It would be unfair to state that Russia’s war against Ukraine only began with the invasion of February 24, 2022. However, the scale, intensity, and direct challenge to international law that the invasion represented demands that we recognize 2022 as the true point of no return: when the war became an undeniable, full-scale assault on Ukraine’s sovereignty.
Early in March 2022, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed a nonbinding resolution denouncing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and calling for its swift withdrawal. The resolution gained the backing of 141 of its 193 member nations, including Malaysia, thus, reflecting Malaysia’s condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. However, in July 2022, then Foreign Affairs Minister Saifuddin Abdullah stated that Malaysia was dedicated to maintaining its neutrality in the conflict, which appeared to conflict with the stance Malaysia had taken during the UNGA vote. Saifuddin’s statement suggested that Malaysia was settling into a position of strategic ambiguity on the Russia-Ukraine war.
Although Russia’s invasion violated the principles within the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the bloc was unable to unanimously denounce it because of the differing positions of Southeast Asian nations, which ranged from active support (Myanmar’s military junta) to opposition (Singapore, Cambodia). In a recent article for the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Ian Storey and William Choong opined that ASEAN failed to significantly advance the international community’s attempts to exert pressure on President Vladimir Putin to halt his military campaign in Ukraine; instead, it just highlighted the divisions that already existed within ASEAN. Considering the relatively weak and divided positions of ASEAN’s member states, we should ask ourselves why it is essential for Malaysia to support Ukraine, both from a diplomatic and strategic perspective.
Humanitarian and Moral Responsibility
Malaysia had always tried to position itself as a champion of human rights, though not without a degree of hypocrisy. For instance, Russia’s commission of war crimes has not gained the same traction in Malaysia that Israeli war crimes have. In fact, on February 27, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim met with Sergei Shoigu, secretary of the Russian Security Council, who is the subject of an outstanding ICC arrest warrant that was issued in June 2024. Despite being a member of The Hague Group that aims to hold Israel accountable for its crimes in Gaza, the Malaysian government chose to shut their eyes to Russia’s war crimes. This display of hypocrisy obviously tarnishes Malaysia’s credibility. The atrocities committed by Russia require a principled response by Malaysia and selective outrage risks undermining Malaysia’s moral reputation in international affairs. Supporting Ukraine will put an end to this hypocritical policy and align Malaysia with its historical stance on global justice and international law.
Malaysia has an opportunity to demonstrate compassionate diplomacy by contributing to humanitarian efforts in Ukraine. Assistance does not necessarily mean lethal support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In fact, on November 19, 2024, Ukraine’s Ambassador in Malaysia appealed for Malaysia to provide humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. Efforts like these would not only provide some relief to the Ukrainian people, but would bolster Malaysia’s reputation as a responsible global player.
On top of that, such support could also be viewed as belated justice for the 43 Malaysian victims who were aboard Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 when it was shot down over Ukraine on July 17, 2014. The downing of this flight by Russia-backed militias in eastern Ukraine remains a painful reminder of the effect of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, even before the commencement of the “special military operation” in February 2022.
Moreover, Russia’s invasion also directly endangered Malaysian embassy staff and citizens traveling in the country. On February 27, 2022, a group that included nine Malaysians arrived at the Polish-Ukrainian border after evacuation from Kyiv in the wake of Russia’s invasion. Ensuring the safety of fellow Malaysians necessitates a strong diplomatic stance and response to hold Russia accountable for its reckless behavior.
Malaysia’s Strategic Interests
Ukraine’s largest imports from Malaysia include broadcasting equipment and palm oil, while Malaysia’s largest imports from Ukraine include seed oils, and refined petroleum. The invasion has caused significant disruption to such trade activities, directly impacting businesses in Malaysia that import and export such goods to and from Ukraine. While Malaysia is not heavily reliant on Ukrainian wheat or corn, the same cannot be said for the country’s seed oils, which made up 41.3 percent of Malaysia’s imports of these products. (Observatory of Economic Complexity) Although not reliant on such Ukrainian products, Malaysia was still affected by the price surges that resulted from Russia’s invasion. Food inflation increased from 3.6 percent in January 2022 to 7.2 percent in August 2022. The cessation of hostilities by Russia would restore global food supplies and reduce price volatility, thus making it a strategic necessity to safeguard Malaysia’s food security and economic stability.
What’s more, a weakened Russia in Ukraine and in general could provide some relief when it comes to the Rohingya refugee crisis, which has had a disproportionate impact on Malaysia. Why? Russia has not just failed to condemn the violence and atrocities committed by the military junta that seized power in February 2021, but has in fact emboldened the junta’s actions by supplying arms and increased energy exports to the generals, helping them survive financially and militarily. Russia had essentially created a lifeline for the junta at the expense of the country’s civilians and ASEAN as a whole. A weaker Russia would have a reduced capacity to continue arming the junta, which would give Myanmar’s resistance forces an edge over the junta. As long as the junta remains in power, the prospect of a resolution of the massive Rohingya refugee crisis in Bangladesh remains slim, and increasing numbers of desperate people are likely to continue traveling by sea to Malaysia, overwhelming the country’s capacity.
Malaysia’s Relations with Major Powers
While maintaining dialogue with Russia is necessary, the government should realize that Malaysia’s economic and defense priorities are aligned with Western partners and even China to some extent. Backing Ukraine doesn’t necessarily mean cutting ties with Russia but rather strengthening Malaysia’s position as an international player and its relationships with key global players. Furthermore, supporting Ukraine’s cause could potentially reinforce its credibility in Western capitals, giving Malaysia greater influence when advocating for Palestinian rights and the situation in Gaza.
At the same time, Malaysia is risking little in its relationship with Russia. The country’s economic ties with Malaysia are minimal. For context, Malaysia’s exports to Russia were worth only $620 million in 2023 compared to the Philippines’ $6.17 billion and Vietnam’s $11.4 billion. While nations like Myanmar and Vietnam are substantial purchasers of arms from Moscow, Russian military equipment has proven unreliable when compared to Western-made alternatives. In 2017, the Malaysian Air Force was forced to bring its MiG-29s into early retirement due to maintenance and spare parts issues that plagued the Russian fighter jets. Given the paucity of economic and defense ties with Russia, Malaysia has few good reasons not to take a more robust position on the war in Ukraine.
Supporting Ukraine does not equate to blindly following Western directives, in fact it is quite the opposite. Such a shift would demonstrate Malaysia’s foreign policy independence and its commitment to both the principles of justice and its own strategic interests.