Uyghur separatist groups have consistently supported the Taliban in their two-decade-long fight for control of Afghanistan, but increased Chinese presence in the country is altering the status quo with significant risk for Beijing
The Taliban have long provided members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), also known as the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), with opportunities for residence, education, and illicit trade. In return these groups have supported the Taliban both financially, benefiting from complex Uyghur financial systems across the region, and with a supply of fighters.
The former Islamic Republic of Afghanistan government repeatedly reported the presence of these groups as one of the main foreign factions backing the Taliban, particularly in the northern and northeastern provinces of Afghanistan. The erstwhile Afghan government considered these Uyghur militant groups to be key operational arms of the Taliban in certain areas.
With the 2021 fall of the Republic and the Taliban’s return to power, China swiftly revealed and expanded its previously covert two-decade-long relationship with the Taliban. Although the Taliban initially expected extensive economic and political support from China, Beijing has backed a chosen few initiatives aligning with its economic and strategic interests.
Over the past three years, Chinese companies, supported by the country’s diplomatic and economic structures, have established a significant presence in Afghanistan. These companies have sought exclusive economic opportunities, particularly in the extraction of rare natural resources such as uranium and lithium, while offering selective trade incentives such as tariff exemptions on Chinese exports to Afghanistan.
Additionally, China has provided political support for the Taliban in international forums to consolidate its influence over the regime.
Meanwhile, Chinese state media and propaganda outlets systematically portray Afghanistan encouraging hundreds of Chinese tourists to visit in recent years while promoting the Communist Party’s cultural policies in Afghanistan.
The Taliban, in turn, have made every effort to accommodate Chinese citizens, even at the cost of disregarding their own strict Sharia laws. They have ensured that female Chinese tourists face no religious restrictions, while simultaneously enforcing the harshest regulations on Afghan women. Social media is awash with photos of Chinese tourists, including women, smiling while posed next to Taliban fighters – often with both sides holding automatic weapons.
Additionally, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban regime’s deputy prime minister for economic affairs, pledged that they would “never allow any force to engage in acts detrimental to China.” In practice, this means acceding to Beijing’s demands to crack down on Uyghur militants.
Under pressure from the Chinese government, the Taliban have attempted to prevent members of the TIP from undertaking any actions against Chinese citizens and interests. Reports indicate that, in response to China’s demands, the Taliban relocated members of the group from the northeastern border province of Badakhshan – previously a major Uyghur militant stronghold against the former Afghanistan government – to other locations, including Herat province in western Afghanistan.
In a recent conversation with an informed source inside Afghanistan, we learned that despite these concessions and mutual interests, the Taliban remain skeptical of China. This distrust stems from Beijing’s reluctance to formally recognize the Taliban regime or provide the level of financial assistance the Taliban had expected. Instead, China’s involvement has been focused on trade, advancing the Belt and Road Initiative, and securing Taliban compliance in suppressing TIP/ETIM activities.
Meanwhile, the Islamic State’s local branch, a staunch enemy of the Taliban, is keen to step in to bolster its own ranks with Uyghur militants.
In October 2021, a suicide attack by the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) targeted a mosque in Kunduz, northern Afghanistan, where Shia-Hazaras were attending Friday prayers. The attack killed approximately 70 people and injured more than 100 others. ISKP identified the attacker as “Muhammad al-Uyghuri.” While assigning ethnic or regional surnames to attackers is not new for the Islamic State, choosing the surname “Uyghuri” for this particular attacker – regardless of whether he was actually of Uyghur ethnicity – sent a clear message to Uyghur militants: ISKP’s doors are open to them in response to Taliban repression.
Although Uyghur militants have not officially declared hostility toward Hazaras in Afghanistan (partly because some ethnic narratives classify Hazaras as a Turkic people), their presence alongside groups such as al-Qaida, Tahrir al-Sham, and even the Islamic State in the Middle East suggests that sectarian motivations may lead them to target Hazaras, given that the majority of Hazaras in Afghanistan are Shia.
Recently, a Chinese citizen working at a gold mine in Takhar province, north-eastern Afghanistan, was killed. While ISKP claimed responsibility, reliable sources inside Afghanistan informed the author that a member of the Turkestan Islamic Party, in coordination with ISKP, carried out the attack. An agreement has reportedly been made between several TIP commanders and ISKP, under which TIP members will execute operations against Chinese citizens and interests in Afghanistan, while ISKP takes official responsibility. This arrangement benefits both groups.
The Taliban’s growing ties with China have sparked serious concerns not only among TIP militants but also among civilian Uyghurs who had sought refuge in Afghanistan to escape systematic persecution by the Chinese government. Many fear that closer China-Taliban relations may lead to their forced deportation to China at Beijing’s request.
As observed, despite apparent distrust, China has rapidly expanded its influence in Afghanistan since the fall of the former Afghan government and the U.S. military withdrawal. This influence spans politics, trade, and tourism, all serving Beijing’s strategic interests.
Despite its chaotic withdrawal in 2021, U.S. aid has played a vital role in Afghanistan, with $21 billion in humanitarian aid sent to the country through various agencies since the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2021. The Trump administration decision to suspend almost all foreign aid means Afghanistan is likely to come under ever greater influence from China.
In exchange for political and limited financial backing, the Taliban may intensify their suppression of the Turkestan Islamic Party, abandoning their ideological commitments to accommodate the demands of a non-Islamic, communist state. However, this approach will not neutralize ETIM and TIP militants; rather, it will drive them toward ISKP.
The fundamental goal of these Uyghur militant groups is to combat China and target its interests. Achieving this objective necessitates a physical presence in a neighboring country. With Afghanistan now under a regime lacking both domestic and international legitimacy and devoid of organizational capacity to maintain security, it remains the most viable option for anti-China militants. For TIP members, this environment presents a strategic opportunity – one they are increasingly likely to exploit by aligning with the Islamic State to further their objectives.