A commercial port near Shanghai recently welcomed two Iranian vessels tasked with picking up over 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate – a key precursor for the production of solid fuel ballistic missiles. While it seems clear that Iran will use this sodium perchlorate to build ballistic missiles, who these missiles are for is less obvious. After all, recent treaties between Iran and Russia have stressed the importance of military cooperation and geopolitical support, and medium-range systems like the Fateh-360 have already appeared in Russian hands.
However, while the fulfillment of this cooperation might be a long-term Iranian interest, its current conditions do not afford it this luxury. Instead, the shipment of Chinese sodium perchlorate indicates a rapid rebuilding of Iran’s missile industry since Israeli strikes in October, which have progressed to a point where the industry is ready for additional inputs of raw materials.
Sodium perchlorate (NaClO4) is a common chemical precursor to ammonium perchlorate (NH4ClO4), an oxidizer used in solid fuel rocket motors. Ammonium perchlorate mixtures are easy to manufacture, in common use around the world, and dependable. The Financial Times reported that “more than 1,000 tonnes” of sodium perchlorate is expected to be loaded on the two Iranian ships. However, the MV Jairan has been reported as preparing to load 22 containers, and the MV Golban 34 containers, well more than enough to load 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate. The containers are standard 20-foot containers each with a capacity of 28,130 kg useful load and an internal useful volume of 33.1 cubic meters, suggesting a total available load of nearly 1,600 tons of product.
However, the actual capacity of the containers is limited by the dimensions of the pallets, since each container is packed by the pallet without additional space-filling packaging. Each pallet appears to contain either a single 1000 kg bag of sodium perchlorate or approximately 40 25 kg bags of sodium perchlorate; this may be for the purpose of standardizing shipments around a simple and common divisor, or may be a physical limitation of the pallet itself. Each shipping container can hold 2x5x2 pallets, resulting in each shipping container holding 20 tons of sodium perchlorate. In all, the 56 containers on the MV Jairan and MV Golbon are able to carry 1,120 tons of sodium perchlorate.
After conversion from sodium perchlorate to ammonium perchlorate, a relatively simple chemical process, this will yield 1,075.2 tons of ammonium perchlorate at perfect yield; at a more reasonable yield of 98 percent, 1,053.7 tons of ammonium perchlorate can be produced with this precursor. Iranian missile propellant generally contains around 70 percent ammonium perchlorate by weight, depending on the ammonium perchlorate mixture, and so this ammonium perchlorate can yield Iran’s military 1,505.3 tons of finished propellant.
Key Enablers
Both the MV Jairan and the MV Golbon took on their cargo in the Taicang Port area, located near Ningbo. The MV Jairan then docked at the Longshan Shipyard, while the MV Golbon departed the Changtu Island port on January 21.
While Taicang Port hosts a number of Chinese-run companies, it has also served as the non-stop base of operations for Iran Shipping Lines (伊朗国船), which manages imports and exports between the two countries. There are a number of reasons to suspect Iran Shipping Lines to be the company responsible for shipping the sodium perchlorate. First, Iranian shipping logistics sources display that Iran Air holds a 5.1 dangerous goods transporting permit, which it needs to possess to be able to ship sodium perchlorate – and the shipping process described on these sources matches the exact trajectory of the cargo currently aboard the Jairan and Galban.
The sources also fill in some missing details on the shipment process. The chemicals were first brought to Taicang dangerous goods warehouse, where they were inspected, boxed, and prepared for transport. The sodium percolate was then loaded onto the ships, and sent on its way to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. According to a company in charge of organizing shipping logistics between China and Iran, most dangerous goods that Iran Shipping Lines ships from China will be imported through Bandar Abbas.
While the name of the company that supplied the chemical remains unknown, we estimate that a supplier like Epoch Master Global (佰舸斯达) would be well-positioned to fulfill this order. Epoch Master is a chemical company licensed to sell sodium perchlorate in China, and has received an inspection from necessary authorities as recently as March of 2024. Both Epoch Master’s manufacturing headquarters and Taicang Port are located in Jiangsu province; the factory is 160 miles away (or a 3-hour drive) from the port, making it the nearest manufacturer of sodium perchlorate we’ve been able to identify. Epoch Master’s website is designed to support Persian-speaking customers, indicating pre-existing infrastructure to support Iranian purchases.
Where Will the Missiles Be Going?
The original Financial Times article reported that the sodium perchlorate being shipped to Iran would be enough to fuel 260 MRBMs (medium-range ballistic missiles). We believe that these numbers are an overgeneralization. The propellant capacities of Iranian MRBMs vary drastically; with range estimations being anywhere between 1000 and 3000 km, systems like the Kheiber Shekan and the Haj Qassem (two Iranian MRBMs cited by the FT article) have propellant weights that vary by upwards of 30 percent. Just to give an example, using the FT’s numbers, we estimated that an average Iranian MRBM would require approximately 5 tons of propellant. However, per Iranian sources, the Kheiber Shekan only weighs 4.5 tons. Where the other 500 kg of propellant would go is unknown to us.
This is all to say that these are only general estimations.
Using estimated propellant weights, Iran could hypothetically field approximately 250 Haj Qassems or 390 Kheiber Shekans with the imported sodium perchlorate. The proportions that Iran chooses to field will depend on their perceived operational needs, and giving a single number as the “capacity” of missiles that this shipment is capable of producing is only suggestive of the broader ends they hope to achieve.
