Features

Making Sense of Nepal’s Pro-monarchy Protests

Recent Features

Features | Politics | South Asia

Making Sense of Nepal’s Pro-monarchy Protests

While the recent rallies have drawn international attention, support for a return to the monarchy is neither new nor a majority position. 

Making Sense of Nepal’s Pro-monarchy Protests

Pro-monarch Nepalis flood the streets to welcome the country’s last king, Gyanendra, now a common citizen, to Kathmandu, Mar. 9, 2025.

Credit: Facebook/Rastriya Prajatantra Party – राप्रपा

While this month’s pro-monarchy rallies in Nepal have caught international attention, there has always been a level of support for monarchy in this narrow patch of South Asia. 

The institution was formally abolished in 2008. Even though most Nepalis agreed with the change, some were unhappy – mostly people from the traditionally privileged classes and castes. After 2008, these people were silent; now they have again found their voice in the recent national flag-waving spectacles. 

Yet a sense of proportion is still warranted. Even in the much-discussed protests in the capital Kathmandu on Sunday, which were widely covered in international media, there were only around 10,000 to 15,000 people, according to the police. On the other hand, at the height of the anti-monarchy protests in 2006, hundreds of thousands hit the streets of Kathmandu. 

Counting the number of people turning up in the streets is one way to measure support for the re-establishment of Nepal’s monarchy. But perhaps a better way is to tally the number of votes of pro-monarchy forces in recent elections.

In the 2017 general election, the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), the only significant political outfit campaigning for the monarchy’s restoration, got under 2 percent of total votes and won just a single seat in the federal lower house. Come 2022, the same party got around 6 percent of votes and 14 seats in the lower house – a big improvement, but by no means a resounding mandate for the restoration of the kingdom.

Things have not dramatically changed since 2022. Some recent proxy surveys are often used to gauge the monarchy’s popularity. For instance, a 2024 nationwide survey suggested that nearly half of Nepalis favor the reversal of the country’s secular status and reinstatement of the Hindu state. 

As the Nepali monarch was considered a Hindu deity, some of those in favor of the Hindu state might also be supporters of the monarchy. Yet it is safe to say that the demand for a Hindu state is far more popular than are the current contenders for king and crown prince.

When King Gyanendra came to the throne in 2001, following the bizarre death of his brother, King Birendra, the new monarch immediately started amassing power and curtailing civil liberties. He jailed political leaders and members of civil society. He installed the army in media houses to vet their content. It was against his absolute rule that hundreds of thousands of people protested all over the country, eventually leading to his ignominious fall.

The last king was unpopular, and so was his son Paras, who was linked to the killing of a popular singer and is known for his rowdy behavior. It is these same tainted figures who are now trying to mount a comeback. 

Yet it would also be foolish to dismiss the recent protests as inconsequential. The real problem is that Nepal’s political parties, especially the three main ones – the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party Nepal–Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML), and the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist Center (CPN-MC) – have shown themselves rather incapable of governing the country. 

The top leaders of these parties have led all post-2006 governments by turn. Yet successive governments have been beset by allegations of corruption, nepotism, incompetence, and apathy to people’s concerns. 

The resurgence of pro-monarchy activities is thus reflective more of the old guard trying to cash in on widespread public frustration rather than a show of support for the discredited institution. 

The royals do not seem to have much support among the youth. Yes, young Nepalis too are disillusioned by the traditional political parties and seek an alternative. But the return of the monarchy is not their preferred solution. They are rather plumping for newer and younger politicians like the popular mayor of Kathmandu, Balendra Shah, the first independent candidate to win that office. 

Another new outfit, the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), has also attracted a big chunk of young Nepalis, especially those working outside Nepal. The RSP, formed just six months before the 2022 elections, has 21 seats in the federal lower house, compared to 14 for the royalist RPP.

The monarchists are now angling for an “accommodation” with the mainstream parties. But the pro-republican forces, who between them control over 90 percent of the national and provincial legislatures, dismiss such a possibility out of hand. This will continue to be the case until they see more robust signs of public support for the deposed monarch. 

Many used to see Narayanhiti, the ex-monarchs’ abode, as a pillar of stability and national interest in a country precariously sandwiched between India and China. They reckoned that while the political parties looked after their own interest, the monarch, unburdened by vote-bank politics, had the interest of the whole country at his heart. 

But Nepal made little progress during the active years of monarchy (1960-1990). The economy stagnated. Health and education measures were sub-par. Political parties were banned. There was no free speech. People didn’t get passports to go abroad. For these reasons, too, the youth are skeptical of life under a restored monarchy. 

There is also speculation that India wants the king back, as a part of its larger goal of restoring Nepal’s status of a Hindu state. While it’s true that the Bharatiya Janata Party establishment in New Delhi has over the years been sympathetic to those promoting a Hindu state in Nepal, there is no evidence that it wants to see the kingdom restored. 

In fact, India has traditionally seen Nepal’s monarchy as an institution that acted against its interest by cozying up to China – whether it was King Mahendra (r. 1955-1972), or his sons Birendra (r. 1972-2001) and Gyanendra (r, 2001-2008).

Nor does China appear interested in the return of an institution that was once Beijing’s most reliable friend in Nepal. Given their mercantilist approach, Chinese officials have rather seamlessly shifted focus to cultivating the mainstream parties – and rather successfully at that.  

The future of pro-monarchy protests in Nepal depends in part on the response of the big parties. At the moment, they seem to be panicking. Top political leaders are now taking all kinds of jibes at the ex-monarch, warning he could lose even his limited privileges as a Nepali citizen if he does not give up activism. They have dared Gyanendra to contest elections if he wants to make a comeback. 

One reason for the panic, particularly on the part of the CPN-UML and Congress, which are currently ruling in a coalition arrangement, is the paucity of the government’s achievements despite it having near two-thirds parliamentary majority. They thus seem to be on the defensive. 

The other reason could be that Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli has had rather frosty relations with New Delhi, and it is natural for him to suspect the Indians of trying to destabilize his government. 

Unfortunately, Oli is not someone who takes criticism well, and his response has been to lash out at monarchists rather than take the people into confidence on governance, accountability, and corruption control. This approach could backfire, as it risks antagonizing even neutral observers. At one time, Oli was cheered whenever he went; now he is routinely booed by the same crowds. 

Thanks to the neglect of top leaders like Oli, the federal system installed by Nepal’s 2015 Constitution has never taken root. Instead of buttressing the pillars of the federal state, these leaders have looked to centralize most powers and resources.

This in turn has fueled the sentiment among many Nepalis that the federal system has been an abject failure – and republicanism and secularism, the other two pillars of the 2015 charter, are increasingly tarred with the same brush. This has also contributed to the public’s disillusionment with the status quo.

The voices of popular discontent with the big parties are now being openly heard. Again, the onus is on the three parties, who together ushered in all the progressive post-2006 political changes, to realize their mistake before it is too late. 

Dreaming of a career in the Asia-Pacific?
Try The Diplomat's jobs board.
Find your Asia-Pacific job