In the beginning of March 2025, I traveled to Mexico to speak with a range of officials and experts about activities by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its companies in the country, among other topics.
In the midst of U.S. attention to China’s activities in Mexico and across the region, and in the face of threatened U.S. tariffs against Mexican products, the Mexican government of Claudia Sheinbaum is reportedly attempting to restrain high-profile activities with China that it perceives could antagonize the Trump administration. Nonetheless, beyond a small number of completed or postponed projects with China – such as a BYD hybrid car plant and the Maya tourist train – that have received particular high-level U..S scrutiny, the China-Mexico relationship continues to grow and deepen.
Political Relations
President Sheinbaum’s caution toward China appears to be reciprocated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It’s been over three months since China’s outspoken former ambassador to Mexico, Zhang Run, departed for a post in the Foreign Ministry at the end of 2024, yet the Chinese government has not yet named a new ambassador. That’s particularly unusual in CCP engagement with a country as large and important as Mexico.
Beyond the state-to-state relations, China’s engagement in Mexico also extends to the legislative branch and subnational governments. There is a China friendship committee and an Asia committee in the Mexican legislature headed by leftist Workers’ Party (PT) member Yeidckol Polevnsky. Senate President Geraldo Fernandez Noroña, also of the PT and considered more radical than Polevnsky, is a powerful advocate for strengthening Mexico’s relations with China and reportedly has a close relationship with China’s embassy.
China also courts Mexico at the state and local level, both through regular business delegations to Mexican states, few of which bear fruit, as well as at least 15 Mexico-China “sister city” relationships.
Military and Defense Ties
In military affairs, the current and recent Mexican administrations have restricted engagement with China. This year, neither the Mexican Army War College (CODENAL) nor the Navy War College (CESNAV) are hosting People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cadets, although the army has done so previously. In 2024, CESNAV hosted a visit by a sizable contingent from the PLA Superior War College. Also, in September 2023, a delegation of 16 PLA members, as well as a military delegation from Russia, visited and marched in Mexico’s Independence Day parade.
Although China has not sold Mexico substantial military equipment, it did participate in an ill-fated joint venture to assemble 6.5 ton First Auto Works (FAW) trucks in Mexico. A China-based company also reportedly sold the Mexican Army uniforms, with the Mexican partner company – which is tied to Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) ally and former Interior Minister Adan Agosto Lopez – reportedly profiting from a 300 percent markup on the cost paid to the Chinese wholesalers.
In addition, the Mexican Navy purchased three Chinese catamarans for $26.7 million for a tourist transit, which it operates from Mazatlán to the island of San Blas.
Beyond arms sales and engagements, China has assigned a capable military attaché, Army Colonel Cui Yungmao, seeking to strengthen military engagement and pursue arms sales opportunities. Cui reportedly has excellent Spanish and is a regular visitor at Mexican Army and Navy military institutions.
China-based military companies regularly have a substantial presence at the annual Mexican Air Force air show (FAMEX), which they reportedly use to court the Mexican military and the Mexican Space Agency (MSA).
Beijing has long courted the MSA. The National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) has reportedly signed agreements with the Technical University of Beijing to bring students to China for graduate-level training on satellites and space sciences.
On the other hand, the MSA’s plan to launch a satellite in China was reportedly switched to another provider and another site, possibly to avoid alarming the Trump administration.
Chinese Private Security Companies (PSCs), represented in organizations such as the Mexico-Chinese Private Security Council, have sought work in the Mexican market, but have not to date established a substantial presence.
Drones from the Chinese firm DJI and Chinese-made military equipment, including body armor used in confrontations against the Mexican military and other adversaries, are reportedly readily available for purchase by criminal organizations in Mexico on the black market.
Chinese Investment in Mexico
In commerce, driven by nearshoring, Chinese investment in Mexico in recent years has expanded to approximately $2 billion per year. The well-respected commercial consultancy Rhodium Group identified $13 billion in Chinese investment in Mexico in approximately 700 transactions between 2013 and 2023.
In the digital space, Huawei has become a leading infrastructure provider, diversifying from telephone equipment to other services. Indeed, by 2024, Huawei had invested an estimated $1.3 billion in Mexican cloud computing infrastructure alone. The company, principally through Telmex, is also reportedly providing such services and infrastructure to the Mexican government, including the presidency, the Secretariat for Communication and Transportation (SCT), and a number of ministries. There are also rumors of a Huawei offer to provide technology and data services to the country’s national intelligence centers.
In addition to Huawei, a range of Chinese companies are active in Mexico’s telephone sector, including Oppo, whose Mexico market share has reportedly expanded rapidly in recent years, as well as the China-based companies Honor, Xiaomi, and ZTE.
