An export-oriented Thailand is on the frontlines of the U.S. trade war, facing a higher-than-anticipated 36 percent “reciprocal tariff” threat from the Trump administration. Although much of Southeast Asia is in the same boat, given the region’s close economic relations with China, Thailand has more reason to sweat. Its once glorious GDP growth is consistently trailing behind the pack, bogged down by deep structural problems that aren’t easily fixed and haven’t been seriously addressed.
Some might point further to Thailand’s status as a treaty ally of the United States, framing the unkind tariff rate as a loss of goodwill, though this may not really matter when Trump’s on the offensive, sparing not even America’s closest friends. Thailand is hardly one. Lacking shared priorities and strategic glue of the Cold War, the Thai-U.S. alliance has long been adrift.
The U.S. ran a $45.6 billion trade deficit with Thailand in 2024. A straightforward surplus reduction for Thailand would involve buying more American goods. And what better way than to buy pricey American weapons? Trump’s all in on arms exports too, seeing how he just signed an executive order to fast-track these.
Thailand needs to import arms anyway, as establishing an indigenous defense industry remains a long-term undertaking. Moreover, because of the Thai-U.S. alliance’s security foundation, the Thai military has been trained the American way and naturally prefers advanced, combat-proven American weapons. Thailand’s gradual diversification of arms suppliers away from the U.S. – noticeable since the 1980s – is never really about concerns over the reliability of American firepower, but more about the burden of high costs, both financial and political, and the imperative of keeping strategic options open.
Over the past decade, the Thai military has increasingly turned to Chinese arms, which are more budget-friendly, less politically conditional, and well-suited to Thailand’s relatively low-threat security environment. The strategic context is nevertheless shifting, with China tightening its security grip on mainland Southeast Asia on land and at sea. While Thailand doesn’t necessarily see China as a threat in the way many U.S. allies do and is happy to keep purchasing Chinese weapons, the Thais want to preserve their strategic autonomy. They certainly don’t want Beijing uncomfortably close.
So, for Thai generals seeking to boost their American arsenal, now’s a favorable time. Meanwhile, from a public perspective, a counterbalance from America would be more welcome than ever. Of course, how much Thailand can buy would depend on its purchasing power and the appetite to rework its procurement strategy.
As expected, Thailand’s defense ministry is reportedly compiling a weapons wish list, which the government would then use as a potential talking point with Trump in the coming weeks. Curiously, however, Thailand’s publicly announced game plan is very murky on defense. In her first official statement following Trump’s “Liberation Day” declaration on April 2, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra talked about importing more American planes. Without specifics, it wasn’t clear whether she meant commercial or military planes, or both. A more elaborate Thai framework for talks with Trump, unveiled by Finance Minister Pichai Chunhavajira a week after the initial shock, is also muted on defense. Beyond tax relaxation on over 100 American goods, non-tariff barrier reduction, and stricter transshipment controls, Thailand’s push to import more from and invest more in the U.S. zeroes in on agricultural products, livestock, and energy.
The downplaying of defense likely reflects the ruling Pheu Thai party’s stance. Not only does it have a complicated relationship with the Thai armed forces – a former enemy of the military, it is now bound to it by a fragile alliance of political convenience – but its policy platform is centered on tangible economic wins for the people. Weapons deals don’t exactly fit the narrative.
Thai military leaders, for their part, know that the U.S. won’t offer top-notch weapons, not when Thailand is still good friends with China. The Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF)’s past attempt to acquire the F-35, America’s most advanced fighter, tells the story. The RTAF wanted a dozen of these. The U.S. said no, obviously concerned that sensitive technology could be exposed to China, and instead offered newer variants of the F-16. The RTAF then opted for Sweden’s Gripen E/F fighters over America’s F-16 Block 70/72 last August. All that happened under Joe Biden’s presidency, which, despite its toughness on China, was more restrained than the full-throttle hawkishness and zero-sum energy coming now from Trump’s team.
Since the Gripen contract has yet to be finalized, there are already murmurs of a possible reversal back to the F-16, scoring points from America but risking Thai credibility in the eyes of Europe. Would that be a good bet going forward? The Trump phenomenon is catalyzing Europe toward rearmament and greater strategic independence. If sustained, Europe could really emerge as a credible third path for Thailand and other nations trying to tread carefully between Washington and Beijing.
In seeking to purchase more U.S. weapons as a way to narrow Thailand’s trade surplus, the budget-conscious Thai armed forces may be compelled to ditch or delay deals with local contractors. This, as opposed to foreign deals, would undoubtedly offer a more diplomatically convenient path for Thailand. But it would mean hitting pause on the development of Thailand’s own defense industry.
Making defense an explicit part of the equation would ultimately drag Thailand into hard, uncomfortable debates over power and alignment, and that’s something Thai leaders have been keen to avoid. Seen this way, the moment defense becomes overt in talks with Trump could be the moment Thailand finds itself dangerously cornered.