The Indo-Pacific remains a shining beacon of hope in the United States’ otherwise dim foreign policy predictions. However, just like during President Donald Trump’s first term, securing U.S. interests through trade and reshaping international partnerships accordingly will remain a priority. To ensure U.S. trade, critical military, and technology supply chains, his foreign policies in the Indo-Pacific will remain driven by military engagements.
U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has called China the most formidable adversary the U.S. has faced. He also noted that the challenges prompting the Quad’s revival under Trump’s first administration have only intensified. The Quad is a grouping of four countries – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – that have been tightening their cooperation with the goal of ensuring “a free and open Indo-Pacific that is peaceful, stable, and prosperous.”
With Rubio and National Security Adviser Mike Waltz, among others, the Trump administration has shown a commitment to remain engaged in the region to deter Chinese belligerence. While the trade competition between the United States and China will likely increase with Trump’s protectionist policies, Trump (along with Xi Jinping) has made statements regarding cooperation between the two countries. However, the red lines on long-standing issues such as technology sharing, critical technology sectors, and Taiwan remain. Taiwan will be a central issue for the Trump administration.
The new administration’s first major foreign policy initiative was a meeting of the Quad foreign ministers on January 21, 2025 – the day after Trump and his team took office. The timing was emblematic of the region’s importance for the United States. A joint statement released after the 2025 meeting highlighted the Quad’s dedication to enhancing Indo-Pacific maritime, economic, and technological security, alongside promoting resilient and reliable supply chains. Further, the Quad foreign ministers opposed unilateral actions to alter the status quo through force or coercion, a possible hint toward China.
The Trump administration sees the Quad as a partner in U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. However, the Quad is likely to be pulled in two different directions. On the one hand, U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific will largely be driven by its military presence in the region, owing to the constant Taiwan issue and China’s overall belligerence in the region. These tensions affect U.S. partners and threaten Washington’s interests in the region, such as the safety of trade routes, technological supply chain initiatives, critical minerals, etc.
On the other hand, other Quad member countries have shown ambivalence when it comes to their engagement with China. They might be pushed to choose sides with the United States if Trump plays hardball. This builds a very uncomfortable position for most of the Indo-Pacific countries. If Quad countries follow the U.S. approach to the region and focus on a purely military approach to the Indo-Pacific, the region might witness a backsliding in the Quad’s progress made in areas of human-centric development such as connectivity and health.
However, there are good reasons why Trump might opt to revive the “Squad” beyond the Quad. The former replaces India with the Philippines, while other members remain the same. In addition to being a traditional treaty ally of Washington, the Philippines holds a significant place in Trump’s “America First” vision for the Indo-Pacific. If Trump’s regional policy is indeed driven by U.S. military engagement to counter Chinese belligerence in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, then the Philippines may become a linchpin in U.S. engagement in the Indo-Pacific.
Prior to the U.S. presidential election in 2024, China had already been mobilizing its maritime assets around the First Island Chain, encompassing Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. This was likely done to shore up a favorable position for Beijing ahead of the new U.S. administration. One of the focal points for both China and the United States is the South China Sea, particularly the area near the Philippines, known as the West Philippines Sea. China, through its coast guard and maritime militia, has been operationalizing a de facto occupation of key areas within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In the past two years alone, China’s belligerent activities have targeted Philippine vessels and fisherfolk in the Second Thomas Shoal, the Sabina Shoal, and Iroquois Reef – all of which are well within the Southeast Asian state’s lawful EEZ.
Additionally, given the interdependent security dynamics of the First Island Chain, events in the Taiwan Strait will also have considerable implications for the security of the Philippines and its waters. It is important to note that three Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites are being established in the northern region of the Philippines, which is in close proximity to Taiwan. Thus, if a shooting war breaks out between the United States and China over Taiwan, the Philippines’ northern regions will be a likely target, given the presence of U.S. logistics and military facilities there. Therefore, pushing China back in the waters near the Philippines will ensure that the balance of power shifts more favorably back to the United States.
China is unlikely to appease the United States by disengaging from the West Philippine Sea in return for economic concessions, given the scope and depth of its illegal presence there. On the other hand, Trump always negotiates from a position of strength and dominance, making it unlikely that his administration will agree to any settlement where U.S. pre-eminence will be diluted. Therefore, the most pragmatic pathway for Washington will be to impose a considerable cost on China’s adventurism in Philippine waters by bolstering its ally’s defense capabilities and encouraging other key allies – like Japan and Australia – to enhance their maritime presence and deterrence operations in the Western Pacific, and possibly vital chokepoints of the subregion. Only by increasing the physical risk for China will Beijing consider negotiations on more equitable terms. More importantly, it would be crucial for the United States to consider deploying more of its defense systems to the region as an added layer of deterrence.
Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the Philippines has illustrated its commitment to punching above its weight and playing an active role in the U.S. alliance network. However, given the uncertainty of Philippine national politics, Washington should make the most of the favorable dynamics while it can. The Trump administration should expedite the institutionalization of its defense engagements with Manila and operationalize a more functional action plan through the Squad.