagements with China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This is despite a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that China and Timor-Leste signed in 2023.
For example, the 13th Exercise Hari’i Hamutuk in 2024, which also involved Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, took place across Timor-Leste. This multilateral exercise improved the infrastructure and skills of Timor-Leste’s soldiers and built interoperability and relations among the participating countries. Bilaterally, the U.S. military helped train the air component of the Timor-Leste Defense Force and restore the Baucau airfield. On the humanitarian side, the U.S. Navy Seabees have completed over 100 projects, such as schools and clinics, in Timor-Leste since 2009.
ASEAN membership is contingent on Timor-Leste meeting fundamental milestones in the regional grouping’s socio-cultural, economic, and political-security pillars; the third pillar includes the defense sector. Timor-Leste has a long way to go in modernizing its defense force for territorial protection and maritime security. According to Timorese think tank Fundasaun Mahein, the country is also ill-equipped to defend its nascent digital infrastructure, such as the South Submarine cable connecting Dili to Australia, from cyber threats amid geopolitical competition.
From a geostrategic viewpoint, U.S. defense assistance seems self-serving. It aims to beef up the U.S. force posture and the capabilities of its allies in the Indo-Pacific region. Timor-Leste is one of the strategic locations near northern Australia and the Pacific identified under the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. Furthermore, the Ombai-Wetar Straits north of Timor-Leste could be an alternative waterway for U.S. military assets moving between the Indian and Pacific oceans. This waterway would become necessary if the Straits of Malacca and Singapore were drawn into a regional maritime conflict.
Nonetheless, Timor-Leste has benefited from years of defense assistance from the U.S. and its partners. The assistance enabled Timor-Leste to make progress that contributed to the country’s efforts to earn an observer seat at the ADMM in 2023.
Timor-Leste President José Ramos Horta has voiced his hopes for his country to become the 11th member of ASEAN in 2025, which includes membership status in the ADMM. In joining ASEAN, Timor-Leste seeks primarily better market access and educational opportunities, which are crucial for economic development. Economic growth, in turn, underpins political stability and domestic security.
For Timor-Leste, declining oil and gas reserves, amid unresolved issues concerning the Greater Sunrise gas field, could create budgetary problems that dampen its national aspirations, including defense modernization. The lack of military modernization would limit the ability of the small Timor-Leste defense force to safeguard its territory and natural resources, ensure internal stability, and contribute to international peacekeeping missions.
Additionally, membership in the international community, such as ASEAN, is crucial to demonstrating and safeguarding Timor-Leste’s political status as a functional, independent, and sovereign state. This is also a critical goal given the weakened rules-based international order that now faces further destabilization from the policies of the second Trump administration.
It bears watching whether Trump’s policies will create uncertainties in Timor-Leste-U.S. relations.
First, Trump will surely dismiss the Biden era’s defense vision statement for Southeast Asia and overwhelmingly see the region through the transactional lens of “America First” and countering China. Horta recently said that the suspension of USAID funding might affect local NGOs but not the Timor-Leste government. However, one unknown is whether Trump and his acolytes will rethink U.S. defense assistance in light of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between China and Timor-Leste. The U.S. might demand Timor-Leste withdraw from its partnership with China and do more for America in return for defense assistance, putting Dili in a tight spot.
Second, Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) has begun pressuring U.S. government agencies, including the Defense Department, to cut their workforces and budgets. It was already troubling that U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth could not name any ASEAN country during his confirmation hearing. How the cost-cutting exercise at the Defense Department will impact military cooperation with Southeast Asia, including defense assistance to Timor-Leste, is uncertain.
Whatever happens, other regional powers such as Australia and Japan may have to step up their support to Timor-Leste in the interest of its political stability and regional security.