In January 2025, more than 6,900 Taiwanese men born after 2004 became the first group of conscripts to complete the country’s reinstated one-year mandatory military service, a policy last implemented in 2018. The extended service program, announced in 2022 by former President Tsai Ing-wen, is part of a broader effort to strengthen Taiwan’s defense posture in response to rising cross-strait tensions and shifting demographic trends.
Beyond extending the conscription period from four months to a full year, the program introduced an updated and more rigorous curriculum featuring hands-on training with Stinger and Javelin missiles, Kestrel rocket launchers, and autonomous drones. The changes aim not only to counter past perceptions of Taiwan’s military service as a glorified “summer camp,” but also to incorporate lessons in asymmetrical warfare drawn from the war in Ukraine.
However, the demands of the new curriculum have not always been met in practice over the past year. From understocked equipment and lackluster recruitment of training cadres to ongoing disagreements over military appropriations in the legislature, full implementation has not only been challenged, but is likely to face its greatest test beginning in 2027, when the bulk of college graduates born after 2004 will begin reporting for conscription. The Lai administration is aware of these challenges and has taken actions to address them – but it is now in a race against time.
Of the four featured items for hands-on instruction in the updated yearlong program, only the domestically made Kestrel anti-armor rocket has been widely available for conscripts’ training and performance evaluations. Neither the man-portable Stinger nor Javelin surface-to-air missiles, which Taiwan purchases from the United States, have been stockpiled in sufficient quantities to support widespread training use. Instruction on these weapons systems has thus largely focused on technical knowledge rather than practical operation.
In October 2024, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) was reportedly in the process of requesting U.S. certification to domestically assemble 1,985 Stinger missiles – a move that could significantly accelerate their delivery timeline. While no official updates have been released since, the request reflects Taipei’s awareness of the shortfall and its determination to address it.
Similarly, although arms deliveries may continue to lag, the MND has announced plans to incorporate simulators for drones and dual-mount Stinger systems into its training curriculum to enhance realism and help bridge the gap in hands-on experience. The ministry has also expressed confidence that its current stockpile can meet the training demands of the estimated 9,839 one-year conscripts expected in 2025.
While there are workarounds for restocking arms and addressing equipment gaps, a thornier challenge may be the shortage of skilled personnel to train the influx of conscripts. The 6,900 men who completed the inaugural one-year program in January 2025 represented just 6 percent of the country’s conscription-age male population. This low participation rate is largely due to Taiwan’s policy allowing men to complete up to seven years of higher education before reporting for mandatory service. Since most pursue only a college degree, the MND estimates that approximately 35,000 men will report for conscription in 2027.
Yet training cadres are already stretched at current levels. An evaluation of the MND’s 2025 budget, conducted by the Legislative Yuan Budget Center, noted that the number of volunteer personnel has continued to decline, with many combat units operating at less than 80 percent of their authorized strength. Given the priority to fill the ranks of warfighting units in the “active force,” staffing training cadres within the “garrison defense force” has become increasingly difficult.
The lack of enthusiasm to enlist is rooted in a long history of low military morale, shaped by deep-seated institutional dysfunction, ineffective reform efforts, and a persistent legacy of civil-military mistrust. While the revamped year-long conscription program is part of a broader effort to combat the military’s image problem, recent administrations have focused on improving pay and benefits to attract and retain enlistees.
Most recently, President Lai Ching-te announced a monthly stipend increase of up to NT$12,000, beginning in April 2025, for all volunteer military personnel. With this raise, the starting salary for a private – the lowest-ranking position – will be NT$41,000 (around US$1,300), a notably competitive figure given that Taiwan’s minimum wage stands at NT$28,590. Of course, pay is only one factor potential enlistees consider, and many of the military’s lingering image problems remain unaddressed. It therefore remains to be seen how effective this pay increase will be in boosting enlistment.
The dual challenges Taiwan’s military faces in scaling up training equipment and personnel are set against an internal timeline of 2027, when the bulk of college-deferred conscripts born after 2004 are expected to report for service. That same year, however, is also frequently identified as a potential window for a Chinese invasion. While the Lai administration approaches 2027 with action plans to address both internal and external threats, political consensus in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan remains elusive.
The opposition-controlled legislature passed record-breaking budget cuts in January 2025, including reductions to defense spending. Although the cuts do not directly target the conscript training program, an MND spokesperson noted that impacts on day-to-day operations could still ripple across and affect conscripts. This marks yet another instance of partisan disagreement over defense policy – even as the threat of a Chinese invasion looms larger with each successive military drill.
The scale-up challenge leading up to 2027 and beyond is not merely one of arms or personnel, but one of unity, for both policymakers and the public alike.