The Chinese company Hikvision, operating in Mexico since 2016, including a research center in Queretaro, continues to be a dominant player in commercial and private security systems, including a number of initiatives to provide cameras for public security for towns around Mexico.
Chinese computer and electronics manufacturer Lenovo has made Mexico its largest production and research and development (R&D) hub in Latin America, expanding its sales to the Mexican market by 25 percent in 2023 alone. Reportedly, Lenovo tries to keep out of the public spotlight.
This year’s $22.8 billion acquisition by Blackrock of 80 percent of the properties of Hong Kong-based Hutchison Ports will dramatically change the Chinese profile in the port sector. Hutchison had previously operated ports in Veracruz, Lazaro Cardenas, Manzanillo, Tijuana, and Ensenada.
In the automotive sector, although plans for a factory by the electric car maker BYD remain on hold, Giant Motor Corporation, which represents First Auto Works (FAW) and the Anhui Jianghuai Automobile Group Corp (JAC) production facility in Hidalgo, as well as Shanghai Automotive industrial Corporation (SAIC) and Beijing Automotive Industrial Corporation (BAIC), continue to have a substantial presence in the Mexican market. BAIC and Foton are major players in the market for buses.
In construction, although the China Communication Construction Corporation (CCCC), in conjunction with the 30 percent CCCC-owned Mota Engil, have completed most of the track work for the Maya tourist train, there is a question of their continuing role. The Mexican Army continues to build train stations and other facilities to make the infrastructure functional. In a similar fashion, although China Railway has completed most of its improvements to Line 1 of the Mexico City Metro, it continues a presence on the line with a long-term maintenance contract.
China-based companies have expressed interest in investing in warehousing, logistics, and other facilities in Mexico’s “Trans-Isthmus Corridor,” whose development is a priority for the Sheinbaum government. To date, no concrete projects have yet materialized.
In the lithium sector, the Chinese company Ganfeng continues to own the Bacanora lithium field, but its ability to exploit it continues to be paralyzed, following former President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador’s February 2023 initiative to nationalize Mexico’s lithium sector. Ganfeng is now in litigation over the issue.
Stores specializing in Chinese merchandise have also expanded notably in Mexico’s retail sector, including not only informal shops in markets such as Tepito, but networks of brick-and-mortar stores such as China Market and Hogar China. These chains are expanding not only in Mexico City but around the country in cities such as Hidalgo, Puebla and Queretaro. Products from China exceeded 20 percent of all imports for the first time in 2024.
There are concerns over whether such stores fully operate in conformity with Mexican tax and other laws. In July 2024, the Sheinbaum government symbolically raided and shut down China Mart, a three-story retail outlet for Chinese products in Plaza Izaga 89.
China-Mexico commercial collaboration in general is reflected in its business councils. The China-Mexico Chamber (MexCham), under working President Victor Cadera, principally represents Mexican companies working in China, while the China Chamber of Commerce and Technology of Mexico, headed by Amipola Grijalva, is more focused on networking involving Chinese companies and their counterparts in Mexico.
Academic and Media Engagement
Mexican academic and intellectual engagement with China continues to expand. Mexico’s sixth Confucius Institute, providing Beijing-sanctioned instruction in Chinese language and culture, recently launched in the University of Guadalajara. The University of Veracruz in Jalapa opened a nongovernmental Center for China Studies, complementing others in Mexican public institutions, including in the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), the College of Mexico (one of the country’s oldest), the Autonomous University of Baja California in Tijuana, University of Guadalajara, and the Asia-Pacific (APEC) Studies Center in the University of Colima.
China’s government reportedly provides 10-20 scholarships per year for Mexicans to study in China, in addition to countless scholarships for Mexican students coming directly from Chinese universities. China-based companies also provide sponsored training programs for Mexicans to study in China, such as Huawei’s “Seeds for the Future” program. Just within the context of its employment of Mexicans, Huawei may have brought as many as 100 Mexicans to its training center in Shenzhen in the past five years.
As in other parts of the region, China also actively courts Mexican media outlets. The left-oriented journal Jornada regularly carries content from Xinhua. The more centrist Reforma reprints content from Chinese media. China’s recently departed ambassador, Zheng Run, was a featured regular columnist in Milenio. Indeed, Milenio reporter Alma Paola Wong, among others, received a sponsored trip to China, and other representatives of Milenio and other respected media outlets were brought to China by Huawei for a media technology demonstration.
Conclusion
Mexico’s relationship with China will continue to be shaped by the “strategic triangle” involving the Mexico-U.S. and China-U.S. relationships. Despite the caution exercised by the Sheinbaum administration, the multidimensional China-Mexico relationship continues to evolve through its own momentum. China, in practical terms, is not an “alternative” to the United States for Mexico, but for both good and bad, it will continue to be an important part of the dynamics shaping Mexico’s future.