Indeed, the total yield for the sodium perchlorate is grounded in straightforward strategic priorities. The Israeli Defense Force estimated Iran’s Operation True Promise 1 & 2 to have used 120 and 200 missiles respectively. The combined total leaves Iran 320 missiles short today – notwithstanding previous attacks and the transfer of ballistic missiles to its proxies. It is important to note that these numbers indicate the total number of systems used, and do not distinguish between liquid-fuel systems such as the Emad and solid-fuel systems such as the Fattah. However, if Iran intends to replenish its stockpiles, the amount of sodium perchlorate on these two ships might indicate a commitment to fulfill the long-standing goal of transitioning Iran’s stockpile to be primarily solid fuel. Beyond mere replenishment or transitioning of systems, Iran might maintain its liquid-fuel systems while expanding its solid-fuel systems in a bid to re-establish regional conventional deterrence through sheer numbers after the collapse of its “forward defense” foreign policy.
Iran does not have the immediate luxury of producing its ballistic missiles for commercial export. Without long-range air defenses from Russia, many of Iran’s production sites remain vulnerable to Israeli attacks – especially with the newly established Syrian air corridor. Not only have production sites such as Shahroud been attacked, but key manufacturing for propellant mixers has also been disrupted. Analysts estimated months-long disruptions in Iran’s missile production capability, with Axios citing a senior U.S. official claiming Iran’s missile production to be “crippled.” Some sources estimated it would take Iran up to a year to acquire new planetary mixers from China. While we did witness delays in Iran’s ability to manufacture new missiles, a 4-to-6-month delay is a far cry from “crippled.”
Iran is not starting from zero. Much of the Shahroud complex remains, and Iran’s older solid-fuel production site at Shahid Bakeri continues to operate. Whether Iran had spare mixers, managed to shift production to existing infrastructure, or simply acquired new material much faster than expected is unknown. However, the transferring of volatile, degradable compounds like sodium perchlorate indicates these materials can be quickly integrated into the broader manufacturing process – and that implies the expected “production lull” has ended.
A recent agreement with the Russian Federation, signed on January 17, 2025 and building on an earlier diplomatic declaration from 2020, includes far-reaching goals for military cooperation between Russia and Iran. However, many of the details remain to be hammered out in the Working Group on Military Cooperation set out in Article 5, section 1 of the new agreement. Importantly, section 5 doesn’t include a mutual defense pact, specific arms deals, or technology transfers. Although Iran supplied Russia’s military with ballistic missiles before the Israeli strikes in October, it seems hesitant to ink new deals now, lending credence to the idea that its missile manufacturing is focused on the buildup of a domestic deterrence stockpile.
Tightening the Illiberal Partnership
As reported in the Wall Street Journal, China has responded to questions about the outgoing sodium perchlorate sales by suggesting that the government was “unaware” of the over 1,000 tons of the chemical being loaded onto Iranian ships. This attempt to avoid international scrutiny does not hold water upon further analysis of the laws and regulations imposed on the manufacturing, shipping, and handling of sodium perchlorate.
The high reactivity of sodium perchlorate has earned the chemical a spot on the Ministry of Public Security’s list of dangerous, explosive chemicals. This necessitates that every step of the production and shipment process undergo heavy supervision and regulation. Companies that produce and ship the chemical are inspected regularly and must possess appropriate licenses. Buyers must fill out a series of forms to declare the risk of the purchase and ensure that the product undergoes customs inspection before it can be loaded onto any ship. In short, it beggars belief that the Chinese government was unaware of over 1,100 tons of potent oxidizer leaving one of their ports and bound for Iran.
Of course, this is far from the first instance of China shipping military components to friends of circumstance. Throughout the war in Ukraine, the Chinese government has been happy to continue shipping Russian manufacturers parts that go into combat arms like drones, as well as facilitating trade in more sensitive goods like sanctioned microcontrollers which are necessary for more advanced arms manufacturing.
Iran, Russia, and China do not form an alliance in the same sense as NATO does; the partnership between the three extends only as far as it serves them. What binds this “axis” is the goal of disrupting the international order as it stands, not a shared vision of how it would look after it falls. This goal has proved powerful enough for them to look past their vast ideological differences and support each other in the larger struggle against the United States and its allies.
The shipment of these 1,100 tons of rocket propellant precursor underscores both the continuing cooperation of the disruptive powers as well as the crucial material position that China holds in the relationship. Without China, Russia and Iran would struggle to produce the armaments that allow them to wage their regional wars against Ukraine and Israel. Similarly, Iran and Russia’s willingness to prosecute those conflicts tie down large amounts of U.S. resources and attention- increasingly scarce commodities as the American public turns inward and away from the role of global hegemon, facilitating China’s rise to military dominance in the region. The fact that both Russia and Iran are petrostates rich in hydrocarbons, the key resource that China lacks almost entirely, sweetens the partnership from the perspective of Beijing.
The End of the Lull
This shipment of sodium perchlorate is more than just a routine chemical transfer – it’s a signal that Tehran’s missile industry is back on its feet. Despite Israeli strikes and reported production delays, Tehran has rebounded faster than expected. The scale and timing of this procurement indicate a focus on domestic deterrence rather than exports to Russia, reinforcing the idea that Iran’s immediate priority is securing its own arsenal, not arming its partners.
At the same time, China’s involvement underscores its role as the indispensable link in the supply chains of revisionist powers. Beijing’s professions of ignorance ring hollow given the strict regulations governing the production and shipment of sodium perchlorate. Whether through direct military cooperation or the facilitation of strategic materials, China, Iran, and Russia are reinforcing each other’s ability to challenge Western influence – each for their own reasons, but with a shared understanding of the benefits of keeping the U.S. and its allies preoccupied elsewhere.
The Chinese sodium perchlorate aboard the Jairan and Golbon is not just aimed to fuel Iranian missiles, but rather serves to fuel a much larger reconfiguration of global power.