The U.S. administration of Donald Trump has openly admitted that one of the reasons for its attempts to re-engage and then rebuild good relations with Russia is to gain leverage over China (the so-called reverse Kissinger or reverse Nixon). Beijing’s calm or even indifferent reactions to Trump’s signals of reconciliation with Vladimir Putin may confirm that whatever the U.S. intentions, the outcome of the Russia-U.S. dialogue would be beneficial for China.
First, it is quite obvious that the ”reverse Kissinger” is not feasible, and China knows that. This idea is based on the false assumption that the United States can (to some extent) repeat its 1960s and 1970s moves, when Washington worked with Beijing to isolate Moscow. But the main difference today is the strong China-Russia relationship. Bilateral ties are based on a very ideological cornerstone, namely deep anti-American (and anti-Western) sentiments, the desire to preserve authoritarian regimes in China and Russia, and a lack of trust in democratic systems.
Kissinger and Nixon exploited the very acrimonious relations between the USSR and the PRC, known as the Sino-Soviet split. Relations had begun to deteriorate with Khrushchev’s secret speech in 1956 and reached their peak with the border crisis, actually a short war, on the Ussuri River in 1969. So it is incorrect to say that the United States enticed China away from the Soviet Union; the Nixon administration merely took advantage of the deteriorating ties between Beijing and Moscow.
China knows that a “reverse Kissinger” will not work today. In a readout published by the Chinese Foreign Ministry after a telephone conversation between Putin and China’s Xi Jinping on February 24, it was stated that “history and reality teach us that China and Russia are good neighbors who cannot be pushed away.” In case anyone missed the message, the statement added that “China-Russia relations have a strong endogenous driving force and unique strategic value.”
If a full “reverse Kissinger” is not possible – as U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio admitted in an interview for Breitbart – the question is whether a partial “reverse Kissinger” can work and what results it can bring for Russia, the United States, and China. In other words, what can Putin get from the U.S. and what can he offer? In both cases, not much. But the United States seems to have something to offer, as it could lift sanctions on Russia, which could improve the economic situation and limit Putin’s political isolation. Trump’s idea of mending fences with Russia could give Putin more room to maneuver to become less dependent on China – and that is the U.S. goal, as Rubio said in his interview.
But it seems unlikely that Putin will offer the U.S. anything substantial on China. Even in the case of a partial “reverse Kissinger,” it would be risky for Putin to bet on the United States. Both China and Russia are very careful to avoid the risk of two fronts, so Putin will not risk seriously damaging his relationship with Xi. And given Trump’s unpredictability, it is rather unlikely that Putin trusts the U.S. president.
Reducing Russia’s dependence on China might actually serve to strengthen their relationship. Xi must be aware that Russia’s overdependence on China is not a comfortable position for Putin. This is probably why Putin took aggressive action toward Ukraine and the West immediately after his face-to-face meetings with Xi in 2022 and 2023 – he wanted to show his own agenda and independence from China. Putin started the war with Ukraine two weeks after his February 2022 visit to Beijing; announced partial mobilization and increased his threats to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine immediately after meeting with Xi at the 2022 Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Samarkand; and revealed his plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus right after Xi Jinping’s official visit to Moscow in March 2023.
In fact, any “leverage” that Putin might get from increased engagement with the U.S. would only be a tactical and short-term gain for Trump, but not a strategic and profound move by Putin to distance himself from China. And this could be advantageous for Xi Jinping because it creates the illusion that the Sino-Russian alignment is weakening. In other words, Russia and China could play this game together as a kind of cognitive warfare, as the two countries have played the role of (respectively) “bad cop” and “good cop,” especially since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Under these circumstances, China may be seen as having less power and influence over Russia, which may also lead to less global attention on the China-Russia alignment – a situation that is definitely good for China.
Another piece of good news for China is the fact that the Russia-U.S. rapprochement has already seriously undermined the transatlantic relationship, thus advancing one of the main and long-term goals of Beijing’s approach to Europe. China’s narrative on Europe, especially Central Europe, is that the continent is totally subservient to the United States and that European or EU policies are totally dependent on orders from Washington. This is why, from the outset, China has favored the French-led idea of strategic autonomy, initially understood mainly as a loosening of Europe’s ties with the United States.
On a related note, there is an idea floating around in several European capitals that, given Trump’s apparent willingness to abandon Europe and end the transatlantic alliance, it is time to soften the EU’s China policy. Supporters cite several benefits from a China-EU rapprochement: Europe could gain leverage over Trump and avoid opening “two fronts” (friction with both the United States and China). There is also a belief that, should the United States decide to support Russia during the ongoing war in Ukraine or after the conflict freezes, China could play a role as a stabilizing force in Europe.
All of these arguments are obviously to China’s advantage. Although Beijing does not intend to change its policy, it could be perceived differently in Europe, from a challenge or even a threat to a stabilizing force. This is undeniably a huge gain for China, (although a complete reversal of EU policy toward China is not very likely).
The deterioration or abandonment of the transatlantic alliance and the Russia-U.S. agreement to block Ukraine’s NATO membership is another gift to China. NATO is seen by Chinese leaders as a vestige of the Cold War, and Beijing has consistently opposed NATO enlargement. Meanwhile, the new Strategic Concept adopted in Madrid in 2022, for the first time mentioned China, as well as cooperation with the Asia-Pacific 4 (now Indo-Pacific 4) – both moves seen as proof of a NATO pivot to Asia. From Beijing’s perspective, any move to block NATO enlargement and undermine its unity and coherence is good for China.
Finally, Trump’s desire to end the war in Ukraine by focusing on the outcome but not on the substance or content of the peace process and the final agreement, means that the war is unlikely to end in an undisputed Russian victory – or defeat. For Putin, his ultimate victory would mean the attrition of Ukrainian statehood and the eradication of the Ukrainian nation. What Trump is really pushing for is a hybrid peace – the situation that China most desires.