The arrest of an alleged Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) operative in Pakistan has reignited long-simmering tensions between Kabul and Islamabad, with both sides trading pointed accusations over the transnational terrorist group’s operational base.
Zabihullah Mujahid, spokesperson for the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, seized on the detention of Mohammad Sharifullah to assert that Pakistan, not Afghanistan, offers ISKP safe havens. This claim, however, has been met with vehement rebuttals from Pakistani authorities, who argue that Afghanistan’s lax border controls and ineffective counterterrorism strategies have allowed ISKP militants to infiltrate Pakistan, destabilizing regional security. Pakistan says Sharifullah is an Afghan national, a claim denied by the Taliban. The exchange underscores a deepening rift between the neighboring nations, which each attempting to deflect blame while the threat of ISKP looms larger.
Mujahid’s statement framed Sharifullah’s arrest as irrefutable proof of ISKP’s entrenchment in Pakistan, declaring the group’s activities “unrelated to Afghanistan.” This narrative aligns with the Taliban’s broader effort to position its regime as a responsible governing force that has eradicated terrorism within its borders since retaking power in 2021. By distancing Afghanistan from ISKP’s cross-border operations, the Taliban aim to legitimize their rule and counter international criticism of their counterterrorism record.
However, this argument conveniently overlooks the Taliban government’s own reports of conducting frequent operations against ISKP within Afghanistan – a tacit acknowledgment of the group’s persistent presence on Afghan soil.
For their part, Pakistani officials have dismissed Mujahid’s claims as a “disingenuous diversion” from Afghanistan’s failure to secure its territory. They emphasize that ISKP’s ideological roots and operational command structures remain entrenched in Afghanistan, citing high-profile attacks such as the 2022 assassination of prominent Taliban minister Khalil-ur-Rehman Haqqani as evidence. Islamabad argues that Kabul’s poor border management enables militants to cross into Pakistan disguised as civilians, exploiting porous checkpoints to orchestrate attacks. Despite Pakistan’s deployment of advanced surveillance systems and fencing along the 2,640-kilometer Durand Line, officials claim Afghan negligence has rendered these measures insufficient to stem the flow of militants.
ISKP, a regional offshoot of the Islamic State active since 2014, has capitalized on the geopolitical friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan to expand its influence. The group’s ability to launch attacks in both nations – from suicide bombings in Kabul to sectarian violence in Peshawar – highlights its transnational reach. While the Taliban government has intensified raids against ISKP cells in provinces like Nangarhar, its refusal to collaborate with Pakistan on intelligence-sharing has hampered regional counterterrorism efforts. Conversely, Pakistan’s historical use of proxy militant groups for strategic depth in Afghanistan has eroded trust, with Kabul viewing Islamabad’s accusations as hypocritical.
The killing of Khalil-ur-Rehman Haqqani, a senior Taliban figure with close ties to the Haqqani Network, exemplified the complexities of this blame game. ISKP claimed responsibility for the attack, which occurred inside Afghanistan’s heavily fortified Interior Ministry. Pakistani analysts cited this as definitive proof of the group’s operational capabilities within Afghanistan, undermining the Taliban’s narrative of full territorial control. Conversely, the Taliban attributed such security lapses to residual chaos from the U.S. withdrawal, deflecting scrutiny of its governance gaps.
The escalating rhetoric threatens to derail already fragile diplomatic relations, with both nations prioritizing political point-scoring over collaborative security measures. For Afghanistan, deflecting blame onto Pakistan serves to bolster its image as a stable emirate capable of self-governance. For Pakistan, positioning itself as a victim of cross-border terrorism justifies its stringent border policies and appeals for international aid. However, this stalemate only empowers ISKP, which thrives in ungoverned spaces and diplomatic vacuums. The absence of a unified regional strategy risks allowing the group to metastasize, threatening Central Asian states and beyond.
To mitigate the ISKP threat and de-escalate tensions, the following measures are critical. Afghanistan and Pakistan must enhance bilateral intelligence-sharing through a joint counterterrorism task force facilitated by neutral mediators. They should also establish a regional security dialogue involving Iran, China, and Central Asian states to coordinate counterterrorism intelligence and funding.
Afghanistan and Pakistan need to modernize border infrastructure with biometric systems and drone surveillance to monitor high traffic crossing points. Third-party audits of border management protocols would help identify and rectify systemic weaknesses on both sides. However, any strengthening of border protocols remains uncertain due to the Afghan government’s continued refusal to recognize the Durand Line.
Finally, socio-economic development programs in Afghanistan’s border provinces are critical to undercut ISKP recruitment driven by poverty and grievances. A security-centric approach alone cannot end the problem of terrorism.